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INTRODUCTION
After 1970, Iran under the Shah started acquiring 
most of the attributes of a major regional power in the 
Persian Gulf region. As compared with its neighbours, it 
had a relatively larger population, a better developed 
techno-industrial base and a higher oil production rate 
(second only to Saudi Arabia). After the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war, the excess of oil revenues as a result of the oil 
price increase was used to convert the Iranian oil wealth 
into a sizable military machine. This was mainly carried 
out through a rapid weapons acquisitions programme. Earlier, 
the strategic factors i.e. the announcement of Britain's 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in January 196 8 and the 
actual withdrawal in December 19 71 gave Iran an opportunity 
to fill the military vacuum by increasing its military strength. 
Thus by 1978 Iran had achieved an almost unchallenged status 
as the principal power in the Persian Gulf. This was mainly 
because:
(1) It possessed armed forces (army, navy and air­
force) which were both quantitatively and qualitatively 
superior to those of most countries in the Persian 
Gulf.
(2) No country in the Persian Gulf (or even the 
Middle East except Israel) since World War II had 
developed and maintained such deep-rooted political, 
economic and strategic links with the United States.
(3) It made itself responsible for the overall 
protection and security of the Gulf region, 
particularly in safe-guarding the free passage of oil
through the Persian Gulf to Western Europe, Japan,
South Africa and Israel. On this unimpeded flow of
oil depended the economic and ultimately the political 
health of these countries.
(4) It took a leading role in the forging of regional 
security moves in the Persian Gulf and on few occasions 
employed its armed forces as protector of the regional 
status quo and a counterpoise to emerging radical 
regimes.
(5) On the economic front, it embarked on financial 
aid giving programmes to countries in the Persian Gulf, 
the Middle East and even the Indian sub-continent; 
politically it exerted an invisible but a palpable 
presence behind the governments that favoured a moderate 
solution to Middle East problems.
(6) As the monarch of an oil rich state, the Shah's 
pronouncements were heeded by world statesmen. These 
pronouncements ranged from an international scheme for 
the price-indexing of developing countries' primary 
commodities, to support for proposals of regional 
economic cooperation, Third World demands for a new 
international economic order, and the future pricing 
of oil.
The purpose of this study is to examine the growth and 
development of Iran as a regional military power from 19 70 
till the end of 19 78. Although the main focus are these 
eight years, the study is carried forward into the first 
quarter of 19 79 due to the momentous development in Iran,
2
3i.e. the Islamic Revolution which led to the overthrow of 
the monarchy. The emphasis is exclusively on 'the military 
aspect rather than the economic, though the development 
in the former could not have been possible without the latter. 
Before going into the summary of different chapters, an 
explanation of certain key terms frequently used in the 
study may be useful.
The region to which Iran is viewed as belonging is 
the (Persian) Gulf sub-system. The 'boundaries of the 
Persian Gulf sub-system are demarcated by the outer limits 
of all those states that border the Persian Gulf: Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Abu Dhabi, 
Sharjah and Dubai. The 'elements' of this sub-system are 
those which result from the interactions of the states 
mentioned, and the global or trans-national inter-actions 
of actors who exert considerable influence in the region, 
e.g. the superpowers, multinational oil companies, revolut­
ionary movements such as the Omani rebels, and nations- 
without-states such as the Kurds, Palestinians and Baluchis.
'Power' in the Persian Gulf region is viewed as 
primarily 'military power' although it assumes the presence 
of an economic base from which this 'military power' is 
ultimately derived.
The thesis is divided into the following six chapters:
Chapter I deals with the sources and types of threat 
perceptions which Iran experienced under the Shah.
Chapter II describes the rapid growth and modernization 
undertaken by the Shah for the Iranian armed forces (army,
4navy and airforce). A section also discusses the nuclear 
programme. The chapter also takes into account the military 
capability desired and ultimately achieved.
Chapter III analyses the projection of military strength 
of Iran across its borders: the forcible occupation of three 
islands in the Persian Gulf and sustained military inter­
vention in Oman. Finally, the main motivations behind these 
military moves and the reasons for success are considered.
Chapter IV explores the Iran-U.S. military relationship 
and the evolution of U.S. military programmes in Iran; the 
U.S. military presence; and the diverse political, economic 
and strategic interests that brought both of them together.
Chapter V attempts a critique of the Shah's threat 
perceptions and his huge armament programme. In addition, 
other arguments justifying the Shah's military buildup are 
brought under scrutiny.
Chapter VI reviews in detail the events in Iran 
(1978-79) when Iran faced the Revolution leading to the 
overthrow of the monarchy. The chapter brings into focus 
the main sources of 'internal threat' to the Shah; the 
role and conduct of the military during the mass upsurge; 
the new perceptions regarding security by post-revolutionary 
Iran, and the politico-strategic implications of the Revolution 
in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
In brief this study attempts to describe how 
the Shah goaded by geo-political incentives, encouraged by 
vast financial resources, and inspired by a vision of 
launching Iran into an age of 'Great Civilization', set upon
5an ambitious course to see its greatness reflected as a 
regional power in the area. In this quest for 'greatness' 
he seemed to approve of the sentiments once expressed by 
another self-confident monarch, Frederick the Great of 
Prussia: 'Do not forget the great guns that are the most 
respectable argument of the rights of Kings'.
CHAPTER I
IRAN'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
UNDER THE SHAH
6Introduction
After the 197 3 Arab-Israeli war, Iran under the Shah 
embarked upon a hectic military buildup programme. The 
sheer size and rapidity of this massive buildup seemed to 
suggest that Iran was primarily motivated by grave threats 
to its national security. This theme of national insecurity 
becomes apparent from the various speeches and statements 
of the Shah. In these he frequently referred to 'different 
threats' posed to Iran from across the borders.
In this chapter an attempt is made to identify the 
various sources and types of threats to Iran as perceived 
by the Shah.
Threat to the Oil
Till 1978 Iran had the world's fourth biggest oil 
reserves (approximately 60 billion barrels) after Saudi 
Arabia, U.S.S.R. and Kuwait and was the fourth biggest 
producer after the U.S.S.R., Saudi Arabia and U.S.A.
It was the second biggest exporter and in normal times 
nearly six million barrels of oil daily left the Persian 
Gulf’*' terminals. Iran then obtained over eighty per cent
 ^ The term 'Persian Gulf' is controversial. While some 
of the Arab countries have tried to rename it as the 
'Arabian Gulf', it is used here as the 'Persian Gulf' for 
historical reasons. For the purpose of this study it is 
used to include Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
(cont' d)
7of her foreign exchange reserves from oil exports. The
total Gulf oil approximating 30 million barrels a day
passed through the Straits of Hormuz, supplying 70 per cent
of Western Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's requirements.
The most tangible threat to Iran concerned the vulnerability
3of her oil economy. According to the Shah,
the Persian Gulf and the Straits of
Hormuz in truth constitute Iran's
life line. If this area were in any way ^
threatened our very life would be endangered.
1 (cont'd)
The Persian Gulf extends from the Hormuz Straits sweeping 
in a north-westerly direction, all the way to Iraq. It is 
about 800 kilometres long from the Hormuz Straits to the 
Karun River; about 180-250 kilometres wide and has an 
approximate area of 250,000 square kilometres. Its depth is 
about 100 metres, at its deepest near the Straits, but due 
to the Karun River which deposits about 725 million cubic 
metres of alluvial silt every year, the north-western tip of 
the Gulf is becoming shallower every year, and the area of 
the Gulf is shrinking. The delta moves forward at an average 
annual rate of 5 3 metres. The important islands in the Gulf 
are Hormuz, Qishm, Larak, Kish, Kharg and the Greater and 
Lesser Tumbs. (See Iran Almanac 1976 and book of faots, 
Fifteenth Edition, Tehran: Echo of Iran, July 1976 , p.60.)
2
The Guarfoan, 12 November 1978,
3 . . .According to the National Iranian Oil Company, the exports
earned by Iran during 1974 accrued to the tune of $20 billion - 
a sum greater than the total earnings from oil exports during 
the previous 65 years. A $65 billion development project 
designed for completion in five years was launched. It is 
the oil exports and imports worth around $7 billion a year 
that make the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian 
Sea and the sea lanes leading into the Indian Ocean vitally 
important to Iran's growth and survival. (Amir Taheri, 
'Policies of Iran in the Persian Gulf Region' in Abbas Amirie 
(ed.), The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International 
Politics , Tehran: Institute for International Political 
and Economic Studies, 1975, pp.259-260.)
4 . .The Shah m  an interview with the Saudi Arabian newspaper
Aukaz as quoted in Kayhan International (Weekly English 
edition), 5 June 1976.
Iran's oil was thought to be vulnerable to different 
forms of threats at various points in the oil flow cycle 
i.e. the oil fields, the collecting system, the local 
terminal facilities and the oil sea lanes along which the 
supertankers transhipped the oil to Europe, Asia, North 
America, Israel and South Africa. Although Iran's 
responsibility ended after its territorial waters, safe 
sea lanes in the north-western half of the Indian Ocean 
remained her major security concern.
As far as the oil fields are concerned, the most
important of them are located in the foothills of the Zagros
Mountains in the southwest of the country at the head of
the Persian Gulf. Due to the hilly terrain, these oil
fields were not considered as vulnerable as the major Saudi
oil fields or other targets in the oil cycle, although
they are close to the Iraqi border. There was, however,
a perception of an ever present danger of sabotage and
Iraqi airstrikes threatening the oil wells and the oil
field pumps, although it was difficult for Iraq or any
other adversary to occupy these fields without mounting a
major military offensive.
i noThe collect4*/G system (pipelines and pumps) and local 
terminal facilities were also deemed more vulnerable to 
the disruption of the oil cycle. The major refineries 
are located at Abadan on the Shatt-al-Arab waterway 
adjacent to Iraq, at Kerman Shah, a little over ’one hundred 
miles from the Iraqi border, and at Tehran. The collecting 
system was thought to be vulnerable to air attacks as 
the refineries stood within Iraqi artillery range.
9Moreover, Iran's neighbours, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Iraq,
had alternative routes for exporting their oil through
pipelines to the Mediterranean while Iran did not. All
of its oil exports and incoming imports had to be shipped
through the Persian Gulf. In anticipation of increased
production, it had become necessary to construct additional
terminal facilities. In 1959, commercial and strategic
considerations necessitated the construction of terminal
facilities on the island of Kharg, about 30 miles off the
Iranian mainland, which today is the largest and most up
to date terminal in the world. Hence, the necessity to
safeguard these terminal facilities, which were an enormous
enterprise, also accounted for Iran's vigilance in the
5Persian Gulf.
The other threats related to the sea lanes and the
oil tankers as they sailed from Kharg island down to the 
Persian Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz into the 
Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The 
Straits are an important choke point along the route linking
£
the Persian Gulf with the Sea of Oman. No wonder its 
protection and free passage became a pervading security 
obsession with Iran. They were termed as Iran's 'jugular 
vein' and the Shah had said that Iran would stamp out
For further information also see R.M. Burrell, 'The Persian 
Gulf', The Washington Papers, Vol.l, New York: The Library 
Press, 1972, p.21.
 ^ The width of the narrowest section of the Strait is
21 nautical miles. For a comparison of principal straits 
and channels in the Indian Ocean region see Ferenc A. Vali,
Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power, 
New York: The Free Press, 1976, pp.265-266.
10
any terrorists threatening the Straits of Hormuz even if 
the Persian Gulf countries from which they operated did 
not consent to Iran's intervention. In another interview 
with the West German weekly Die Zeit he also said that Iran 
would prefer to take action against the terrorists at the
7country's own request if they faced such a problem.
According to the Shah's threat scenario, the Straits
gcould pose two types of identifiable problems. The deep 
water channel could be mined and the plying tankers could 
be threatened or attacked in several ways. The tankers 
were vulnerable to artillery and missile attack from the 
9land, attacks from submarines and surface ships which 
could use a variety of weapons, including mines, torpedoes, 
missiles, guns and frogmen. In short, the existence of 
a choke point such as Hormuz presented, supposedly, a 
number of opportunities and temptations to would-be attackers 
which were less readily available at other points. Perhaps 
the most important contingency was that they could be mined 
either from the sea or the air.^^ However, unlike certain 
other strategic straits such as the Straits of Tiran leading
7
Kayhan International, 4 May 1972.
o See United States Senate, U.S. Military Sales to Iran - 
A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 2nd 
Session, July 1976, p.9. (Hereafter referred to as U.S.
Military Sales to Iran,)
9 It was feared that if Baluchistan and Oman, two trouble- 
prone areas adjoining the Gulf of Oman, came under a radical 
government's control, a serious threat would be posed to 
the maritime traffic in the area.
^  U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p.9.
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into the Gulf of Eilat or Bab el Mandeb or the Jubal Straits 
leading into the south and north end of the Red Sea, it 
is impossible to block Hormuz by sinking a 
tanker in the navigation channel.
It was also apprehended that after crossing through
the Straits of Hormuz, the oil tankers were again exposed
to a new type of threat. This threat, however, was rated
as diffuse as the tankers sailed through the Sea of Oman
and proceeded into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
In the Indian Ocean they bifurcated; some bore to the east
and sailed for Japan and East Asia; others, the majority,
proceeded around the Cape of Good Hope into the South
Atlantic and on to Europe and North America. Along these
two lanes of communication, different countries with
different political groups could pose varied problems.
It was felt by the Iranian leadership that potential threats
from these littoral states could not be ruled out. The
Kayhan International summed up this when it wrote:
By virtue of its vase communication 
lines and because of historic and 
geographic facts, whatever goes on in 
the Horn of Africa is of direct concern 
to Iran.12
It was probably with this potential threat in his mind 
that the Shah stated in November 19 7 4 that
This is because the Straits of Hormuz are fairly wide and deep 
and are not easily susceptible to physical obstruction.
Refer to No.6 above.
12 See Kayhan Internatvonal, Editorial, 7 January 1978.
12
Iran's peace keeping role not only 
covered the Persian Gulf and the 
nation's territorial waters but 
also extended to the Indian Ocean 
region.13
On another occasion, he declared:
We have no reason to be ashamed of 
our [military] presence in the 
Indian Ocean. We have our rights 
to the Ocean certainly more than 
any foreign power d o e s . 14
Hence, Iran's interest in the [East] African continent
also partly stemmed from the importance to Iran of secure
15sea routes along the Cape and the Horn of Africa. In
fact as early as 19 73, the Shah in an interview with
Newsweek emphasised the growing responsibility of Iran
towards securing these oil routes and mentioned:
We have not only national and 
regional responsibilities but 
also a world role as guardian and 
protector of 60 percent of the 
world's oil resources.16
This concern was further shown when a naval exercise
MIDLINK (sponsored by CENTO) was held in 1974 to demonstrate
strength in sea lanes carrying Persian Gulf oil to Western
17 . . .  . .countries. With this end m  view, Iran started building
1 The Shah, speaking at the ceremony marking the 42nd 
anniversary of the establishment of the Imperial Iranian 
Navy, ibid., 9 November 1974.
14 . .ibid., 4 May 1974. Shah speaking to a West German 
weekly Die Zeit.
15 ibid., 2 July 1977.
16 Shah's interview to Newsweek, 21 May 1973.
17 See T.B. Millar, 'The Military-Strategic Balance', in 
Abbas Amirie (ed.), The Persian Gulf and Indian Oeean in 
International Politics (Tehran: Institute for International, 
Political and Economic Studies, 1975), p.87.
13
a defence capability that would allow it to protect
tankers bound for Europe as far as the tenth parallel
18(i.e. just north of Malagasy). This increased
capability to protect came through extending the patrol
radius of Iranian Air Force to over 1,400 nautical miles
and the gaining of port facilities in Mauritius in return
19for economic assistance to that country. Furthermore,
Iran also considered the possibility of a triangular
arrangement for surveillance of the Indian Ocean jointly
with the participation of South Africa and Australia.
In February 1971, the Natref Oil Refinery at Sasolburg
was opened. Later the same year, Iran and South Africa
established diplomatic relations, and in early January
1973, the South African Consul General in Tehran, Mr J. Oxley,
said that Iran had been
quicker than many other Middle Eastern 
countries to appreciate the strategic 
position of South Africa and the 
essential value of South Africa in the 
aspect of protecting its vital westbound 
exports.20
Further evidence of cooperation and defence coordination 
was shown by the appointment of Lieutenant General Charles 
Fraser, the former officer commanding joint combat forces 
in South Africa, as South Africa's first Ambassador to
18 R.D.M. Furlong, 'Iran - a power to be reckoned with1,
International Defense Review, Geneva, Vol.6, No.6, December
1973, p.726.
19 R.M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, 'Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas', The Washington Papers,
Vol.11, No.20, Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications,
1974, pp.35-36.
20 ibid.
14
Tehran. While the response from South Africa to the idea
of joint surveillance of the Indian Ocean was quite warm,
the Whitlam government in Australia did not intend to
participate in any type of defence arrangements with that
government.^
Iran's stakes in the Persian Gulf were considered
greater than the other neighbouring Gulf states. This
was because of its large population, holding large reserves
of oil, great deposits of natural gas, and occupying the
entire northern boundary of the Persian Gulf and Sea of
Oman (about 1,950 kilometres), including the Straits of
22Hormuz.
According to Ramazani, the Iranian interests in the
2 3Gulf are-historical, economical and strategic.
21 The Australian government's attitude to South Africa was 
clearly demonstrated on the occasion of the 19th Commonwealth 
Conference in Ottawa from 2-10 August 19 7 3 when Prime Minister 
Whitlam took a strong and independent stance against South 
Africa's racist policies and minority rule; solidarity 
with the developing African and Asian countries and keeping 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. (See The Canberra Times,
10, 13 August 1973.)
For political reasons against co-operation with South 
Africa on the Indian Ocean security, also see T.B. Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), p.365.
22 Ahmad Ghoreyshi and Cyrus Elahi, 'Iran's Foreign Policy' 
in Jane W. Jacqz (ed), Iran: Past3 Present and Future,
New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976, 
p.377.
23 .See Rouholla K.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s
Role, Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1972.
15
It is claimed that the Achaeminian empire, which was founded 
by Cyrus the Great in 533 B.C. had recognised the vital 
importance of the Persian Gulf and gave special attention 
to the expansion of overseas commerce, acquisition of strong 
naval forces and merchant fleets, promotion of ship con­
struction, improvement in .navigational techniques, coastal 
surveys and maritime explorations^
Economically speaking, the area bordering the Persian 
Gulf is important. The triangle formed by Khorram Shahr, 
Govatar and Shiraz comprises a vast region equal in area to 
France. In this region live nearly 4 million Iranians 
whose livelihood directly or indirectly depends upon Iran's 
southern waters. It was estimated that the majority of 
Iran's population by the end of the century may be living
2 4 Mahmoud Faroughi, 'Iran and the Persian Gulf', Austral^an 
Outlook, Vol.31, April 1977, p.142. However, the above 
fact can be challenged on historical grounds. In the heyday 
of the Achaemfinian empire the naval activity was mainly 
in the Mediterranean Sea and not the Persian Gulf. Its 
overthrow by Alexander the Great and subsequent battles 
in India were through land routes and not by sea. This 
suggests that the Gulf itself, as opposed to the land routes 
between Persia, India and China was not so important as to 
be legitimately described as 'vital' during the Achaemfnian 
Empire. However, the Gulf assumed importance in ancient 
and classical times with active navigation between Mosopotamia 
and India; between the ninth and fifteenth centuries A.D. 
when Arab trade reached large proportions; in the sixteenth 
century with the Portuguese explorers; and in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries when the English and Dutch tried 
to establish trading monopolies in the Gulf. (See Iraq 
and the Persian Gulf, B.R. 524, Geographical Hand Book Series: 
Oxford sub-centre of the Naval Intelligence Division,
September 1944, p.127.)
16
in the southern half of the country. It was estimated
that Iran would invest about $30 billion in southern provinces
2 6during the coming eight years after 19 75. Moreover, the
Persian Gulf was increasingly becoming the focus of commercial
27and industrial development activity. Also, the heart of 
Iran's railway and transport network was moving southwards 
for better connection with the hinterland. Port congestion 
had become a serious problem and the extension of old and 
the construction of new ports were planned to take a heavy 
volume of traffic. The nation Vs rapidly growing province 
of Khuzestan was directly on the Persian Gulf while the
25
25 Iran's population is expected to reach 60 million by 
the end of this century. The port of Bandar Abbas on the 
Strait of Hormuz has had its population grow from less 
than 12,000 in 1960 to 200,000 in 1974. The Shah had 
said that Bandar Abbas would have a population of one million 
before the end of this current decade. In 19 74, something 
like 15,000 workers were brought infcthe coastal province of 
Khuzestan. (For details see Taheri, op.cit., p.260.)
2 7 For example, vast projects for tapping under ground 
water resources, huge desalination plants and nuclear 
generating plants were being planned on the Persian Gulf 
through foreign technical know-how. Also, of the four new 
direct reduction steel mills already planned, three were 
supposed to be in the Persian Gulf. Huge copper deposits, 
believed to be among the world's largest discoveries, 
were found near Kerman. Iran's petrochemical industries 
were also being exclusively sited on the Persian Gulf. The 
Gulf also brought to Iran an annual earning of $1 billion 
in export earnings from fish. (ibid., p.261.)
17
coastal provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan were tipped as
2 8the 'Khuzestans of the 1980s1.
Iran's interest in the Persian Gulf was also linked
to the people of Iranian origin, nearly a million living on
29the other side of the Persian Gulf. Many Iranian banks, 
businesses, schools and hospitals were opened in the Arab 
states of the Gulf. With the increasing affluence, resulting 
from oil wealth by the end of the 1960s, many Iranians 
had started emigrating back home from these states. And
since then, those who stayed abroad had begun to assert
. . 30their national identification with Iran more forcefully.
Strategically, the Iranian interest in the Gulf was
kindled when in July 195 8, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown
and replaced by a radical regime. This initial threat
to the monarchical principle and traditional regimes was
exacerbated when in the 1960s President Nasser engaged
first in a propaganda battle against traditional, that is
2 8 Baluchistan and Sistan, though one of the least developed 
regions of the country, comprised 11 per cent of total area 
with population of approximately 500,000 with density of 2.8 
persons per kilometre. The areas are rich in mineral 
resources and bear a good potential for handicraft and carpet 
industry. (For further details see Khosrow Mehrabi, 'Sistan- 
Baluchistan Week', Kayhan International, 15 December 1973.)
29 In Bahrain, for example, Iranians form a sophisticated 
and thriving community; in Kuwait they comprise one sixth 
of the total population; in Batinah sector of Oman they 
constitute a sizable section of bazar bourgeoisie and in 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirate they form a significant 
part of the total labour force. (Taheri, op.cit., p.261.)
30 . .ibid. Also see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
The Persian Gulf, 19 74: Money Politics3 Arms and Power3 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on The Near East and South 
Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress,
2nd Session, 30 July, 9, 7 and 12 August 1974, Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p.240.
18
'reactionary', regimes in the Arab world and Iran, and
later on, in an actual military battle against the religio-
loyalist forces in Yemen. This was followed by-a more active
role for Iran when in January 196 8 Britain announced its
intention to withdraw from the Gulf by 19 71. Iran was
concerned that the potential power vacuum should not invite
extra-regional powers. It wanted the Gulf states to assume
responsibility for the security of the Gulf and it was
prepared to do so either in concert with other Gulf states,
as it proposed in March 1970, or alone,when it forcefully
seized the strategic islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs
31in the strategic Straits of Hormuz in November 1971.
The Soviet Threat
The Shah perceived 'threat of encirclement' mainly from
32the Soviet Union. Iran shares its longest border with
the Soviet Union, i.e. about 2,500 kms. Most Iranians
regarded the Soviet Union as their most likely potential
adversary because of the past history of Iranian-Soviet
relations. It is no doubt a historical fact that modern
Iranian history has been largely shaped by the Great Powers
33pursuing their vested interests in the Middle East.
Until the early part of the 19th century, large portions
31 Further examined m  Chapter III.
 ^ U,S. News and World Report, 26 June 1978.
33 .For historical details see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russza
and Britain in Persia 169 4-1914, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968; and Tareq Y. Ismael, The Middle East in
World Polities, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1974 .
of bordering lands and areas, e.g. Caucasian provinces
(now well within Soviet boundaries) were under the Iranian
jurisdiction. In the early 20th century, the Russians
had invaded and occupied Iranian territory three times from
1909 to 1911, 1914 to 1918 and 1941 to 1946. Since the
1917 Revolution, the Russians have tried to establish
two separate Soviet republics, one in Mahabad and the
other in Azerbaijan. The Iranians vividly recall the
Soviet occupation of northern Iran in both wars and their
34refusal to evacuate till May 1946 after World War II.
With the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, the
Iranians believed that in the event of direct military
confrontation between the two countries, on their own they
would not stand a chance. Thus Iran's options for coping
with a Soviet direct attack were limited. The strategy
was to raise the threshold of Soviet attack by building
up its armed forces thus delaying the Soviet advance as
long as possible and then either accept defeat or hold out
35until the U.S. intervened. Iran's perceptions of threat
from the Soviet Union were great when Iran joined the
3 6Baghdad Pact in 19 55. Although there was an improvement 
in relations by the early 1960s, there was a growing 
apprehension leading to a climax in the years 1971-73.
34 . .Ahmad Ghoreyshi and Cyrus Elahi, op.cit., p.371.
35 . . .Shahram Chubin, Iran's Military Security zn the 19 80s,
The California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 
Discussion Paper No.73, California, September 1977, p.6.
3 6 This threat explained Iran's membership of CENTO, 
and its bilateral agreement with U.S.A. for help 
in the event of Soviet aggression.
20
The Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 resulted in the
dismemberment of Pakistan and led to the growth of a
separatist movement in Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistans;
the Soviet Union signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship
37and Co-operation with Iraq on 9 April 1972. In March 1973
Iraqi armed forces invaded Kuwaiti territory, threatening
to continue their advance unless Kuwait would be willing
to grant some territorial concessions, which included
handing over the islands of Warhah and Bubiyan (off the
3 8port of Umm Qasr) to Iraq. Also, border clashes between 
Iraq and Iran flared with greater frequency and the Kurds 
(Iraqi and Iranian) became restless. In July 1973, the 
regime of king Mohammad Zahir Shah was overthrown in
37 Articles 8 and 9 of this treaty were exclusively concerned 
with mutual assistance and co-operation in defence.
3 8 The degree of Soviet involvement in the incident, 
however, remains uncertain; but the fact that the then 
Vice-President of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council,
Siddam Hussein Takriti, flew to Moscow the day before the 
invasion, and the fact that the Soviet naval C-in-C Admiral
S.G. Gorshkov arrived in Baghdad suddenly on 3 April, were 
not lost on Tehran. In reality, the U.S.S.R. did not approve 
of the irresponsible action of Iraq. Not only were most Arab 
countries, including Syria, opposed to the Iraqi action, but 
Saudi Arabia and Iran actually threatened to take actiontagainst 
the Iraqis and moved troops near the Kuwaiti border. Admiral 
Gorshkov's visit was connected to Soviet attempts to 
augment their presence in Iraq but was utilized to influence 
the Iraqis to adopt a more reasonable stance. The Soviet 
endeavour to convince Iraq not to force a confrontation 
upon her neighbours became even more apparent in the 
discussions held during Brezhnev's visit to the United States 
in June and from Soviet activity and efforts in the Gulf 
proper to prevent an escalation of the situation. (See 
A. Yodfat and M. Abir, In the Divection of the Persian Gulf:
The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, London: Frank Cass 
and Co., 1977, pp.86-87.)
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Afghanistan and the war in Dhofar continued to challenge
the Sultan of Oman's rule through outside military and
moral support. More recently, the April 19 78 coup in
Afghanistan and the Soviet-Cuban operations in the Horn
of Africa had magnified the Iranian fears of the Soviet
'encirclement'. In all these developments, the Shah saw
39the guiding hand of the Soviet Union. According to
39 See, for example, the Shah's interview with Arnaud de 
Borchgrave, 'Tea with the Shah', Newsweek, 20 November 1978. 
The exaggerated Iranian fears are sometimes attributed to 
previous 'Russian aggrandisement' at its expense and the 
Soviet desire, expressed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop talks 
of November 19 40, that the area south of Batum and Baku in 
the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be 
recognised as a centre of Soviet aspirations. However, 
the truth is that a secret protocol to a draft agreememt 
between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union was 
in fact prepared by the Germans. The protocol defined the 
spheres of the territorial aspirations of each participant 
as 'apart from the territorial revision in Europe to be 
carried out at the Conclusion of Peace'. Accordingly, 
Germany's 'territorial aspirations centre in the territories 
of Central Africa'? Japan's 'in the area of Eastern Asia 
to the south of the Island Empire of Japan'. The Soviet 
Union 'declares that its territorial aspirations centre south 
of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction 
of the Indian Ocean'. (See Raymond J. Sohtag and James S. 
Beddie (eds), Nazi-Soviet Relations3 1939-19413 Documents 
from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington: 
Dept, of State, 1948, p.257.)
Apparently the draft was the topic of a conversation 
between Molotov and the German Ambassador in Moscow, von 
Schulenburg, on 26 November 1940. Von Schulenburg reported 
to the German Foreign Office that Molotov stated that the 
Soviet government was prepared to accept the draft of the 
Four Power Pact on the following conditions:
(1) 'The establishment of a base for land and naval forces 
of the U.S.S.R. with the range of the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease' in the Turkish 
Straits.
(2) 'Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in 
the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised 
as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union'.
(ibid., pp.258-259. Two other conditions related to Finland 
and Japan.)
(cont'd)
22
the Shah's perceptions, the Soviet Union would regard a
pro-Moscow regime in Iran as definitely advantageous.
Firstly, it would change the balance of forces and give
40her a tremendous advantage over the U.S. and China.
39 (cont'd)
Though the German proposals were supposed to distract 
attention from Europe, the Soviets remained attentive to 
Europe, perceiving that their main interest lay there rather 
than in the Middle East. Hitler decided to discontinue 
negotiations with them, and a month later, on 18 December 
1940, he issued his 'Operation* Barbarossa' order to attack 
the Soviet Union (ibid., pp.260-264).
It should be noted that a great number of Western and 
Iranian history books that deal with that period describe 
in detail the parts of those German-Soviet negotiations 
that refer to the Middle East, but most of them refer to 
the German proposals as though they were Soviet ones, ignoring 
the unsuccessful German attempts to distract Soviet attention 
from Europe to the Middle East.
40 There was a marked identity of views between Iran and 
China on various issues. In June 1973, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Chi Peng-fei visited Tehran and expressed support 
for Iran's military buildup. In return the Shah had stated 
that any collective security discussion in Asia must include 
China. Peking had also expressed support for the Iranian 
view that the security of the Persian Gulf area should be 
left to the littoral states themselves. Both Peking and 
Tehran were believed to have given tacit approval to plans 
for the approval of expansion of the U.S. facilities at 
Diego Garcia. Neither of them wanted to see a super power 
naval race develop in the Indian Ocean but neither did they 
want (as the majority littoral states of the Gulf) the 
Soviet Union to gain an exclusive naval dominance in the 
area. The Iranian-Chinese relations were further reinforced 
when Chairman Hua Kuo-feng visited Iran from 29 August to
1 September 1978. His visit ended with the signing of a 
cultural agreement and detailed talks on co-operation in 
science and technology. It is also said that the mutual 
discussions covered the regional talks on Gulf security which 
have been stalled since November 1976. (See Burrell and 
Cottrell, op.cit., p.37; Tehran Radio, 31 August 1978, 
quoted in the American Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS), Middle East (ME), 31 August 1978, pp.Rl-R2, New 
China News Agency (Peking) in English, 2 September 19 78, 
quoted in FBIS(PRC), 7 September 1978, pp.A23-A25; and
D.L. Price, 'Moscow and the Persian Gulf', Problems of 
Communism, March-April 1979, Vol.XXVIII, pp.12-13.
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Secondly, it would grant Moscow control over Iran's
41petroleum resources. And thirdly, it would give her 
control over sea lanes with an immediate access to the 
Indian Ocean.
The Arab Threat
Iran also perceived a threat from the West. This was
because of potential and existing military rivalries with
the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially Iraq
42and Saudi Arabia. Before Iran reached the political accord
with Iraq, the relations between the two countries were
poor, often leading to open hostilities. Iran's fears
were heightened with the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of 6 April 1972.
This was followed by visits of Soviet naval ships to the
43Iraqi ports of Umm Qasr and Basra. With the Soviet supply 
of military hardware to Iraq the tension along the borders 
of the two countries increased. To take an example, between 
October 1972 and May 1974 there were at least 10 major
Although the Soviet Union is the world's leading producer 
of petroleum and coal, it faces the risk of fuel shortage 
when (along with its allies) it would meed to import about 
100 million tons of oil annually by 1980. (For example, see 
Boris Rochkov, 'The Russian Stake in the Middle East',
New Middle East, No.8, May 1969, pp.36-37. Also read Yodfat, 
op.cit., pp.1-20.
42 Although Iran had reached political accord with Iraq over 
the Shatt al Arab river dispute in March 19 75, a durable 
pattern of friendly relations could not be predicted. Iraq 
had often been termed as a 'political maverick1 of the Arab 
world.
43 Contrary to Iran's threat perceptions, most of these visits 
were made by the Soviet oil tankers and not warships. (For 
details see Australia and the Indian Ocean Region - Report 
from the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1976), Appendix A, pp.211-235.
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exchanges of fire, with greatest concentration between
December 1973 and April 1974. In February 1974, 41 Iranians
were reported killed in a battle at Badra, some 100 miles
east of Baghdad. Later in the same month, over 60 Iranians
and 20 Iraqis were killed in another flare-up. In March,
a battle at Tangeb resulted in 56 Iraqi deaths, and fighting
continued during the visit of Dr Luis Munuz; the person
44chosen by the U.N. to resolve the border issue.
The Iranian fears were further raised when Iraqi forces
invaded Kuwait in March 19 73, ostensibly to gain control
of the two islands of Bubiyan and Warba, which dominate
the approaches to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. In fact,
the whole idea behind building the port of Umm Qasr was
to reduce the Iraqi navy's dependence on Basra, only 2 0 miles
up the Shatt al-Arab, which might become unusuable in the
event of a war with Iran. The Iraqis have always regarded
Kuwait as an artificial British creation and have been making
historical claims for annexation since 1961 (the latter's
independence). This was on the ground that Kuwait was
45included m  the 'Wilayat' of Basra in the Turkish
empire before the creation of Iraq as an
46independent state. Soon after the incident
44 Burrell and Cottrell, op.cit., p.5.
45 'Wilayats' were administrative units under the Ottomans.
46 R.P. Owen, 'the rebellion in Dhofar - a threat to 
Western interests in the Gulf', The World Today, Vol.29,
June 1973, p.267.
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the Shah categorically mentioned that Iran would not
tolerate Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and renewed Iraqi attack
. . . 47would ensure Iranian military involvement.
Iraq had given support to subversive movements in
the region. At one time or the other, Iraq supported many
subversive movements giving credence to the theory that it
had taken over Egypt's former role of 'exporting revolution
4 8in the area'. Iran viewed with particular alarm these
subversive and terrorist movements which aimed at Khuzestan,
Baluchistan and the Gulf area.
In spite of the political accord of March 1975 and
49Iraq's moderating policies afterwards, a lingering distrust
4 7 The London Times, 1 April 1974. At present Iraq does not 
maintain effective control of the two islands, although it 
has periodically placed police on Warbah. Kuwait has, 
however, refrained from garrisoning the islands and offered 
to lease the islands to Iraq while retaining Kuwaiti 
sovereignty over them. (See U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, Review of Recent Developments in the Middle 
East, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East of the Committee on International Relations,
95th Congress, 1st Session, 8 June 1977, Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977, p.101.)
4 8 Some of the movements which were supported by Iraq were 
the Palestine Revolution Political Committee, the Iranian 
national front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Arabistan (Khuzestan), the Kurdistan Democratic Party of 
Iran, the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan'- 
(Pakistani and Iranian), the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, the Eritrean Liberation Front, 
the Front for the Liberation of Chad, and the United Front 
for the Liberation of West Somalia. {Al Nahar Weekly Arab 
Report, 28 January 1974 as cited in Burrell and Cottrell, 
o p .cit., p .7.)
49 For a reassessment of Iraq's policies see J.P. Smith,
'Iraq Starts Changing Its Tune', The Guardian, 20 August
1978, pp.15-16.
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remained on both sides. This distrust was reflected
in the Shah's reply to a correspondent whether Iran,
in spite of its acquisition of the sophisticated weaponry,
was not 'crying wolf' . According to the Shah, the Iraqis
had the surface-to-surface SCUD missiles and the chances
51of a surprise attack on Iran still remained.
In fact, Iran's greatest fears of Iraq's design
emanated from Iraq's strong links with Moscow, particularly
. . 52in the field of military co-operation.
Iran's relations with its other Arab neighbours were
also far from friendly. The foci of misunderstandings
between Iranians and Arabs span a broad spectrum and are
50 For example, even after the March Agreement the Society 
for the Defence of the Arabism of the 'Arabian Gulf' 
established a representative office in Basra, which was 
responsible for spreading [revolution] throughout the 
Persian Gulf (Kayhan International, 30 July 1977).
^  The Shah's interview to Tribune correspondent in Tehran 
as published in Kayhan International, 19 November 1977.
5 2 .Since 1972, Iraq and the Soviet Union have enjoyed a
treaty of friendship and cooperation intended to remain in
force for 15 years. For 20 years, Moscow had supplied
90 per cent of Iraq's defence hardware needs. Among
Iraq's trading partners, the Soviet Union ranked sixth
as supplier and seventh as customer (non-oil). See David
Lynn Price, 'Moscow and the Persian Gulf', Problems of
Communism, Vol.XXVIII, March-April 1979, pp.1-13. Also
see Kayhan International of 23 October 1976 regarding an
arms agreement signed on 17 August 19 76 between Iraq and
the Soviet Union.
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rooted in past history. Iran nursed grievances against
various Ar.ab states, who for the past 15 years had been
espousing irredentist claims against Iran. For example,
54Syria and Egypt launched the 'Arabian Gulf' campaign 
in the 1960s in an effort to rename the Persian Gulf when 
President Nasser began his Pan-Arabism. Since then Arab 
radical groups had been increasing their criticism over 
Iranian 'hegemonic designs' in the Persian Gulf 
area. Libya's Colonel Qaddafi once called the Persian 
Gulf a 'second Palestine'.55 Saudi Arabia, a conservative
power, had often expressed displeasure at Iran's contacts 
with Israel. In spite of common perceptions about 
preservation of monarchies, reliance upon the West and
53
5 3 . .The m a m  irritants between the Arabs and Iranians were
the religious and ethnic cleavages; (the Iranians belong
to the Shiite sect while the Arabs are mostly Sunni Muslims.
Ethnically the Iranians consider themselves Aryans and hence
distinct from the Arabs); the language differences; still
undemarcated maritime boundaries with the Gulf states;
Iran's occupation of 3 islands near the Strait of Hormuz;
Iran's trade and diplomatic relations with Israel and the
dominant military role acquired in the Persian Gulf region.
54 Syrian geography and history texts depicted the Iranian 
province of Khuzestan (called Arabestan) as an Arab territory 
forcefully occupied by Iran. (Kayhan International, 30 July
1977.)'
55 Qaddafi had strongly denounced what he termed as Iran's 
occupation of the southern section of the Arab peninsula 
and called for concerted action by non-aligned nations 
against Iran at the non-aligned summit meeting in Colombo 
1976 . (ibid., 28 August 1976.)
28
deep distrust of pro-Moscow forces in the area, the points
of difference between Iran and Saudi Arabia were
5 6significant.
The Threat from the East and the Southeast
Iran under the Shah perceived yet another source of
threat from its eastern neighbour, Afghanistan. The
threat perceptions intensified from the fact that the
Afghan army was Soviet trained and equipped with Soviet
arms, that the Soviet Union was one of the first countries
to grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime in Kabul
57m  July 1973 and April 1978 coups. Also, the Soviet 
Union's aid to Afghanistan had exceeded that of all other 
donors combined. Although Iran and Afghanistan in recent
The major points of difference between the economic and 
political roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran stemmed from the 
following facts. Saudi Arabia has the world's largest 
proven reserves of oil (130 billion barrles) with only 6.5 
million population. Enormous oil revenues are left surplus 
and invested abroad. Saudi Arabia is not keen to embark 
on a crash modernization programme like Iran, for fear 
of upsetting political stability. By contrast, Iran's oil 
reserves (65 million barrels) cater for a relatively larger 
population of approximately 37 million. Iran desperately 
needed oil revenues for its ambitious development plans 
launched by the Shah. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was less 
interested in raising oil prices whereas Iran wanted a rise 
in prices due to its diminishing oil reserves and increasing 
rate of inflation. The OPEC Conferences since 1975 had 
demonstrated these differences between the two countries. 
(For details see Mehrdad Khonsari, 'Differing goals draw 
Iran-Saudi oil policies closer', Kayhan International,
30 April 1978.)
57 . . . . .The first country to accord diplomatic recognition in
July 1973 was India.
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years (1973-76) had tried to improve their relations
5 8through promotion of economic co-operation, yet Iran's
fears over Afghanistan related to Afghanistan’s claim
59of Pukhtoonistan, which was assumed to affect Iran's 
security.
5 8 In February 1974, Iran and Afghanistan signed a common 
agreement. In May, the then President Daud sent his brother 
Sardar Mohammad Naim to Tehran for improving political 
relations because of a border incident in which 70 Afghans 
were reported killed. There were talks in May about granting 
landlocked Afghanistan a duty-free export outlet in the 
southern coast of Iran. A pact was signed over sharing 
of Hirmand river waters between the two countries on 13 
March 1973 and ratified in 1975. There were also pledges 
by Iran to offer financial and technical grant to Afghanistan. 
(For details see Burrell and Cottrell, op.cit., pp.42-43 and 
Kayhan International, 4 June 1977, and 21 June 1978.)
59 The Pukhtoonistan issue is concerned with Pathans, a 
people who exist on both sides of the Durand Line, the 
boundary between British India and Afghanistan established 
in November 189 3. Pakistan inherited the border on the 
partition of British India in 1947 but the Afghan government 
has reportedly claimed the non-validity of this line as 
dividing the people who wish to be united. Pathans in 
Afghanistan number about 7.5 million (about 40% of the 
total population) and about one third of them are nomadic 
or semi-nomadic. Pathans represent only 13% of the 
population of Pakistan and although they resent the Punjabi 
domination of Pakistan, there is little evidence that they 
want to opt out of Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the Pathans 
provide the politico-military elite of the country and 
are keen to increase their number as well as strengthen 
their power and sense of identity. The Afghan leadership 
has never defined the exact boundaries of the proposed 
'Pukhtoonistan state1. Probably the existence of rich 
minerals and securing an outlet to the Arabian Sea are 
the main motives behind Afghanistan's claim of Pukhtoonistan. 
(For details see P.I. Cheema, 'Irredentism and Afghanistan's 
claim for "Pakhtoonistan1, Scrutiny, Islamabad, Vol.IV,
No.3, 1978, pp.63-70.)
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The province of Baluchistan (in Pakistan) was also
considered a potential trouble spot. The province is
bordered by Iran in the West and Afghanistan to the north.
The province shares nearly 500 miles of border with Iran
6 0and is sparsely populated. The Baluchi demand for 
more autonomy from the central government in Pakistan 
had become more pronounced since the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan War. Pressures from the Shah also contributed
directly to the heavy-handed posture against local autonomy
assumed by former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. When the elected state government in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan resisted political and economic
controls by the central government in early 197 3, Bhutto,
prodded by the Shah, ousted the state cabinet, imprisoned
the principal Baluch leaders on sedition charges, imposed
emergency central rule, and sent 70,000 troops to the
61province to quell Baluch insurgency. It is estimated that 
nearly 55,000 Baluch were fighting in late 1974, some 11,500 
of them in organized, hard-core units. At least 3,300 
Pakistani military men and 5,300 Baluch guerrillas as well
6 0 Baluchistan comprises 40% of the territory of Pakistan.
It is estimated that nearly 5 million Baluch tribesmen 
live in the inaccessible mountain and desert country of 
western Pakistan, eastern Iran, and southern Afghanistan, 
an area that stretches for nearly 750 miles along the 
Arabian Sea and the Sea of Oman. (Selig S. Harrison, 
'Nightmare in B a l u c h i s t a n Foreign Policy, No.32, Fall 1978, 
p.137.)
61 ibid., p.138.
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as hundreds of women and children caught in the cross­
fire, were killed during the four-year war. A total of 
178 major engagements and another 167 lesser incidents 
during thsinsurgency are said to have taken place.
Due to this turmoil, Iran feared that the insurgency may 
spill over into the neighbouring Iranian Baluchistan. 
Historically, the Iranian Baluchis have been an unimportant 
tribal group living in a backwater province far from 
Tehran. But the province is contiguous to the Gulf of 
Oman which links Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. In a 
world acutely dependent on oil and in which over half of 
the world's oil reserves were concentrated in the Persian
Gulf area, Iranian Baluchistan was accorded high strategic
6 3value by the Shah's regime.
Iran also believed that a rebel movement inspired 
by Iraq or Russia may attempt to inspire such a degree 
of dissension in Iranian Baluchistan that it co.uld lead to 
the dismemberment of the Baluchi province within Pakistan 
and thus create problems on Iran's eastern borders.
 ^^ ibid., p .139.
6 3 Sistan and Baluchistan, one of the least developed 
regions comprise 11% of Iran's total area with a population 
of approximately 500,000. The provincial capital is 
Zahidan and a strategic north to south road connecting 
Zahidan to the port of Cha Bahar, (a tri-service defence 
installation) on the Sea of Oman, was nearing completion. 
(Mehrabi, op.cit., p.8.)
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This could in turn act as a base for infiltration and 
sabotage among Iranian Baluchi tribes. Already involved 
in the Persian Gulf region via his intervention in Oman 
against the Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf 
(PFLOAG),the Shah did not wish for either a 'second front' 
in Baluchistan or difficulties in Pakistan. A fundamental 
tenet of Iranian security policy had been the territorial
integrity of Iran's Muslim but non-Arab neigbours,
64 . .i.e. Pakistan and Turkey. In the wake of the 1971 crisis
and Pakistan's dismemberment, the southeastern borders
emerged as an area of special concern to Iran. For
Iran, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 demonstrated the
ineffectiveness of military alliance and bilateral agreements
with the U.S. as a measure to ensure national security.
The then Prime Minister Hoveyda commenting on this aspect
voiced Iran's fears by saying:
Pakistan, an ally of the U.S. through 
two multinational and one bilateral 
treaty, has been attacked and dismembered 
without as much as ’a ripple of serious 
protest. There is no reason why Pakistan's 
plight should be treated as an isolated case 
that could not be repeated elsewhere in the 
region.65
64 For Iran's great interest in Pakistan's security under 
the Shah read Mohammed Ayoob, 'Indo-Iranian Relations: 
Strategic, Political and Economic Dimensions', India 
Quarterly, January-March 1977, p.8.
As cited by C.L. Sulzberger, 'It's everyone for Himself',
The New York Times, 9 February 1972.
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Even before the 1971 crisis, Iran attached great
importance to Pakistan's security in its strategic planning.
In September 1965 and December 1971, Iran gave substantial
material and moral support to Pakistan. In 1966, the
Iranian government supplied some Sabre jets to Pakistan.
And in 19 74, it was reported that Iran had agreed to supply
6 7F-5 jet fighters to Pakistan.
After 1971, Pakistan's national security assumed a
new dimension for Iran. Hence Iran's concern centred on
preserving the internal integrity and political independence
of Pakistan. According to the Shah,
the integrity of Pakistan is vital for 
us. If it were threatened and some 
separatist movement started, this 
would create an absolutely intolerable 
situation for our eastern f r o n t i e r s . 68
The Shah reiterated these fears in.June 1974 although the
situation in Pakistan had by then achieved a certain measure
f i  f i Iran and Pakistan were both members of CENTO (military 
alliance) and RCD (economic alliance). Iran's unequivocal 
support for the right of self-determination of people of 
Kashmir and denunciation of Pukhtoonistan were evidence of 
sympathy for Pakistan.
^  Washington Post, 8 March 1975.
6 8 The S;hah's interview in Washington as reported in
Kayhan International, 25 October 1973.
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of stability. He declared that Iran would 'intervene
69militarily' if the situation became intolerable.
Regarding the prospective supply of arms to Pakistan 
he said:
... We shall never assist Pakistan if they 
start an aggressive war on India, and
I am sure that India is not going to threaten 
Pakistan just for the sake of it.70
On another occasion he emphasized the need for indigenous
armament saying,
We desire to become self-sufficient in 
armaments. A joint arms industry may 
be considered on both a bilateral basis 
between Turkey and Iran or a tripartite 
basis to include Pakistan as well.^l
Thus Iran under the Shah desired a strong and united
Pakistan for security and stability in the Persian Gulf
area. The security of Iran's southeast province of
Baluchistan, which is a geographical and ethnic extension
of Pakistan, provided a buffer between Iran and India.
Moreover, Iran was dependent on cheap labour from Pakistan
whereas Pakistan was a recipient of economic aid from Iran
and also a territorial reinsurance against Indian attack
72in case of war.
69 Interview to the French daily, Le Monde as cited m
Kayhan International, 29 June 1974.
Shah's press conference in New Delhi. ibid., 12 October
1974.
71 The Middle East, London, January 1976, pp.29-31.
7 2 Pakistan lacks geographical depth; some of its major 
cities are right on the border and most of its territory 
is within the easy range of air attacks from India as 
evidenced in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars.
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The April 19 78 coup in Afghanistan with Soviet backing 
and the political uncertainty in Pakistan following the 
ouster of Bhutto's-government in July 1977 had further rein­
forced Iran's fears along its eastern borders.
The Shah also perceived various other rather vague 
and ill-defined threats to Iran's security which were 
never spelled out clearly by him. For example, on one
occasion he referred to 'a country' laying great importance
74on chemical warfare and on another he referred to the
75threat of growing terrorism and lack of law and order.
He also saw potential threat from left wing communist
guerrilla groups (the 'Red' threat) and right wing Muslim
7 6guerrilla groups (the 'Black' threat).
73
7 3 For Soviet connections of the new Afghan regime see,
Hannah Negaran, 'The Afghan Coup of April 19 78: Revolution 
and International Security', Orbis , Vol.23, No.l, Spring
1979, pp.93-112; Hannah Negaran, 'Afghanistan: A Marxist 
Regime in a Muslim Society', Current History, Vol.76, No.446, 
April 1979, pp.172-175; Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., 'Afghanistan 
After the 1978 Revolution', Strategic Review, Spring 1979, 
pp.57-62; 'Afghanistan - Where War is Like a Good Affair', 
Time, 14 May 19 79; 'The Afghan Revolution - socialism in 
a clannish society', The Guardian, 5 November 1978, p. 13;
'The Afghan Revolution: Kabul looks to Moscow', The Guardian,
12 November 1978, p.38; William Borders, 'Afghanistan 
Pushes Soviet Ties', International Herald Tribune, 20 
November 1978 and Asia Week, 19 November 1978.
74 See Kayhan Internat^onal, 19 November 1977. 
ibid., 12 November 1977.
7 6 David Lynn Price, 'Oil and Middle East Security',
The Washington Papers, Vol.IV, No.41, London: Sage 
Publications, 1976, p.49.
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It was again the Shah's perceived dangers which
prompted Iran to initiate a leading role in the plan for
collective security in the Persian Gulf. Although Iran
started promoting the concept as early as March 1970,
it was only after March 19 75 that the proposal took on
some form of defence cooperation amongst the Gulf states.
During a visit to the United States in May 1975, the Shah
announced that 'in the Persian Gulf we seek collective 
77security'. Two months later [July], the Gulf foreign 
ministers met in Jeddah for the defence summit. The 
following six main issues were examined:
1. Limitations on foreign powers in the region;
2. A guarantee of the territorial integrity of all states, 
presumably to nullify border disputes;
3. A non-aggression pact among the states;
4. Mutual assistance against subversion and cooperation 
in military and intelligence affairs;
5. Freedom of navigation; and
6. Territorial divisions of the waters of the Gulf
7 8and limits of the continental shelf.
However after July 1975, the momentum of the talks 
regarding Gulf security slowed down.
^^ ibid., p .80.
7 8  ’I ’ -)ibid.
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The last serious consideration came in November 19 76 
when the foreign ministers of the eight littoral states 
of the Persian Gulf ended their talks without a formal 
settlement, but with pledges for further talks. There 
were divergences among Iraq and the other seven littoral 
states. The general feeling among the ministers was that 
the conference on Gulf security had come
prematurely and a complex subject like coordination among
eight littoral states could not be completed within such 
79a short time.
Except for Oman's unequivocal support, the other Gulf
states maintained their reservations about the Iranian
8 0proposals for Gulf security. These reservations stemmed
from various political, military, economic and cultural
factors which determine the policies and perceptions of
81different Gulf states. Also, there was no specific or
79 Amir Taheri, 'Foreign Ministers’ meeting ends on 
optimistic note', Kayhan International, 27 November 1976.
8 0 E.g. in this regard see the Shah's interview to Newsweek 
as quoted in Kayhan International, 12 December 1977.
81 For a detailed analysis of these factors and the problems 
of regional cooperation in the Persian Gulf see, D. Kappeler, 
'Possibilities and Problems of Regional Cooperation in 
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean', Iranian Review of 
International Relations , Tehran, No.8, Fall 1976, pp.75-116; 
and Shahram Chubin, 'Iran: Between the Arab West and the 
Asian East', The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses 
Journal, Quarterly, Vol.IX, No.3, January-March 1977, 
pp.180-181. Also, according to Senator Edward Kennedy, 
'passions are deep and distances are short' in the Persian 
Gulf region. (E. Kennedy as quoted in David T. Johnson, 
Current Issues in US Defence Policy, New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1976, p.104^.
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common source of threat among the Persian Gulf nations.
This was demonstrated when Iran reacted with urgency
to the rebellion in Oman in providing military help, while
the other Arab states generally remained hesitant.
(For details see Chapter III.) On the other hand, Iran
did not share the Arab view regarding the oil embargo in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Barring Oman, none of the
Arab states had shown any enthusiasm for a formal security
pact, although several of them were prepared to collaborate
8 2informally on an ad hoc basis. In addition, from the 
point of view of the smaller powers of the Gulf, any 
regional grouping meant a domination by the larger powers 
(i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) at their expense.
For them a formal political/military pact would 
legitimize, sanctify and freeze the division of power in
8 3the region, i.e. formalize the existing hierarchy of power. 
And lastly, a security pact could only follow once a complete 
agreement on territorial boundaries and termination of
8 2 Joint Communique issued at the end of the Shah's visit 
to Oman reaffirming Iran-Oman joint security in the Persian 
Gulf, Kayhan International, 10 December 1977.
8 3 The leading regional power or core-actor has difficulties 
in attracting other states into a system which is likely 
to be hierarchical and not egalitarian. (See George Liska, 
'The Third World: Regional Systems and World Order' in 
Robert Osgood (ed.), Retreat from Empire: The First Nixon 
Administration, Baltimore, 1973, pp.279-343.
'• S
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disputes on islands was reached. Despite the considerable
progress elsewhere, the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute including
84two islands, still persists.
Thus finding difficulties in promoting the concept
of Persian Gulf security, Iran put forward the proposal
for the Indian Ocean Common Market in 19 7 4 which envisaged
bilateral cooperation among the littoral states of the
Indian Ocean evolving gradually into discussions of
8 5mutual security problems. This proposal did not evoke
any concrete response. However in the case of the Persian
Gulf proposal there have been some efforts at cooperation
8 6in the non-military fields.
Conclusion
The above discussion of Iran's threat perceptions 
reveals that the Shah perceived diverse forms of threats 
from all directions. These threat perceptions included:
See Owen, op.cit., p.267. Also at the base of the 
Musandum peninsula there is a confusing jigsaw puzzle of 
sheikhdoms and enclaves that cause occasional wrangling 
between Ajman, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, and Oman. Price,
Oil and Middle East Security, p.26.
8 5 E.g. refer to the Shah's reply to National Press Club 
in Australia as reported in Kayhan International, 5 October 
1974 and 'The selling of an Indian Ocean Common Market', 
ibid., 18 March 19 78.
8 6 These include: development of solar energy, conservation 
of water resources, reclamation of land, control of pollution 
in the Persian Gulf and the promotion of joint economic 
ventures. (ibid., 14 January 1978 and 18 December 1976.)
For likely chances of future regional military cooperation 
in the Persian Gulf also see R.K. Ramazani, 'Security in 
the Persian Gulf', Foreign Affairs, Vol.57, No.4, Spring
1979, pp.821-835.
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the fear of stoppage of oil from the Persian Gulf through 
the Straits of Hormuz to the Indian Ocean; the abiding 
security concern for its economically rapid developing 
area adjacent to the Persian Gulf; the possible danger 
of military intervention by Iraq and the Soviet Union; 
the pervading anxiety regarding the spread of subversion 
and likely secession in Baluchistan from the neighbouring 
Pakistani Baluchistan; and the diffused fear of the 
emergence of radical governments in the Persian Gulf area.
CHAPTER II
THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES - 
MAJOR DEFENCE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
41
Introduction
After the fall of the Mossadeq government in August 
1953 and the Shah's firm grasp on the decision making of 
his country, Iran's defence was focussed on the expansion 
and modernization of the armed forces. The major upgrading 
and buildup of the airforce did not begin until the mid- 
1960s while the expansion of the navy began to gather 
momentum late in that decade.^-
Out of the three services, i.e. land, air and sea,
the Imperial Iranian Airforce (IIAF) was modernized to
2the greatest extent. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s 
the number of combat aircraft almost doubled and included 
the most sophisticated vintage of American fighters. The 
army did not increase in numbers as much as the other 
services, but was transformed from a largely infantry based 
force to an army built around armour and mechanized elements. 
And the Imperial Iranian Navy (UN) , with its primarily 
coastal orientation, was markedly upgraded and expanded
3to offer a deep-water capability.
By the middle of 19 76, the rapid acquisition of
sophisticated weapons and equipment resulted in about
424,000 U.S. foreign military and civilian advisers# and
 ^ George Lenczowski, 'Iran's Armed Forces under the Pahlavi 
Dynasty', in George Lenczowski (ed.), Iran Under the Pahlavis, 
Stanford: Hoover Institution Publication, 1978, p.418.
2 . .
U.S. Mvlvtary Sales to Iran, p.25.
3 Lenczowski, op.cit., p.418.
4 . .U.S. M^l^tary Sales to Iran, p.33.
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by the end of 1978, this total number had
increased to nearly 41,000 U.S. residents in Iran out of
5which 5,000 were military personnel alone.
The Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF)
The Iranian ground forces by the end of 1978 comprised 
a total of 285,000 and were grouped into three field armies. 
They included 3 armoured divisions, 3 infantry divisions,
4 independent brigades (1 armoured, 1 infantry, 1 airborne 
and 1 special force), 4 surface-to-air missiles battalions
gequipped with HAWK missiles and an Army Aviation Command. Like 
many other countries with compulsory national service,it was the 
infantry divisions which had absorbed most of the two-year 
conscripts. The basic infantry weapons were the 7.62 mm 
Heckler, Koch G3 rifle and MG3 machine gun, produced 
locally in Iran, while heavy weapons came from a variety 
of sources. 120 mm mortars were manufactured in the 
country while in the anti-tank missile field, French SS-lls 
and -12s delivered since 1970 were supplemented by 
substantial numbers of the American Hughes Heavy Antitank
7Weapon (TOW). Infantry Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC's) 
were of three main types. They were tracked U.S. M113s
5
Newsweek, 20 November 1978.
£
The Military Balance 19 7 8/79, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, p.37.
7 R.D.M. Furlong, 'Iran - a power to be reckoned with', 
International Defense Review, Vol.6, No.6, December 1973, 
p .724.
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(many fitted with TOW), tracked Soviet BTR-50s and 
wheeled Soviet BTR-60s. The administrative transport 
vehicles were of the same mixed origin with older U.S. 
jeeps and trucks being supplemented and replaced by the 
Soviet material provided in part-payment for Iranian 
natural gas.®
Iran ordered about 800 Chieftain tanks from Great
9Britain m  1971. However it was m  1973 when it began 
to take delivery. In May 1975 Iran
reportedly ordered another 1, 200 Chieftains. ^  These 
medium-weight Chieftains were equipped with 120 mm guns 
and fitted with laser range-finders. Iran's armoured force 
of 3 divisions by the end of 19 7 8 was equipped with 
760 medium Chieftains and 250 Scorpion light tanks from 
Britain together with 400 M-47/-48 and 460 M-60A1 medium 
American tanks.
The artillery, in terms of personnel, accounted for 
about 30% of the Iranian army. Each of the three Army corps 
g This was as a result of a $110 million agreement signed 
in February 1967 which stipulated the exchange of Soviet 
military equipment, i.e. non-armoured vehicles, troop 
carriers and anti-aircraft guns for the Iranian natural 
gas and other raw materials. (Leslie M. Pryor, 'Arms and 
the Shah', Foreign Policy, Vol.31, No.31, Summer 1978, 
p. 58.) In this regard also see SIPRI, The Arms Trade with 
the Third World, New York: Humanities Press, 1971, p.578.
9
Strategic Survey, London: IISS, 1973, p.42.
10 According to a US Senate report, out of a total of 2,250 
Chieftain medium tanks ordered by Iran, 435 had been 
delivered by February 1976. See U.S. Military Sales to 
Iran, p .17.
The Military Balance 1978/79 , London: IISS, p.37.
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had an Indirect Fire Support Group of 4-8 battalions with
a further two Groups at the Artillery Training School in
Isfahan. Each division was provided with 4-6 battalions
for direct fire support. In addition, a SAM battalion
equipped with HAWK was deployed to protect the oil
12installations at Abadan and Kharg. The inventory at
the end of 1978 included 710 guns/howitzers (75 mm Pack,
85 mm), 440 (M-109, 155 mm) 38 (M-107, 175 mm) and 14
13(M-110 203 mm SP). Surface-to-surface artillery was
14mainly American with a few exceptions. Among the newer
self-propelled guns obtained from the U.S., the Ml09s
(155 mm SP) were notable. The first of these were purchased
in 1968 and delivered in 1971. Some more were purchased
in 1972, 1973 and 1974. By the end of 1978, the Iranian
15army had a total of 440 M109s.
Although purchases of the M109s represented a 
modernization of an existing capability, extensive training 
in vehicle operation and maintenance was required. This 
training was conducted at the Artillery School in Isfahan
12 Furlong, op.cit., p.725.
13
The Military Balance 1978/79, London: IISS, p.37.
14 The notable exceptions were the Russian M-46 130 mm 
towed gun and the 40-tube, 122 mm BM-21 version of the 
truck-mounted KATYUSHA rocket family. (Furlong, op.cit., 
p.725.)
See The Military Balance 1978/79, London: IISS, p.37.
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with the assistance of U.S. advisors. Maintenance training 
was conducted at the Combat Support Training Centre at 
Tabriz.16
For artillery spotting and forward air control, the
Imperial Iranian Armed Aviation (IIAA) branch maintained 10 Cessna
0-2A fixed wing light aircraft, 40 Cessna 185s and 6 Cessna 
17310s.
The army had also developed an airborne and a special 
forces brigade along American lines against counter­
insurgency operations. The Army Aviation Command with 
headquarters at Isfahan had a total of about 600 helicopters
which provided transport, command and close fire support iU c ,;
18elements to the sky cavalry Brigade.
Iran intended to expand her army aviation strength 
from approximately 8,000 men and 406 aircraft from July 
1976 to 14,000 men and over 80 0 late model helicopters by
1978. The initial cost of this programme for procurement,
installation and training was estimated to be about $4
I*-.-.* 19 billion.
The IIAA-U.S. programme concept was generally agreed 
to in the fall of 1972. A contract was signed between Bell 
Helicopter International (BHI) and the Government of Iran
^  U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p.18.
17 Avr Force Magazzne, December 1978, p.89.
18 Lenczowski, op.cit., p.420.
U.S. Mzlvtary Sales to Iran, p.17.19
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(GOI) on 21 February 1973 to train both pilots and
training personnel. The training started for both groups
20on 10 April 19 73. The concept for the development 
of the IIAA was perceived
in the requirement for highly mobile tactical forces in 
a country of limited lines of communication and extensive 
border areas. The Shah established guidelines for the 
IIAA that called for a capability to (1) airlift (security 
deletion) infantry battalions; (2) support ground 
operations by armed helicopters (conventional and anti­
tank roles); (3) support ground operations with air cavalry;
and (4) provide for helicopter evacuation of battle casualties
21and resupply operations.
By the end of 1978 the Imperial Iranian Army had on
its inventory 202 AH-IJ, 210 Bell 214A, 21 HUSKIE, 88
AB-205A, 70 AB-206 and 30 CH-47C helicopters.^
The Iranian army also started purchasing TOW missiles/
launchers in 1973, and delivery of 4,760 was completed in
early 19 75. The Hughes Aircraft Company was equipping
a maintenance support facility at Shiraz for TOW missiles.
The Iranian Government contracted a coproduction agreement
2 3with Emerson Electronics for TOW launchers.
U.S. Congress, United States Arms Policies in the Persian 
Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past3 Present3 and Future - Report 
of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Saudi 
Arabia, 95th Congress 1st Session, December 1977, Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p.151. (Hereafter 
referred to as United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf.)
22 Air Force Magazine, December 1978, p.89.
2 3 .U m t e d  States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.153.
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The Iranian forces were used when in November/December
19 7 3 Iran sent a task force of about 1,200 men to Oman to
assist the Sultan to quell the insurgency in the province 
24of Dhofar. (For a detailed discussion see Chapter III.)
Regarding the general disposition of the Iranian 
troops, initially, after the Second World War they were 
mainly deployed in the northern section. However, after 
the Iranian-Soviet rapprochement of 1962 the ground forces 
were shifted along the border with Iraq and generally 
towards the south. By mid-1976 most of these ground forces 
were deployed in the western part of the country due to 
the perceived Iraqi threat. In the northwest, the troops 
were based at Rezaiyeh, Sanandaj, and Qazvin; in the 
west at Khorensabad, Kerman Shah and Ahwaz; and in the 
northeast at Mashad. There was also evidence that the 
defence establishment intended to build many of its 
future bases in the southeastern part of the country. One 
of these bases (Chah Bahar) on completion was supposed to 
have a distinctive tri-service (army, navy, airforce) 
character.
To sum up it can be said that the Iranian army was 
the largest and the most established of the three services *
24 iD.L. Price, Oman: Insurgency and Development',
Conflict Studies, No.53, London: The Eastern Press, Ltd., 
January 1975, p.9.
25 U.S. Mtlitary Sales to Iran, p.15. For the composition 
of the 88th Armoured Division based at Khash in southeastern 
Iran see, Hannah Negaran, 'The Afghan Coup of April 197 8: 
Revolution and International Security., Orbis, Vol. 23, No.l, 
Spring 1979, p.108.
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It also accounted for the bulk of Iran's military manpower.
It had purchased some of the latest American artillery 
and missiles; the British Chieftain Tank and Scorpion 
Light Tank; and American and Italian helicopters. Although 
it had not fought any major war, it had gained some 
military experience in border fighting against Iraq and 
counter-insurgency operations against Oman. Despite its 
sophisticated equipment, it was heavily dependent on foreign 
military advisers and lacked adequate training, technical 
manpower and basic infrastructural facilities. But on the 
whole it can be said that the Iranian army was developing 
as a heavily mechanised and primarily air mobile force 
designed to have the capacity for projecting itself rapidly 
and efficiently in the direction of any conflict which 
could arise within Iran's growing security perimeter. Iran's 
massive import of heavy and light tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers and armoured cars in combination with its big 
fleet of helicopters (which were being delivered on a rush 
basis) provided the army's growing equipment base for an 
effective offensive capability.
The Imperial Iranian Airforce
The Imperial Iranian Air Force did not receive
2 6separate service status until August 1955. It was, however, 
organized as a branch of the army already before World War
2 6 John Paxton (ed) , The Statesman 1 s Yearbook 1973/7:>j 
p.675.
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II. After that war and especially after the Baghdad Pact
in 1955, the U.S. military aid programme enabled Iran to
develop her airforce with the F-86 fighter as its workhorse.
The primary mission of the airforce was to provide air defence
and close air support for the ground forces. It was only
in 1965 that the government allocated some $400 million
2 8to its expansion and modernization.
The phenomenal growth and sophistication of the
airforce can also be ascribed to the personal interest
29taken by the Shah in its buildup.
The airforce by the mid-1970s consisted of more than
60,000 personnel and was mainly patterned on the American 
model. It had a projected strength of approximately 500 
combat aircraft, including F-4 Phantoms, F-5 Tiger-Fighter-
bombers and F-14 Tomcats, all of which were equipped with
. . . . . . 30 air-to-air missiles.
By the end of 19 78 the most spectacular items among
Iran's purchases had been the 56 swing-wing F-14A Tomcat,
177 F-4E, 32 F-4D, 16 RF-4E, 140 F-5E and 13 Boeing 747.31
27 Lenczowski, op.cit., p.420.
^  ibid., p .421.
29 It was said that the Shah was very knowledgeable about 
modern weapons technology and used to read Aviation Week 
regularly before he read the Iranian press. (U.S. Military 
Sales to Iran, p.7.)
30 For details see E.H. Kolcum, 'Air Power Pivotal to 
Iran's diplomacy', Aviation Week and Space Technology,
23 November 1970, pp.21-22. Also see H.J. Coleman, 'Iran 
pushes Modernization of Airforce', ibid., 7 May 1973, pp.14-15.
31 Azr Force Magaztne, December 1978, p.89.
27
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The Shah's selection of the F-14A Tomcats was based on 
his consideration that its performance, armed with the 
Phoenix missile, could successfully counter the Soviet 
MIG-25 advanced fighter aircraft, and the fact that 
the Soviet Union had a number of bases near the Iranian 
border which were within advanced fighter operational
32range of Iran's major population and industrial centres. 
Besides, the F-14 also requires less pilot skill than the 
air-superiority fighter, the F-15. Its stand off capability 
with the Phoenix missiles is valuable in the low density 
threat, less-cluttered environment of Iran's air space, 
and it can be used best at maximum range in a setting 
where air threats are reasonably predictable. However, 
the main criticism against the procurement of the aircraft 
was its high technology, difficult maintenance and high
4-  3 3cost.
The Letters of Offer were signed in January and June
1974 for 80 aircraft at a cost of $1.94 billion. Purchase 
of the Phoenix missile system and support contracts increased 
the cost of the programme to $2,338 billion. Deliveries 
were planned from January 1976 through July 1978 at a rate 
of two per month for the first year, and three per month 
thereafter. By November 1976, 21 aircraft had been delivered 
and were mostly based at Khatami Air Base at Isfahan and
C K  • 3 4Shiraz.
32 . . .
United States Arms Policies in the Perszan Gulf} p.148.
33 Shahram Chubin, 'Iran's Military Security in the 1980s',
The California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 
Discussion Paper No.73, California, September 1977, p.19.
34 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, pp.148-149.
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The programme originally had anticipated that base 
construction, training, and aircraft delivery would coincide. 
But slippages occurred, and without the catalyst of the 
first deliveries of F-14, Khatami Air Base would have been 
unsuitable for receiving the aircraft because of construction 
delays.35
It was, however, the F-4 aircraft which formed the
backbone of IIAF. It purchased 32-F4D and 177 F-4E
aircraft at a total cost of $1.05 billion. The F-4D was
first introduced in Iran in 1968, all were delivered and
based at Bushehr. The F-4E first arrived in 1971 and the
remainder during 197 7. They were mainly based at Mehrabad
3 6Shahrokhi, Shiraz and Bandar Abbas. The F-4Ds were 
capable of delivering laser-guided bombs. But almost all 
of the F-4Es had leading edge slats for increased manoeuver-
ability and were equipped with Maverick air-to-ground
. . . 37missiles and electro-optical target identification system.
Yet another addition was the F-16 lightweight
fighter aircraft. The Shah expressed interest in March
1975 on the basis that the aircraft would augment the F-14
in an air defence role and, in addition, perform air defence
and close support missions currently being performed by
the IIAF F-5 aircraft. It was stated that eventually the
IIAF would need to replace the F-5 in its inventory. In
35 ibid., p.149.
36 ibid., p.148.
37 U.S. Mzlitary Sales to Iran, p.29.
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June 1975, Vice Minister of War General Toufanian indicated
Iran's desire to purchase 160 F-16 aircraft. This was
followed up in February 19 76 by another order for the
purchase of 300 aircraft.3^
By the end of 19 7 8 Iran had ordered
additional aircraft, including 160 F-16s, 5 RF-4E Phantoms
39and E-3A AWACS aircraft. Out of these aircraft ordered, 
the AWACS was clearly the most expensive and sophisticated. 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) is a Boeing 
707 equipped with complex radar and guidance system.
Costing $112 million apiece, the AWACS was one of the most 
complicated and expensive aircraft used by the U.S.A.
With its look down radar capability the AWACS could spot 
low flying planes and missiles which often escape detection 
by ground based radars.^
Many of these aircraft were scheduled to replace Iran's 
older planes and make Iran's airforce quantitatively and 
qualitatively the most advanced force in the Indian Ocean 
and Middle East area.
On the missile side, the IIAF employed shortrange, 
IR-homing AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles on its F-5s. 
The AIM-9 was also used on its F-4s. These F-4s were 
additionally armed with the AIM-7 SPARROW 2/3 for long-range
3 8 United, States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.150.
39 Azr Force Magazzne, p.89.
40 See Kayhan Internattonal, 30 April 1977, p.l. The 
Iranian government was reported negotiating for 3 more 
AWACS by late 1977. (ibid., 12 November 1977, p. 3.)
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intercepts. For the ground strike, some F-4Es had been
41fitted to carry the Hughes Mavericks. The IIAF also
42wanted to buy the anti-radar SHRIKE and stand-off CONDOR
air-to-ground missiles. The low level airfield AA defence
was provided by Shorts TIGERCAT SAMs and Oerlikon cannon
controlled by Contraves SUPER FLEDERMAUS radar systems
but by late summer 197 3 these were supplemented by 2 Rapier
4 3SAM batteries ordered m  1971.
The IIAF's transport element by the end of 1978
consisted of 64C-130 EH, 10 HH-43F Huskies, 6 AB-205 and
84 AB-206A Jetrangers, 5 AB-212, 39 Bell 214C SAR, 2 CH-47C
CHINOOKS, 16 Aerospatiale SUPER FRELONS and 2 S-61A
44helicopters.
The IIAF purchased the Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) in 197 3 
and received its first delivery in March 1975. This
41 Furlong, op.cit., p.728.
42 .The SHRIKE missile would be mounted on F-4Es and used
for what is called 'radiation suppression'. The SHRIKE is 
a supersonic weapon designed to home in automatically on 
enemy radar stations. The Pentagon had asked Congress to 
oppose the sale to Iran of an additional 31 F-4E Phantom 
fighter-bomber and 1,000 SHRIKE missiles for $454.4 million. 
The F-4Es and the SHRIKE missile^ were to be purchased 
instead of the more advanced F-4G WILD WEASEL fighter bombers 
sought by the Shah. (International Herald Tribune, 15 
September 1978.)
4 3 The Rapier missile system offered a low level air defence 
system mounted on a movable vehicle which offered protection 
for tanks against a low level attack. Apart from Iran, the 
sophisticated Rapier missile had been sold to Abu Dhabi,
Oman, Australia and to the British armed forces in NATO.
(Kayhan International, 27 November 1976, p.l.)
44 Atr Force Magazvne, December 1978, p.89.
54
programme was one of the largest and most complex of all
. . 45programmes undertaken by the Iranian military. There
. . . . . . . 46were, however, initial difficulties m  running the system.
To summarise, the IIAF had purchased the most advanced
equipment which had prestige and deterrent value, although
it was highly questionable whether such systems, particularly
the F-14 and I-HAWK would have been effectively operating
47before the early to mid-1980s.
This acquisition pattern also extended to the support 
systems as well. The anticipated IIAF purchase of Project 
Peace Log (a programme to develop a functional logistics 
organization costing $300-$500 million dollars)would have 
required about 14, 000 Iranian personnel by,
1981.48
There were slippages in nearly all major programmes 
due to shortfalls in training, construction, maintenance 
and logistical support. As a result of the shortage of 
trained personnel and other training delays, already trained
45 For details in the improvement of air defence also see 
'USAF Pushes Iran Air Defense System', Aviation Week and 
Space Technology , 24 March 1975, p.23.
46 These difficulties resulted from a number of factors like 
construction delays, non-operationsl training equipment, 
lack of a formal on-the-job training programme, allocation 
of qualified students to higher priority programmes and 
a faulty automated logistics system that had resulted in 
some instances in up to a year's delay in the supply system. 
{U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p.31.)
47 . .ibid., p .32.
48 • L ' J ibid.
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personnel were being shifted from their current programmes 
to those of higher priority e.g. trained air and maintenance 
crews from the F-5E to the F-14. Similarly, the better 
new personnel were assigned to the prestige programmes, 
engendering further delays in programmes such as I-HAWK,
which were immensely complicated, but apparently of lesser
. . 49 priority.
Self-sufficiency was therefore not easily attainable, 
even if the IIAF made no additional major purchases.
Continued U.S. involvement and a concomitant dependency
50of the IIAF on the U.S. was unavoidable until the mid-1980s.
The Imperial Iranian Navy
The Imperial Iranian Navy (UN) traces its origin to 
1927, when the Ministry of War ordered two frigates for 
its recently established Southern Command. The two gun­
boats delivered in 1932 were followed in subsequent years 
by other ships until, in 1941, the Southern Command had
four squadrons at its disposal. Each squadron included
51one frigate and at least two sloops.
After 19 70 the U N  had undergone a major modernization 
programme. While in terms of manpower it was the smallest 
among Iran's armed forces, nevertheless it had grown into
49 •l  • j  ibid.
50 ibid.
51 Lenczowski, op.cit., pp.422-423.
a respectable ocean-going force. By 1976 it already
constituted by far the most impressive fleet in the Persian
Gulf and no combination of the forces of the littoral states
53could offer the U N  a serious challenge.
By the end of 1978 the naval fleet included 1 ex-British 
destroyer (armed with Seacat SAMs); 2 ex-U.S. destroyers;
4 new Vosper Thornycroft MK.5 fast frigates (armed with 
Seakiller SSMs and Seacat SAMs); 4 ex-U.S. corvettes;
5 ex-U.S. minesweepers (3 coastal and 2 inshore); 7 large
patrol craft, 5 Combattante II class FPBG with Harpoon SSM
54and 8 SRN-6 and 6 Wellington SH-7 hovercraft.
To help protect the sea lanes of communication through
the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, Iran had also bought
553 Tang class diesel submarines from the U.S. ' Also, on 
order were 4 Spruance-class destroyers fitted with the
52 In this regard, refer to the remarks of Rear Admiral Mir- 
Habibullah while addressing the symposium on Iran's foreign
policy. (Kayhan International, 12 March 1977.)
53 For a comparison of the relative strengths see The
Military Balance3 1976/77, pp.32-39.
54
The Military Balance 1978/79, p.37.
55 These submarines were of late World War II vintage.
Valued at $54 million, they were supposed to be overhauled 
and then handed over to the Iranian Navy. (U,S. Military 
Sales to Iran3 p.23.)
5 6 U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.154.
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Shah's objective of developing a naval capability for 
sustained operations in the Indian Ocean and protecting 
shipping and the sea approaches to the Gulf. Armament for 
the destroyers was supposed to include configuration for 
antiair warfare (AAW) , antisubmarine warfare (ASW), torpedoes, 
electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment, accoustic gear, 
helicopter landing platform, and the Harpoon missile.
The light naval forces included patrol craft
and patrol boats. This was with a view to supporting the
army in local intervention. In 1976, Iran operated the
largest military hovercraft force in the world and the
Iranian navy was the first to acquire a hovercraft fleet
for patrol purposes. These hovercraft were first used
when Iranian troops landed on Abu Musa and the Tumbs
5 7islands in November 1971.
The Iranian navy had by mid-1970s acquired an air arm 
of aircraft of various types which inlcuded fized wings 
and helicopters. These were used principlaly for purposes 
of antisubmarine warfare and for the escort of tankers 
sailing through the Shatt al-Arab. They could also be 
employed to support amphibious landing operations. By 
1978 the strength of these aircraft included 1 ASW squadron
5 7 These hovercraft (totalling 14 and all built in Britain) 
go scudding about the Persian Gulf on the cushion of air 
faster than any conventional ship. ('Iran's New Window on 
Persian Gulf', The Hindu, Madras, 13 February 1975, p.6.)
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with 12 SH-3D; 1 transport squadron with 6 SHRIKE 
COMMANDER, and 1 MR squadron with 6P-3F Orions. A fleet 
of 28 helicopters comprised 5 AB-205A Hueys, 7 AB-212s 
and 10 Agusta-Sikorsky SH-3D SEA KINGS for ASW.5
The mission of keeping the sea lanes open was assigned 
to the minesweepers and the larger ships of the fleet.
Almost all of them had an extensive ASW armament as well 
as anti-aircraft, anti-ship and shore bombardment facilities. 
This was supposed to work in close co-operation with the 
airforce whose air support could be quickly sought since 
an IIAF Phantom squadron was based on the island of Kish, 
a mixed Phantom/F-5 squadron was at Bandar Abbas, and an 
F-5 squadron was at Bushehr. A major airstrip was also 
built on Abu Musa, and the Tumb islands and Abu Musa were 
fortified.
For maritime patrol duties, 6 long-range P-3 Orion
aircraft were purchased. The long-range Orion, which was
operated by the airforce, could stay aloft for seventeen
hours, and thus could be used for maritime missions well
6 0beyond the Gulf. Stressing the Iranian navy's role
beyond the Gulf, the Shah once said that Iran's security
perimeter no longer stopped at the Strait of Hormuz but
61formally extended to parts of the Indian Ocean.
5 8 Air Force Magazine, p.89 and Furlong, op.cit., p.726.
59 Furlong, op.cit., p.726.
^  Lenczowski, op.cit., p.424.
1 Shah's speech at a ceremony marking the fortieth anniversary 
of the Iranian Navy as quoted in Kayhan International, 5 
November 1972.
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In fact the Iranian strategic position was that it
expected to be able to counter threats as far south into
the Indian Ocean as 10th degree north latitude,
which crosses the edge of Somalia and passes into the Indian
6 2Ocean from the Gulf of Aden.
To support the Iranian navy, a network of bases were
being built after 1970. Fleet headquarters were kept at
Bandar Abbas while Bushire and Chah Bahar acted as the
main subsidiary operating bases. The base at Chah Bahar,
situated in the southeast and close to Pakistani Baluchistan,
was being built to accommodate the Spruance class destroyers
6 3and the diesel submarines purchased from the U.S.
Till March 1976, work in the naval facilities had not begun 
and no contract for construction had been signed, 
though the Air Force base at Chah Bahar 
was finished. It was estimated that
it would require an absolute minimum of 5 to 7 years to make 
ready the facilities to accommodate the Spruance 
class destroyers.^4
By the end of 1976 the U N  operated naval bases of 
which Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and Khorramshahr were the
r o
Alvin J. Cottrell, 'Iranian and Saudi Arabian security 
interests', The Washington Review of Strategic and 
International Studies , May 1978, p.54.
U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p.22.
6 4 . .ibid., p .19.
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most important. There was a training base at Bandar
Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea and smaller bases on Kharg
Island and Hengam Island in the Persian Gulf.^5 However,
the very rapid Iranian naval buildup during the past few
years had created some problems. Crews lacked experience
and there was a dearth of highly trained cadres to provide
them with the necessary training for their new tasks.
Added to this was the need to create infrastructural
facilities for the upkeep and repair of vessels as well
6 6as for the local manufacture of spare parts.
Nevertheless, although the Iranian navy by the end
of 1976 was young and lacked experience, it was the most
modern and the best equipped of the Indian Ocean navies
6 7after that of India. By 1978 it had established a 
capability to patrol the shallow Gulf waters and to project 
Iranian military forces onto the Arab side of the Gulf.
The acquisition of larger surface vessels was intended to 
give the Iranian Navy a growing equipment base from which 
to contemplate a 'blue water' naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. The procurement of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft 
complemented Iran's growing surface vessel presence in the 
Gulf of Oman-Indian Ocean area by adding a capability for
ibid., p .19.
6 6 R. Burt, 'Already it Dominates the Persian Gulf: Iranian 
Navy Growing as an Indian Ocean Power', Christian Science 
Monitor, 22 August 1975.
6 7 Mohammad Reza Djalili, 'The Indian Ocean - Seen From
Iran', Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, 
New Delhi, Vol.IX, No.2, (October-December 1976), p.113.
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maritime reconnaissance. And lastly, the purchase of fast 
patrol boats armed with the latest types of naval armament 
provided Iran with the equipment necessary for vigorous 
coastal protection and Gulf surveillance.
Iran's Nuclear Programme
Iran in the 1970s had embarked upon an ambitious
atomic power generation programme aimed at
building 20 nuclear power stations generating
23,000 megawatts of electricity by 1994.
Iran's decision to go in for a major nuclear programme
was made when in February 1974 she entered into a bilateral
agreement with France whereby French firms would build
several nuclear power stations in Iran with a total output
69of 5,000 megawatts and a cost of $1,200 million. Again
in June 1974, the foreign ministers of both countries signed
an agreement under which France was to build five nuclear
70power stations in Iran. Since then Iran has concluded 
nuclear power agreements with West Germany, Great Britain 
and the United States. The most important of these 
was with the U.S., signed in March 1975,according to which
6 8 Reza Fallah, 'Iran's Energy Policies and Perspectives', 
in Abbas Amirie and Twitchell A. Hamilton (eds.), Ivan in 
the 1980s, Tehran: Institute for International Political 
and Economic Studies, 1978, p.236.
69 H.M.L. Beri, 'Iran's ambitious nuclear programme',
Amvita Bazav Patvika, Calcutta, 25 March 1976.-
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the U.S. was to export nuclear power stations and fissile
71material enough for eight complete plants.
Iran's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in July 1976
signed two contracts with the German company Kraftwerk
Union (KWU) to obtain on a turnkey basis, two nuclear
72power plants and fuel. In addition to this, the KWU
had also agreed to supply the initial load of fuel for
both reactors, plus reloadings for the first 10 years of
operation. Iran had also negotiated the purchase of two,
900-megawatt, pressurized water reactors from France's 
73Framatome.
The position of raw materials, particularly uranium,
is not good in Iran. It was estimated that Iran would
require 100,000 tonnes of uranium by the end of the century.
In November 1974, documents were signed under which
the French Atomic Energy Commission was to help in supplying
Iran with uranium for the two nuclear plants. One document
also specified French assistance in exploiting the uranium
75deposits which might be discovered m  a third country.
74
71 ibid.
Labelled 'Iran 1' and 'Iran 2', the 1,200 MW plants 
were located near the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr. Work 
on these plants began in 1975 and they were supposed to 
become operational by the early 19 80s.
Fallah, op.cit., p.240.
ibid.
75 DB e n ,  op.cit.
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Australia had also agreed to sell uranium to Iran.
In this regard, the two governments had drawn up a nuclear
safeguards agreement, which if finalised, could clear the
7 6way for the purchase of upto $2 billion in uranium ore.
The talks between the two governments had continued for
four years and there was a deadlock due to Iran not being
allowed to reprocess any Australian uranium without prior
consent. Iran was also interested in purchasing between
15,000 to 20,000 tons of uranium, making it by far Australia's
77largest customer. It is estimated that Iran had already
stockpiled another 30,000 tons of uranium purchased from
a number of African and Western countries. Besides this,
a major $300 million uranium exploration programme was
7 8launched at home. Meanwhile, Iran had entered into 
discussions with a number of Western European countries, 
including France for investment in uranium enrichment 
facilities. A ten per cent share was acquired in the 
Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant under construction 
in Tricastin, France. Other shareholders included France, 
Spain, Belgium and Italy and the plant was expected to reach 
a full capacity of 10.8 million of separative work units 
at the end of 1981.^
Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, 'Restrictive Nuclear deal drafted',
Kayhan International, 20 August 1978,
77 The.Age, 29 November 1978.
7 0 Rahmani, op.cit.
79 See Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, 'Iran's nuclear stake in 
Europe's energy plants', Kayhan International, 16 April 
1978-
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Iran was keen to acquire expertise in research and
training in the atomic field. Although Tehran University
was involved in atomic research for almost 20 years,
a new government institution, the Atomic Energy Organization
8 0was set up in 1974. This organization was to bear
complete responsibility for planning and implementing all
programmes related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
In October 19 75, Iran and Britain signed two nuclear
cooperation deals covering cooperation in nuclear research,
including •' training for Iranian specialists at the
Harwell nuclear research centre, and technical assistance
in establishing and managing of control and safety systems
of the nuclear facilities.
Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
8 2in 1968. Iran is also on record as favouring a so-called
8 3nuclear free zone in the Middle East region. The Shah 
had frequently stressed the fact that Iran would not go for 
nuclear armaments. In September 1974, while addressing 
a press conference in Australia he said:
B e n ,  op.cit., p.6.
81 Reza Fazli, op.cit., p.241.
8 2 ibid. Nuclear Fact Sheet for Iran, Appendix D, p.443.
8 3 E.g. see Mr Abbas Ali Khalatbari, the Foreign Minister 
of Iran's address to the 30th Session of the U.N. General 
Assembly in Iran Almanac 19 76 and book of facts, 15th 
edition, Tehran: Echo of Iran, July 1976, p.158.
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Our air force will be very well 
equipped in five years time. And 
this is needed because we just have 
a look around us and see what others 
have in order to equip [ourselves] 
with what we can. There is nothing 
more dangerous for a vitally important 
country geographically like mine to be 
unable to defend not only its borders 
but also its interests ... From those 
nuclear reactors we are not going to 
try to make bombs. And this is a cardinal 
point in our national policy.84
He also referred to depending on the nuclear power of
the United States to offset potential nuclear threats,
arguing in effect as follows:
First of all we have very close 
relations with the United States.
Probably we could not do without 
them, because the present world is 
confronted with a problem of some 
countries possessing nuclear weapons 
and some not. We are among those who 
do not possess nuclear weapons so the 
friendship of a country such as the 
United States with their arsenal of 
nuclear weapons ... is absolutely vital.
However, it can be said that Iran did not like the
controls imposed by the provisions of the NPT on the possible
misuses of transferred technology. In order to break the
hold of the nuclear powers, she has used the lure of
petro-dollars in bypassing super-powers and entered into
big financial deals with West Germany and France for building
8 6nuclear power plants.
84 Kayhan International, 5 October 1974, p.4.
8 6 In this regard see, 'Iran keen on Indian Aid to Buildup 
Uranium Resources', The Hindu, Madras, 24 December 1975.
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Iran may have eventually opted for nuclear weapons
if she had attained the technology for harnessing power.
The Shah had already demonstrated his willingness to
do everything in his power to safeguard the security of
his country against all palpable contingencies. In
this connection the Shah said:
If 20 or 30 ridiculous little 
countries are growing to develop 
nuclear weapons, then I may have 
to revise my policies.87
To sum up it may be mentioned that Iran's dwindling
oil resources and a desire to attain an industrial power 
status prompted the programmes for nuclear energy. Although 
the Shah advocated the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes only, it could not be said . that Iran would not 
eventually opt for the development of nuclear weaponry.
This could be safely speculated in the light of its expanding 
military programme and assumption of regional responsibilities 
for security in the Persian Gulf. But the switch from 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons needs 
a technological base, trained manpower, financial resources 
and a political decision. Although Iran under the Shah 
had sufficient financial resources and a strong leadership,
8 8it lacked a techno-industrial base and trained manpower.
8 7 Kayhan International, 5 October 1978.
8 8 For statistics showing likely manpower deficits by 1978 
(professionwise) see, Iran Almanac 1976 and book of facts,
15th edition, Tehran: Echo of Iran, July 1976, p.326.
CHAPTER III
IRAN'S OCCUPATION OF THE GULF ISLANDS 
AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN OMAN
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Introduction
Iran's military occupation of the three islands 
in the Persian Gulf and military intervention in Oman 
were the two notable instances when its armed forces were 
used outside the borders. While the former was a sudden 
military operation lasting for a few hours, the latter 
was a sustained case of military intervention for many 
years. In this chapter the focus of study is to analyse 
the different events leading to these two events; the 
conduct of operations by Iran; the reasons for Iran's 
successful military involvement (in Oman); and how far 
these moves served to fit in the context of expanding 
security horizons of Iran which followed the British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.
Throughout the mid and late 1960s, Iran's major 
preoccupation in foreign policy was the future of the 
Persian Gulf.^ Iran's rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
enabled it to focus attention towards security in the 
south. The primary objectives in the south (i.e. gulf area) 
were mainly three: (a) to safeguard the regime against 
internal subversion sponsored directly or indirectly by 
hostile Arab states or groups or by Soviet proxy; (b) to 
ensure free transit through the Straits of Hormuz, the 
Gulf and the Shatt-al-Arab; and (c) to protect Iranian
 ^ See R.M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, 'Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas', The Washington Papers, 
London: Sage Publications, Vol.11, No.20, 1974, p.l.
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oil resources and facilities on and offshore against any
2 . .deliberate or accidental disruption. A decision to seek
a dominating role in Gulf affairs was taken before the
announcement of Britain's withdrawal from the Persian
3Gulf was made m  January 1968. The fact that Iran was 
contemplating these moves before the British withdrawal 
gave it a great advantage in seeking to shape the future 
events.
It forfeited its historical claim to Bahrain which 
gained independence in May 19 70 through the tripartite 
negotiations among Iran, Britain and the United Nations. 
This forfeiture of historical claim to Bahrain, considered 
by many Iranians as the fourteenth province of Iran, was 
rumoured at that time, (but discounted by British 
authorities) to have come about through Iran's tacit 
understanding with Britain. For Iran believed it had 
obtained a tacit understanding of Britain, whereby its 
historical claim to the Great and Little Tumb Islands and 
Abu Musa was to be satisfied as a compromise for it to 
permit the people of Bahrain to decide their own political
2 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Emerging Patterns of Regional 
Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy', Orbis , Vol.XVIII,
No.4, Winter 1975, p.1052.
3 In March 1965, the Shah had declared that in future Iran 
would focus her military planning on the Gulf, and in 
February 1967, a new Third Army Corps complete with 
paratroop units was created in Shiraz, Iran's major city. 
(Burrell, Cottrell, op.cit., p.l.)
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future. However, the Shah in a speech delivered m
New Delhi on 4 January 1969 rationalised the dropping of
the Iranian claim saying:
If the people of Bahrain did not want 
to be unified with Iran, they would be 
free to remain separate. It was against 
Iran's principles to use force to acquire 
territory against the wishes of the people 
of that country.5
In November 19 70, the striking power of the augmented
Iranian forces was demonstrated in a major military exercise
held near the island of Beni Farur, an Iranian possession
in the Gulf. The manoeuvres, which involved units from
all the three services, were praised in the Tehran press
as showing that Iran's military planning had begun to bear
fruit and that the country would be in a position to exercise
undisputed leadership in the Gulf after the British
withdrawal.^
Before this incident, the Iranian government in a
statement on 1 April 1968 had said that it would 'reserve
all its rights in the Persian Gulf1 and would in no way
tolerate the 'historical inequity and injustice' of the
7 . .proposed Union of the Gulf states. Similarly, on various 
occasions during the summer of 1971, the Shah of Iran,
4 George Lenczowski, 'Iran's Armed Forces under the 
Pahlavi Dynasty', in George Lenczowski, Iran Under the 
Pahlavis, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Publication, 1978, p.404.
5 Times of India, 5 January 1969. 
g Lenczowski, op.cit., p.403.
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1971, p.24500. .
4
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then Prime Minister Mr Hoveida and the then Foreign 
Minister, Mr Ardeshir Zahedi, all made statements 
asserting Iran's rights to Abu Musa and the Greater and 
Lesser Tumb islands, when the British withdrew from the 
Gulf at the end of the year. They also intimated that Iran 
would, if necessary, exercise its claim by force. In 
making this claim the Shah and his Ministers stressed 
that the islands were Iranian before they fell into the 
hands of the present Arab owners in the 19th century at 
a time when Iran was politically weak; and that it was 
only the British pacification of the Gulf which secured 
de facto administration of Abu Musa and the Tumbs by
gSharjah and Ras al Khaimah respectively.
On 11 June 19 71, an Israeli tanker, entering the Red 
Sea through the Bab El Mandeb Straits, had been fired on 
with rockets from a small boat which appeared to come 
from the island of Perim (owned by the Peoples' Democratic 
Republic of the Yeman, PDRY). A Palestinian guerrilla 
group claimed responsibility for the attack. This event 
hardened the Shah's resolve and he made it clear that he 
would oppose any union of the Gulf Arab Emirates unless
9his demands for the islands were met.
The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, a 
corollary of its east-of-Suez policy^ which, was completed
8 ibid., 1971, p.25010.
9
Strategzo Survey 19 71, London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1971, p.40.
71
on 30 November 19 71.  ^ The same day Iran occupied the
three disputed barren Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Greater
and Lesser Tumbs near the narrow 21-mile-wide entrance
to the Straits of Hormuz.
Abu M u s a , ^  recognized by Britain as belonging to
Sharjah had as its only resource iron oxide worked for
three months in each year, the product of which was reputed
to be used in the manufacture of cosmetics for a well-
12known European fashion-house. A last minute compromise
agreement between Iran and Sharjah was achieved largely
through the efforts of Sir William Luce, a former Political
Resident on the Gulf, working on behalf of the British
government. According to the terms of the agreement
reached, the ownership would in practice be shared (with
Iranian troops stationed on the island) and the income
13from any future oil discoveries divided equally. In 
the case of the two Tumb islands - one of which boasted 
a manned lighthouse and an Arab fishing village, the other
^  For reasons of Britain's withdrawal from the Persian 
Gulf, see Robert R. Sullivan, 'The Architecture of Western 
Security in the Persian Gulf', Orbis , Vol.XIV, No.l,
(Spring 1970), pp.72-73 and pp.81-83.
 ^ Abu Musa's population was then not more than 500 people; 
the Greater Tumb had about 150 inhabitants while the 
Lesser Tumb was uninhabited. (Lenczowski, op.cit., p.404
and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971, p.25010.)
12 R.P. Owen, 'The British withdrawal from the Persian 
Gulf', The World Today, Vol.28, No.2, February 1972, p.77.
13 ibid. For details of the agreement also see Keestng’s 
Contemporary Archives 1971, pp.25010-25011.
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being uninhabited - no agreement was reached with Ras al
Khaimah, whose ownership of the Tumbs was recognized by
. . 14the British government.
The Iranian troops landed on 30 November 1971 and
occupied both islands meeting resistance from a police
post maintained by Ras al Khaimah on the Greater Tumb.
The local police had opened fire on Iranian troops, killing
a naval officer and two soldiers and wounding another
soldier. The Iranian troops had returned the fire,
15killing four island policemen and injuring five others.
The military operations were carried out by an Iranian 
naval task force. The navy's amphibious capability had 
been increased through the formation of the Sea Ranger 
Battalion (formed and trained along the lines of Britain's 
Royal Marine Commando units) which was employed in the 
landings on these islands.^
Iran's military occupation of the islands was strongly 
defended by its own government. According to two Iranian 
scholars,
the Iranian Government's arguments in 
support of its claim to the islands ranged 
from the purely historical to the frankly 
pragmatic.
14 • j  ibid.
15 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1971, p.25010.
16 The hovercraft fleet was used to transport the Sea Rangers 
for amphibious assaults on the islands. It is said that 
the fleet, based in the northern part of the Gulf, could 
carry the Sea Rangers across the Gulf within 2 hours.
(R.D.M. Furlong, 'Iran - a power to be reckoned with', 
International Defense Review (Geneva), Vol.6, No.6,
December 1973, p.726.
17 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relatvons 
of Iran, Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1974, p.222.
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In addition to the Iranian historical claim that these
islands had been under the Iranian sovereignty until
80 years ago, Tehran used the argument of the geostrategic
necessity of occupation, since the islands were at a
critical 'choke-point' near the strategic Straits of
18Hormuz. It was also argued that since Iran was vitally
dependent on the free flow of oil and other commodities
through the Straits, it had to be in physical control of
these islands.^
The Iranian seizure of the islands provoked an immediate
and hostile response in most of the Arab world. Within
the Trucial States themselves minor riots occurred and
property belonging to Iranian banks and merchants was
destroyed. In Baghdad, the Iraqi government condemned
Iran and her 'flagrant aggression in collusion with Britain'
and accused Britain of not fulfilling the obligation to
preserve 'the Arab character of the islands'. On a more
concrete plane, a campaign of harassment and expulsion
was started against the Persian community in Iraq, and
diplomatic links with London and Tehran were severed by 
20Baghdad. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait joined in the
21condemnation but in more muted tones. In the Peoples'
18 The geo-strategic importance of the islands, particularly 
Abu Musa, was realised by the United States' Navy when in the 
year 1955 it considered a scheme to establish a naval base 
there. (R.M.Burrell, The Persian Gulf, New York: The 
Library Press, The Washington Papers, No.l, 1972, p.44.)
19 .C h u b m  and Zabih, op.cit., p. 223.
20 Burrell, The Persian Gulf, p.45.
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Republic of the South Yemen an interesting volte-face was
performed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of
the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) - a Chinese aided
revolutionary movement, which now called for British
22action to expel the Iranian invaders. In Cairo, the
official reaction was very subdued for it was believed
that the islands wer small, distant and unimportant, and
that any major diplomatic protest move would only serve
to distract attention from the crucial confrontation with 
2 3Israel. Such opinion did not, however, prevail in
Libya where Colonel Qaddafi offered to send Arab guerrillas
to retake the islands. He also condemned the British role
in the affair and on 7 December nationalized the assets
24belonging to the British Petroleum Company in Libya.
But on the whole, despite some of these initial
violent responses, the Iranian action seemed to have
passed off barely noticed in international circles. This
25could be attributed to the following factors:
Firstly, Iran had greatly increased her military
powers in the Persian Gulf over the last 3-4 years and
the neighbouring states had generally acquiesced in her
2 6position of dominance. This position of dominance was
22 . . ibid.
23 . . ibid.
24 . .ibid., p.46
2 5 .R.M. Burrell, 'Iranian foreign policy during the last
decade', Asian Affairs, No.61, February 1974, p.11.
2 6 See, for example, Peter Avery, 'Iran 1964-1968: The 
Mood of Growing Confidence', The World Today, November 
1968, pp.453-466.
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assured by the Shah's leadership in the oil negotiations 
which resulted in the Tehran Agreement of 14 February 19 71 
thus holding prospects of a significant increase in 
revenues for the Arab oil producing states in the area. 
Furthermore, by 19 71 the Iranian airforce with its
30 F-4 and 100 F-5 fighters and fighter-bombers, and a 
growing transport force was more than a match for the 
combined Arab forces in the Gulf area. The navy, greatly 
improved, though lacking in experience,completely outclassed 
any possible Arab rival. The army, at 150,000 strong,
was twice as big as that of Iraq and was in a process of
. . . 27 reorganization.
Secondly, from the position of the smaller states
of the Persian Gulf, unable to look after their own defence,
2 8Pax Iranica was not much different from Pax Britannica.
Thirdly, immediately before and after occupation of 
the islands, Iran launched a strong 'diplomatic offensive'
29justifying occupation on historical and strategic grounds.
27
Strategvc Survey 1971, London: IISS, p.40.
2 8 The inability of the Gulf states to defend themselves 
and their heightened sense of insecurity was demonstrated by 
the fact that shortly after Prime Minister Wilson spoke in 
parliament about Britain's withdrawal, the Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi flew to London to confer with the British and offer - 
in general terms and in the name of other Trucial Sheikhs - 
to pay the entire cost of Britain's military presence in 
the Gulf if only it could stay. (See The New York Times,
23 January 1968.)
29 Besides historical and strategic interests, the islands 
had been a thorn in the side of the Iranians because of the 
activities of the Arab inhabitants who earned a profitable 
livelihood from the smuggling of high dutiable articles 
from Dubai into selected creeks along the southern shores of 
Iran. It was, therefore, not surprising to learn that the 
Arabs promptly abandoned the island as soon as it was 
occupied by the Iranian troops. (Owen, op.cit., p.77.)
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Also, the sudden occupation 2 4 hours before the termination 
of the British Treaty of Protection was apparently 
motivated by a desire to show that the dispute over their
30ownership was with Britain rather than the Arab Sheikhdoms.
And finally, Iran's dropping of its historical claim 
to Bahrain assuaged to a greater extent the fears of 
neighbours about Iran's overt, expansionistic designs in 
the Gulf.
In contrast to the sudden occupation of the islands
in the Persian Gulf, Iran's military involvement in Oman
31was more systematic and prolonged. Although the rebellion
32 .m  Oman started m  1965, it was only m  1972 that Iran's 
aid began, in the form of supply of military equipment when
31 For details of development and growth of the insurgency 
and Iran's military role see, D.L. Price, 'Oman: Insurgency 
and Development', Conflict Study* No.53, London: Institute 
for the Study of Conflict, 1975, pp.3-7.
32 In fact, the roots of the rebellion can be traced even 
further back when a large number of Dhofaris joined the 
influx of workers accompanying the Gulf oil boom in the 
1950s. They, along with others, absorbed the ideas of 
Arab nationalism and Marxism. (For details see Fred Halliday, 
Arabia Without Sultans, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974.).
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Sultan Qubbus ben Said's troops could not quell the
33insurgency. The Iranian troops (a battle group of about
34 .1,200 men) landed m  the Dhofar coast of Oman in November
1973 when the Sultan's plea for military support was not
heeded by other Arab states. Early in February 19 74,
Iranian troops freed the entire Salalah-Tamarit road,
splitting the rebel forces into two groups and isolating
35them on the eastern side of Mount Qoreh. The Iranian
battle group left Oman on 10 October 1974 but was replaced
3 6at the end of the year. By 1975 the rebellion had lost 
its momentum, and the insurgents' rout became certain after
33 The Iranian involvement followed the previous unsuccessful 
efforts by other nations e.g. Great Britain, Pakistan 
and to a lesser extent India in helping the Sultan to quell 
the rebellion. The British provided the key positions in 
the command and ranks of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF); 
a great proportion of the non-commissioned officers and 
ordinary enlisted men were Baluchis; and a few Indians 
performed important roles in the fledgling navy. (John 
Duke Anthony, 'Insurrection and Intervention: The War in 
Dhofar', in Abbas Amirie (ed.), The Persian Gulf and Indian 
Ocean in International Politics , Tehran: Institute for 
International Political and Economic Studies, 1975, p.287.)
34 For an essential geography and history of Oman see 
J.C. Wilkinson, 'The Oman Question: The Background to 
the Political Geography of South East Arabia', Geographical 
Journal, September 1971, pp.368-369; R. Azzi, 'Oman: Land 
of Frankincense and Oil', National Geographic, 4 February 
1974; Lorimer's Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Gregg 
International Publishers and Irish University Press 1970; 
Derek Hopwood (ed.), The Arabian Peninsula, Allen and Unwin, 
1972; S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian 
Gulf, London, 1919; and United States Arms Policies in the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past3 Present3 and Future, 
Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the 
Arabian Peninsula, 25th Congress, 1st Session, December 
1977, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 
pp.51-57.
35 Kayhan International, 1 June 1974,
36 .Price, op.cit., p.9.
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the fall of its main stronghold, the port of Rakhyut in
January 1975. In a series of pincer attacks, Iranian
soldiers cleared a 3,000 sq km area of the insurgents,
killing and capturing 250 of them. The remaining insurgents
believed to number about 750, were pushed into a narrow
strip between the border with South Yemen and the Damavand 
37Line.
The Iranian forces suffered losses in January 1975
when some of their soldiers were reportedly killed in an
ambush near Raysut. It was estimated that the total
3 8number of dead by January 1976 was not above 500.
The Sultan made an announcement in December 1975 saying
that the rebellion was defeated. It was however in 1976
that the rebel forces were in dire straits; many were
forced back into their sanctuary in the Peoples' Democratic
39Republic of South Yemen (PDRY) and many others defected.
With regard to weapons and equipment, the rebels were 
reported to have a large number of Soviet made weapons 
which included SAM 7 anti-aircraft missiles, Katyusha 
rockets, 82 mm mortars and heavy cannon with sophisticated
37 Kayhan International, 1 February 1975. The Damavand
Line built in 1975 by the Sultan's forces created a series 
of small but linked military outposts extending from the 
coastal plain into the mountains. The first was, however, 
the Hornbeam Line constructed in 1973. By means of these 
positions in the moutains, the camel and mule tracks leading 
into Dhofar from the PDRY were sealed.
3 8 Lenczowski, op.cit., p.411.
39 ibid.
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fragmentation projectiles. Highly disciplined guerrillas
were given ideological training in'Lenin and Lin Piao schools'
in Hauf and Al-Kaida in South Yemen. Between 50% and 70%
of the rebels had RPG mortars; others were armed with ZPU
41aircraft weapons. According to a defence correspondent,
the total number of Dhofaris active in various political,
military and intelligence fields of the war was estimated
to be about 4,000. But the total fighting force did not
42seem to exceed 2,000.
In comparison to this, the Iranian forces by 1976 were
reported to be ranging between 1,500-2,000 men supported
43by a substantial number of helicopters. By rotating
its forces every three months, Iran was supposed to have
given counter-insurgency training to between 15,000-18,000
4 4troops which served in Dhofar from 1974 to 1977. There
40
40 • i  • j  ibid.
41 Kayhan Internatzonal, 1 February 1975.
ibid., 8 February 1975.
4 3 •According to some writers, the SAF's campaign since
1973 was assisted by the presence of about 3,000 troops
of the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF). See David Lynn
Price, 'Oil and Middle East Security', The Washington
Papers, Vol.IV ,No.41, London: Sage Publications, 1976,
p . 42.
On the contrary, the PFLO in their Gulf Bulletins, 
published in London gave the figure of Iranian forces as
8,000 while Fred Halliday in his book Arabia Without Sultans, 
adduces the figure as 10,000.
44 . . ibid.
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were also reports that Iranian F-5 Phantom jets had been 
carrying out unannounced simulated combat missions twice 
a week near Oman's borders with South Yemen although there
was no possibility of any large-scale South Yemeni attack.
Furthermore, a particular show of military strength came
when in October 1975 a squadron of Iranian destroyers
appeared off the Dhofari coast. Within two days they
fired 1,500 four- and five-inch shells into a six-mile-long
strip of inland territory between the coastal villages
46of Dhalqut and Rakhyut. The heavy bombardment was not
announced by the Iranian and Omani Governments, apparently
to avoid fanning further resentment in other Arab nations
over the military presence of Iran in an Arab country.
However, this Iranian involvement in Oman became
controversial in the adjoining Gulf states and stirred
atavistic fears of the Persian-Arab rivalry. In a press
statement the Sultan said:
The fact that we sought the assistance 
of Iranian troops was in reply to the 
alliance of the so-called Front for the 
Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
with Iran's Tudeh P a r t y .47
The neighbouring Arab states, e.g. Kuwait, Iraq, Syria
and Lebanon, also carried shrill anti-Iranian propaganda
m  their press.
45
45 .Eric Pace, 'Shah of Iran Uses Oman to Train Armed Forces',
The New York Times, 25 January 1976.
46 ibid.
4 7 .Al-Hawadess (Beirut), 12 February 1974 as quoted m  Price,
Oman: Insurgency and Development, p.9.
48 • V •ibid.
81
The Dhofar rebellion ended in 1977 when Iranian troops
were formally withdrawn after suppressing the rebellion
49 . .successfully. The main reasons for successful military
intervention by Iran can be described as the following:
a. Since no help was forthcoming from Oman's Arab 
neighbours when the Sultan made an impassioned plea 
for it, Iran was tacitly taken as the protector of 
the status quo.
b. The Iranian intervention was facilitated to a great 
extent by the absence of any Iranian irredentist 
claims over Oman unlike Bahrain, Iraq, Ras al Khayma 
and Sharjah.
c. The strong overlapping security interests of Iran
and Oman also contributed to Iran's successful military 
performance. Of all the states in the Gulf, Iran and 
Oman are states whose territorial waters overlap as 
they do in the strategic Straits of Hormuz, and 
in which oil tankers traverse at the rate of one
in every 12 minutes. Emphasizing this point the Shah 
once said:
Our role in Oman has not ended ... whenever 
the Sultan of Oman desires our assistance, 
we are ready to return there, and as long 
as the Straits of Hormuz are threatened,
49 The successful suppression of the Dhofar rebellion was 
mainly due to: the lack of cohesion among the rebel groups, 
shortage of military supplies, and withdrawal of international 
support. (For an exhaustive elaboration of the reasons 
for Dhofar rebellion's failure see Anthony op.cit., 
pp.287-295 and Bard E. O'Neill and W. Brundage, 'Revolutionary 
Warfare in Oman: A Strategic Appraisal', Middle East Review3 
Vol.X, No.4, Summer 1978, pp.51-55.)
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the Sultanate of Oman and its stability 
will be important to u s . 50
Besides the security interests, they also shared a
common desire about the perpetuation.of their respective
monarchies from radical threats in the area.
d. The presence of British officers in the Omani army
in senior positions obviated direct contact between
51the Omanis and the Iranians. This diminished to 
a great extent the possibility of a clash between 
the two groups along nationalistic lines.
e. The lack of international sympathy and support for 
the rebels also helped the task of Omani and Iranian 
forces in finally quelling the rebellion. In 1970
(5 years after fighting had begun) none of the Arab 
governments of North Africa supported the guerrilla
50 The Shah's interview to Egyptian daily Al-Ahram as quoted
in Kayhan International, 12 June 1976,
51 Oman's treaty relationship with the United Kingdom began 
in 1798 in order to preempt French interest in the territory. 
Since then, British-Omani links have acquired a special 
relationship, covering economic and political affairs.
The British military involvement in Oman was formalised 
in July 1958 in an Exchange of Letters. In this document, 
the U.K. agreed, at Oman's request, to provide regular 
officers on secondment from the British army; to provide 
training facilities for Oman's armed forces' and to 
advise on training and other matters. By January 1975, 
about 500 British officers and NCOs in all were seconded 
or individually contracted to Sultan's armed forces (SAF) 
and the other sections of the Sultan's government. (See 
Price, Oman: Insurgency and Development, p.14.)
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movement. Yet these states, particularly Egypt 
and to a lesser extent Algeria, had extended decisive 
aid to revolts in the PDRY from 1964-67, who were 
engaged in armed conflict against the British in Aden 
colony. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the UAE in 
the past had supported guerrilla struggles of other 
Arabs. In the case of Oman they either ignored their 
appeals for support or in some cases actually aided
and abetted their principal adversary, the Omani
4- 52 government.
China, at one time a strong supporter of the guerrilla
movements, terminated its assistance in the spring
5 3of 19 73. The Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement in March
1975 over the Shatt-al-Arab dispute was also a major
blow to the rebel cause as Iraq had been a major source
54of funds, training and propaganda for the rebels.
In February 1976, Iraq took the initiative in resuming
55diplomatic links with Oman.
Saudi Arabia established diplomatic ties with 
South Yemen in early 1976 and embarked on a project 
for the construction of an oil pipeline to transport
52 Anthony, op.cit., p.287.
53 .Like Bangladesh and Ethiopia m  1971 and 1972 respectively,
China probably saw more advantage in promoting state-to- 
state relations with Iran rather than supporting a doubtful 
insurgency.
54 In this connection see Shah's interview to C.L. Sulzberger
in International Herald Tribuyie, 23 April 1973.
55 Price, Oil and Middle East Security, p.62.
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crude oil from its fields, through the South Yemen
56territory to the Bay of Aden.
And finally in late 1975 South Yemen backed
5 7down from its open and extensive support for PFLO.
5 6 A good part of the Saudi crude is exported through a 
pipeline to the Mediterranean but this pipeline is susceptible 
to closure in case of war. The new route, if completed, 
would provide a safe alternative to the Saudi crude export, 
in case the entrance to the Persian Gulf is blocked.
(Kayhan International, 10 April 1976.)
57 . . .An important initial signal in this regard was the main
speech delivered in November 19 74 at the Seventh Annual 
Celebrations of the PDRY's independence from Great Britain 
by President Salim Rubaya Ali. On that occasion, the 
President indicated that the day was approaching when the 
Aden regime would seek to establish diplomatic relations 
with the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. This hint of a major 
policy shift was given further momentum a few months later 
when the PDRY's Foreign Minister Salih Mufti visited these 
states to prepare the way for eventual establishment of 
diplomatic relations. (Anthony, op.cit., p.295.)
It may also be mentioned that since 1967, the PDRY 
had been the only serious Marxist regime in the area. In 
its support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Oman (PFLO) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province, Aden had 
provided every kind of assistance, from indoctrination to 
military training. Before the rebellion was defeated,
PFLO's seven-man central committee was based in Aden. 
Recruitment into the PFLO was done at an early age by a 
combination of coercion and invitation. Jabali (mountain) 
children were sent to the People's School, formerly Lenin 
School, at al-Gheidha. Further training in weaponry and 
fieldcraft was provided at the Revolutionary Training Camp 
near Hauf. The hard-core PFLO recruits then went to the 
Soviet Union for further training. Finances for the 
movement were mainly provided by the PDRY in the form of 
a monthly budget or through donations from PFLO members 
and supporters. The PDRY also provided the PFLO with 
passports and its Kuwait embassy was used to maintain 
contacts with PFLO members in the Gulf. East Germany 
assisted in training the PDRY police and security forces, 
and Cuba mainly trained pilots and gave some military and 
medical instructions. (Price, Oman: Insurgency and 
Development, p.7.)
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f. Besides the fizzling out of international support,
the Sultan's strong and effective counter-insurgency
programme emerged as a critical variable. As Walter
Soderlund reminds us:
... as soon as the challenge is in the 
open, the success of the operation 
depends not primarily on the development 
of insurgent strength, but more 
importantly on the degree of vigour, 
determination, and skill with which the 
incumbent regime acts to defend itself, 
both politically and militarily.58
Politically, the Sultan after 1970 embarked
on a serious effort to reduce the insurgents' active
popular support by, inter alia, bringing modern
economic planning and techniques to the Jebal and
other fertile areas, promising Jabali participation
59in the running of their own affairs.
In the military sphere, the new counter-insurgency 
policy stressed solid and well-established counter-
5 8 Walter C. Soderlund, 'An Analysis of the Guerrilla 
Insurgency and Coup d'Etat as Techniques of Indirect 
Aggression', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4, 
December 1970, p.345.
59 Within this context, the role of the Civic Action Teams 
(CATs) stands out prominently. Especially conceived for 
pacification activities, the CATs drilled wells for the 
Jabalis (a major demand) and operated government centres, 
schools, clinics and stores. Compared with the gross 
neglect of the past, this 'benign attention' to the popular 
needs was well appreciated. (For details regarding the 
Sultan's pacification measures see Price, Oman: Insurgency 
and Development, pp.9-12.) For the policies of neglect 
and the incompetence of the previous Sultan, Said bin Taimur, 
also see R.P. Owen, 'Developments in the Sultanate of Muscat 
and Oman', The World Today, Vol.26, No.9, September 1970, 
pp.379-383.
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guerrilla techniques, including aggressive small- 
unit patrols from secure bases in insurgent areas; 
the construction of barriers (the Hornbeam and Damavand 
line) across the PFLO's main camel-train supply 
routes to the more populous eastern sector of Dhofar; 
and the use of local militia (Firqats), half of
whom were defectors from the PFLO, to provide security
, . . 61 and permanent government presence.
Conclusion
Iran's occupation of the islands in the Persian Gulf 
was an arbitrary act while the intervention in Oman was 
based on a request for help by the Sultan's government. 
Both these military undertakings by Iran were motivated 
by a cumulative set of factors. They can be enumerated 
as under:
(a) The Shah's moves served to demonstrate that he 
considered the Persian Gulf to be within Iran's security
6 0 On the territorial offensive strategy read John J. McCuen,
The Art of Counter Revolutionary War, London: Faberr 1966 , 
pp.206-225.
61 Although the role of Iranian intervention in Dhofar was 
successful, the Iranian troops had to operate under certain 
limitations. These limitations were: the fear of political 
opposition from Iran's seven immediate neighbours; the 
desire to prevent the Aden government from being provoked 
to a point where they would be compelled to intervene on 
behalf of the side of the rebels; and the climatic and 
topographical features of Dhofar which limited the free 
mobility and manoeuverability of the troops. (For details 
see Anthony, op.cit., pp.300-302.)
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purview and that he would act quickly in face of likely 
threat in the Persian Gulf or in its vicinity. He under­
lined this point when he said:
Sometimes, the national interest requires 
the commitment of the armed forces 
outside the country's borders; such was 
the case for Iranian military operations 
in [the Omani southern province of]
Dhofar.62
(b) The occupation of the islands served to demonstrate 
dramatically and with considerable psychological and 
political impact, (coming as it did just one day before
the treaties giving Britain control of the external affairs 
of the Trucial Sheikdoms were to expire), that Iran was 
preparing to assume Britain's role as protector of the 
Persian Gulf.^3
(c) Besides strategic considerations, the military
intervention was to give the Iranian army combat experience
64in counter-insurgency operations. By undertaking a 
commitment in Dhofar the Shah was providing valuable
^  Kayhan International, 26 March 1977.
6 3 In this regard note the Shah's statement in which he 
said in unequivocal terms that the United States should 
not and could not step into the 'vacuum created by the 
British withdrawal'. (New York Times, 26 April 1970.)'
6 4 According to some writers even if Dhofar had not existed, 
Iran would have invented it. Dhofar provided a good 
fighting experience and a trial of her newly acquired 
weaponry. (Anthony, op.cit., p.308.)
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operational training for an army heretofore untested in 
combat, logistics, and local maintenance and support - 
all crucial factors in the establishment of a potent 
offensive capability. This, in turn, helped to justify 
her future purchase of armaments. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the combat performance of Iranian troops was, 
at times, described as lacklustre,^5 they were instrumental 
in opening the transportation links with the interior by 
establishing forward helicopter bases, control over the 
road to Midway, in seizing and holding the PFLO's self- 
proclaimed capital of 'liberated Dhofar' at Rakhyut, and 
in building the Damavand line.
65 Washington Post, 16 December 1974. This report by 
Jim Ho'agland indicates that the 3-4 month troop rotation 
policy, over-reliance on fire power in line of pursuit 
and general inexperience accounted for many of the Iranian 
difficulties.
CHAPTER IV 
IRAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
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Introduction
An objective analysis of Iran as a regional military 
power cannot be carried out adequately without studying 
the United States military relationship with Iran. The 
United States has played an important role in strengthening 
Iran which has tried to protect American interests in the 
Persian Gulf area.
Although Iran and other Persian Gulf states gained 
importance among the American public in the winter of 
1973-74, active American interests began early in the 
Second World War. In this Chapter an attempt has been 
made to discuss Iran-United States military relationship 
under the following main headings:
A. The Evolution of U.S. Military Programmes in Iran.
B. THe U.S. Military Presence in Iran.
C. United States Arms Policy: Main Interests and 
Objectives.
Evolution of U.S. Military Programmes in Iran
Although the beginnings of the United States-Iranian 
relationship can be traced back as early as the year 18 51,^ 
the official U.S.-Iranian military cooperation dates from
 ^ This was when a draft treaty was negotiated between the 
American and Iranian envoys to the Sublime Porte at 
Constantinople. For a brief historical overview of Iran-U.S. 
relations from 1851 till the end of the Second World War see, 
Mahmoud Foroughi, 'Iran's Policy Towards the United States' 
in Abbas Amirie and Hamilton A. Twitchell (eds.), Iran in 
the 19 80s, Tehran: Institute for International Political 
and Economic Studies, 1978, pp.339-349.
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World War II when the first U.S. mission went to Iran.
This military cooperation has undergone six principal
2phases during the course of the past 34 years.
Phase I : 1942-45. The United States and Iran signed an
agreement on 27 November 19 43, establishing the U.S.
Military Mission to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
(GENMISH). The purpose of the Mission was to advise and
assist the Ministry of Interior of Iran in the reorganization
of the Gendarmerie and to advise on organizational and
training matters. The initial agreement was for two years
and was extended on an annual or biennial basis until the
organization was deactivated on March 21, 1976.
Phase II : 1945-50. This was a period of extension and
formalization of the U.S. military mission to Iran.
Following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March
31947, the United States and Iran signed an agreement in 
October of that year establishing a U.S. Army Mission Head­
quarters (ARMISH) to enhance the efficiency of the Iranian 
Army. An agreement, subsequently, was signed extending 
credit to the Iranian Government for the purchase of U.S. 
war surplus equipment. President Truman in July 1949 
submitted a message to the Congress on military assistance
2 U m t e a  States Arms Policies in the Perszan Gulf, pp. 133-135 .
3 From Department of State Bulletin XVI, No.409 (Supplement,
4 May 1947), pp.829-832.
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that included a proposal to supply additional military 
items to Iran to strengthen her ability to defend her 
independence.4
Phase III : 1950-60. The United States aid programme 
significantly shifted to military assistance through the 
inauguration of the mutual defence assistance programme. 
Under the United States-Iranian Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement, signed in May 1950, the United States agreed 
to provide the technical personnel to discharge its 
responsibilities for administering the grant assistance 
programme and a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 
was established. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact and the 
Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) on 3 November 1955.
In April 1956, the United States agreed to establish 
a permanent military liaison office at the permanent head-
gquarters of the Pact. In January 1957, Iran, together 
with other Baghdad Pact members, endorsed the Eisenhower
7Doctrine. The then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 
on 27-30 January 1958 addressed the Baghdad Pact meeting
4 See President Truman's speech before a joint session of 
Congress on 12 March 1947, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
Vol.VI, March 15-22, 1947, London: Keesing's Publications 
Limited, p.8491.
5 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 29 October-5 November 
1955, Vol.10, p.14505.
6 Earlier in the first annual meeting of the Pact Council 
held in Baghdad on 21-22 November, the U.S. Government, 
in addition to maintaining permanent political and military 
liaison with the Council of the Pact, also declared its 
intention to establish permanent liaison with the Economic 
Committee (ibid., 3 December-10 December 1955, p.14565.)
7 For study of the text read Thomas P. Brockway, Baszc 
Documents in United States Foreign Policy, rev. ed.,
Toronto: Van Nostrand, 1957, pp.154-155.
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in Ankara informing the delegates that the Eisenhower 
doctrine committed the United States to their defence as 
effectively as would U.S. membership in the Pact; and in 
July of the same year Secretary Dulles told the Pact 
members that the United States would not fail to act in
gdefence of their independence and integrity. The bilateral 
agreements of cooperation with the Pact members were signed 
by the United States on March 1959 just prior to Iraq's
9withdrawal from the Pact on 2 4 March. On 19 August the 
organization was renamed as the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) following Iraq's withdrawal.  ^ Vice President 
Richard Nixon in October reaffirmed U.S. support for Iran's 
efforts to maintain its independence.^^
Phase IV : 1960-64. The U.S. viewed with disfavour the 
Iranian Government's outlays for its armed forces, its 
perennial budget deficits, and its failure to undertake 
economic and social reforms. The Kennedy administration 
urged the Shah to undertake such reforms and initiated cut-
See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15-22 February 1958, 
Vol.XI, p.16023 and 9-16 August 1958, p.16340.
9 For example, an agreement of cooperation between Iran 
and the U.S. was signed on 5 March 1959. For details of 
the agreement see, J.A.S. Grenville, THe Major International 
Treaties 1914-19 7 3 - A History and Guide with Complete 
Texts, New York: Stein and May, 1975, pp.345-346.
^  Asia Recorder - A Weekly Digest of Asian Events with 
Index, New Delhi, Vol.V, No.37, 12-18 September 1959, p.2898. 
For the main provisions and organization of the CENTO pact 
see Treaties and Alliances of the World - An International 
Survey Covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States, 
New York: Keesing's Publications, 1974, pp.182-183.
 ^ Asia Recorder, Vol.V, No.43, 24-30 October 1959, pp.2967- 
2968 .
backs in U.S. military assitance. The consolidation of
ARMISH and the MAAG into a single organization was completed 
12in 1962. In July 1962, the annual payments of $30
million toward the support of the Imperial Iranian Army
13was terminated. The Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson,
visited Tehran in August 1962 and reaffirmed continuing
14U.S. support for Iran's independence. While the Shah
accepted the cutback in military aid, he pursued a more
independent course in foreign affairs. In September 1962,
he notified the Soviet Union that no missile base would
15be permitted on Iranian soil. President Kennedy in 
November 196 3 remarked that about 70 per cent of the U.S. 
military assistance went to nine key countries located on
16or near the borders of the Communist bloc including Iran.
The organization entitled ARMISH-MAAG performed the 
primary functions, e.g. (1) to advise the Iranian Armed 
Forces, primarily the Vice-Minister of War, General Hassan 
Toufanian, on weapons procurement; (2) to process government-
12 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.134.
13 ibid.
14 See Johnson's remarks in Asia Recorder, Vol.Ill, No.39, 
24-30 September 1962, p.4803.
15 In an exchange of Notes on 15 September 1962 at Tehran, 
the Iranian Government gave the Soviet government an 
assurance that Iran would 'not allow any foreign power to 
establish rocket-launching site of any kind on Persian 
territory' and also declared that Iran would never be 
a party to any aggression against the Soviet Union. (See 
Keesinq’s Contemporary Archives, Vol.XIII, 15-22 September 
1962, p.18986.)
16 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.134.
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to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS); and (3) to 
assist Iran in assimilating equipment purchased from the 
United States.
Phase V : 1964-69. This was a period of changing U.S.-
Iranian relationship marked by the phasing out of U.S.
grant military assistance in favour of cash and credit
purchases of military equipment, and by an increasingly
independent national policy in Iranian foreign relations.
The factors influencing this changing relationship included:
(a) increasing oil revenues, permitting Iran to purchase
some of its military requirements; (b) United States-Soviet
detente policy; (c) increasing U.S. preoccupation in
Southeast Asia due to the Vietnam war; (d) Iranian concern
over Egyptian President Nasser's policies in the Middle
East; and (e) Iranian displeasure over the U.S. shift to
arms sales and a desire to diversify the sources of arms
17supplies. A United States-Iranian Memorandum of Under­
standing of July 1964 stipulated that Iran was expected 
to purchase most of its military requirements and that the 
U.S. Government would assure and facilitate credit arrange­
ments for such purchases.^8
17 For a review of a combination of factors which led to 
an increasingly independent Iranian foreign policy in the 
early 1960s also see, R.M. Burrell, 'The Persian Gulf',
The Washington Papers, No.l, New York: The Library Press, 
p p .16-17.
18 U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.134.
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In February 1967, Iran and the Soviet Union signed
an agreement whereby Iran would purchase and/or barter
19$110 million in arms and supplies. The U.S. economic
assistance was terminated in November 1967 on the grounds
that Iran no longer constituted a 'less developed country
and therefore was eligible for Export-Import Bank
20financing'. Grant military assistance was ended in 1969
by virtue of Iran's ability to finance its own needs. In
an interview with an American magazine, the Shah defined
Iran's position saying:
We do not want to see Britain 
leaving and then come in by the 
back door, still pulling strings 
from London. But we don't want 
any Big Powers trying to replace 
Britain.
Phase VI : 1969-present. The U.S. arms sales to Iran
22 . stemmed from the Guam doctrine of July 1969 of building
19 The arms equipment consisted of 'non sensitive' supplies 
of anti-aircraft guns, trucks and armoured troop carriers. 
Burrell, op.cit., p.17.
20 U.S. Arms Polzczes zn the Perszan Gulf, p.134.
21 See U.S. News and World Report, 27 January 1969.
22 In terms of defence procurement this strategy, also called 
the 'Nixon Doctrine' was spelled out in 1970 by the then 
Deputy Secretary of Defence, David Packard:
I believe that the best hope of reducing our 
overseas involvements and expenditures lies in 
getting allied and friendly nations to do even 
more in their own defence. To realize that 
hope, however, requires that we must continue, 
if requested, to give or sell them the tools 
they need for this bigger load we are urging 
them to assume. That is why, in the interests 
of maintaining an adequate defence posture at 
minimum cost, the growing use of credit-assisted 
sales of military equipment, as well as 
increased military assistance, seem clearly 
indicated for the immediate future.
(cont' d)
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up local powers which would be expected to assume increasing
responsibility for collective security with U.S. arms,
but without direct participation of U.S. forces and adoption
23of the 'twin-pillar' policy in the Persian Gulf region.
In May 19 72, President Nixon and the then National Security 
Adviser, Henry Kissinger, agreed for the first time to
22 (cont'd)
(Quoted in United States House of Representatives, Review 
of Technology Transfer to the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries3 Special Oversight Report No. 4S Sub 
Committee on domestic and International Scientific Planning 
and Analysis of the Committee on Science and Technology,
94th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, November 1976, p.225.) Hereafter referred 
to as Special Oversight Report No. 4.
23 Since 1971, the U.S. arms sales policy in the Persian Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula was defined as an essentially two- 
pillar policy focusing on Iran and Saudi-Arabia. In 1975, 
the former Under Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco, 
stated this policy in the following way:
... our whole policy ... has been based on the 
major premise that the two key countries in this 
area are Saudi Arabia and Iran and that to the 
degree to which the United States could promote 
cooperation between these two major countries, 
we would be contributing to stability in the 
area ... We believe that arms policies that 
we have pursued in relationship to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia in particular have contributed not 
only to this greater regional cooperation, but 
to help to meet what they consider and perceive 
to be their security concerns in the area.
(Taken from United States Arms Policies in the Persian 
Gulf, p.7.)
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sell Iran virtually any conventional weapons it wanted 
and so instructed the bureaucracy in a memorandum in late 
July 1972.24
The oil price increase of 1973-74 provided the Iranian 
government with vastly increased means to purchase equipment 
it considered necessary to meet its requirements including 
some of the most sophisticated systems in the U.S. inventory.
After Nixon, the Ford and Carter administrations
went ahead with arms supplies to Iran. They
were either little influenced by the increasingly widespread
expressions of concern about American weapons sales to
the Middle East or unable to stop the transfers, even with
the help of restrictive legislation, such as the International
25Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 197 6.
This act, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, was passed by 
Congress during Gerald Ford's tenure as President (a fact 
frequently obscured by the impression that no significant 
arms control measures had been implemented prior to the 
accession of the Carter administration). The act asserts 
that:
... it shall be the policy of the United 
States to exert leadership in the world 
community to bring about arrangements for 
reducing the international trade in implements 
of war and to lessen the danger of outbreak of
24 ...U.S. Mzlttary Sales to Iran, p . vn.
25 For details of the original text see U.S. Code Congress­
ional and Administrative News, Vol.l, 94th Congress,
2nd Session, 1976, St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 
April 1977, pp.729-769.
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regional conflict and the burdens of 
armaments. U.S. programmes for or 
procedures governing the export, sale, 
and grant of defense articles and 
services to foreign countries shall be 
administered in a manner which will carry 
out this policy ... The President shall 
seek to initiate multilateral discussions 
for the purpose of reaching agreement 
among ... arms suppliers and purchasers and 
other countries with respect to the control 
of the international trade in armaments ...26
Also provided for is the denial of U.S. security
assistance to countries which 'engage in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
2 7human rights'.
The human rights provision was obviously ignored in
the case of Iran, and perhaps other Middle Eastern countries.
It can be assumed that the military sales were being made
under the authority of Section 102 of the act, which allowed
the President to authorize arms transfers to a country
if he feels that 'an unforeseen emergency exists which
requires immediate military assistance' and that a failure
to respond immediately to that emergency will result in
2 8serious harm to vital U.S. security interests. Despite 
the administration's apparent use of the loophole, however, 
the only unforeseen emergency requiring military assistance 
to Iran at its present level existed solely in the Shah's
2  ^ ibid., p . 734. 
27 ibid., p.759. 
ibid., p.730.
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mind. And, contrary to the intentions of the act, the
sales could seriously harm vital U.S. interests.
Under President Jimmy Carter the policy of arms aid
to the Middle East continued as before. But the Carter's
guidelines of May 19 77 attempted to shift the burden of
proving that new weapons technology was necessary to those
who requested it, and they stated that arms transfers
would henceforth be an exceptional instrument of foreign
policy. The guidelines also offered useful restraints in
six areas: the volume of sales, the introduction of
advanced weapons systems into a region, the development
of weapons for export, coproduction of arms, the resale
of American arms to third parties and weapons sales
29promotions by U.S. diplomats and manufacturers.
The United States Military Presence in Iran
The American community in Iran
The United States Embassy in Tehran acknowledged 
the difficulty of estimating the total number of U.S. citizens 
in Iran because of a general lack of data, and noted that 
the American community should be regarded as a fluid entity. 
The majority of U.S. citizens in the country belonged to 
what the Embassy termed 'the resident American Community 
in Iran' which comprised: (a) official U.S. personnel
29 .For details see Facts on File3 World News Dtgest wzth
Index, New York, U.S.A. Vol.37, No.1906, 21 May 1977, p.380.
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attached to the various elements of the mission, including 
the Embassy and the uniformed military and Department of 
Defence civilians with the Security Assistance Advisory 
effort; (b) employees of U.S. defence contractors assisting
with the training of the Iranian personnel, and the adaptation
\
of systems and military hardware; and (c) members of the 
private sector, including businessmen, oil company personnel, 
teachers, and missionaries. The Embassy estimated this 
'resident' group, including dependents, to be about 31,000 
in October 1976, with the official community comprising
14 per cent of the total, defence contractor personnel
3036 per cent, and members of the private sector 50 per cent.
These figures were besides the tourists and transient
businessmen who came for brief visits and were not required
to register at American consulates upon entry in Iran.
The Embassy estimates indicated that the resident
U.S. community, which had risen from about 15,000 in 1972
to its 19 76 level of 31,000, was expected to increase to
31about 35,000 by 1981. It was thought that the number 
would then level off and start declining with the completion 
of civil and military programmes and growing numbers of 
trained Iranian personnel. Some observers, however, 
pointed to the structural weaknesses in Iran that had caused 
delays in the attainment of ambitious project schedules
30 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.139.
31 • v  • j  ibid.
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and continued shortages of technically qualified manpower.
Even by disregarding the acquisition of new weapons systems
Iran was likely to continue to remain dependent upon
American personnel well into the 19 80s. These observers
considered the total American community rising to as many
32as 50,000-60,000 by 1980. According to reliable sources,
the total number of Americans in Iran was estimated to
33be between 40-41,000 by November 1978.
United States Security Assistance Advisory effort
Military and Department of Defence civilian personnel
comprising the Security Assistance Advisory effort in Iran
consisted of the U.S. Army Mission Headquarters-Military
Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISH-MAAG), Technical Assistance
Field Teams (TAFTs), and the U.S. Defence Representative
34(DEFREP). The primary functions of ARMISH-MAAG included 
supervision of U.S. military security assistance matters 
required to foster Iran's military competence and further 
U.S. national policies and interests; advising the Iranian 
Armed Forces on weapons procurement; processing government-
33 United States, House of Representatives, United States 
Arms Sale Policy and Recent Sales to Europe and the Middle 
East - Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, 
95th Congress, 2nd Session, October 5, 1978 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1979), p.140. (Hereafter 
referred to as United States Arms Sale Policy.)
34 This position of Special Representative of the Secretary 
of Defense was abolished in March 1977.
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to-government (FMS) arms sales; and assisting the Iranian
Armed Forces to assimilate equipment purchased from the
35United States.
Before the phasing out of grant Military Assistance
Programme (MAP) aid to Iran, ARMISH-MAAG had played a
significant role in influencing procurement decisions.
Its influence declined after 1972, when decisions on
purchases of very sophisticated weapons systems were
reached and large programmes were established, although
its objective remained the achievement of a balanced
procurement programme for the Iranian Armed Froces. The
ARMISH-MAAG mission often met with criticism from elements
in the Department of Defence and with conflicting influence
3 6from U.S. weapons manufacturers.
Although most of the reputable U.S. firms did make
contact with ARMISH-MAAG, many contractors did not follow
the procedural guidelines that had been established. A
number had pursued their activities without Government
approval and had directly contacted some Iranian government
37leaders.
35 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.140.
36 For a detailed analysis of the competing roles of the 
most important U.S. actors (the President, State Department 
and Department of Defence) see U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 
p p .38-48.
37 For example, Mr Jones of the Northrop Corporation 
approached the Iranian Government directly to carry out a 
sales campaign for the F-18L aircraft. (See United States, 
House of Representatives, Review of Recent Developments in 
the Middle East - Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe 
and the Middle East of the Committee on International 
Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Session, June 8, 1977, 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p.86.)
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During the 10-year period of 1961-71, the number of 
personnel assigned to the MAAGs had been reduced by the 
Department of Defence by some 75 per cent. In 19 72, the 
Congress had directed further personnel cuts. Following 
the Congressional directive for the reduction of MAAG 
personnel, and in order to avoid increasing the number of 
personnel assigned to ARMISH-MAAG, the U.S. Government 
signed a TAFT agreement with the Government of Iran (GOI)
3 8in January 1973 for 552 personnel at a cost of $16.6 million.
This step was taken at a time when it was apparent
that Iran would require substantial assistance, on a much
greater scale than before, in assimilating specific equipment,
technology and supporting systems emanating from projected
purchases from the United States. Thus, whereas the number
of authorised U.S. personnel assigned to ARMISH-MAAG since
1973 remained at 209 (191 military; 18 civilian), the
number of TAFT personnel increased from the initial 552
39in 1973 to 921 in 1976. The TAFT concept, therefore, had
been the principal means for providing U.S. military
personnel to assist the Iranian Armed Forces in in-country
training, management, maintenance, and utilization of
40U.S. equipment, weapons and supporting systems.
3 8 U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p.35.
39 United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.141.
40 ibid.
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The importance attached to the above advisory groups 
can be gauged from the following table which indicates 
the projected numbers of personnel assigned to them through 
fiscal year 1981.
Table 1
Authorised U.S. Military and Civilian 
Personnel in Iran
Projected
Current fiscal year 1977 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
ARMISH-MAAG:
Army section 109
Navy section 34
Air Force section 66
Total 209
TAFT-IRAN: [Security deletion]
Army 255
Navy 136
Air Force 321
Support activities 151
Total 863 1,782 675 568 497
Source: U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.141.
CARMISH-MAAG operated under the direct military command 
of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe and under 
supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Iran and the Defence 
Representative. He commanded the ARMISH-MAAG and the TAFTs 
and, as deputy of the DEFREP, maintained supervision and 
co-ordinating authority over all other Department of Defence
105
elements related to security assistance. The ARMISH-MAAG/ 
TAFT organization was as follows:
Table 2
ARMISH-MAAG/TAFT ORGANIZATION
UAAS AUTH TAFT AUTH
FY77 809 FY77 863
Source: U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.142.
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The CARMISH-MAAG was faced with the task of assuring
that the efforts of ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT personnel were
combined into a cohesive and effective advisory programme.
The Department of Defence made a conceptual distinction
between ARMISH-MAAG and the TAFTs, namely: that ARMISH-MAAG
was concerned with advisory and staff functions of a
continuing nature, whereas the TAFTs were 'short-term'
teams focusing on the introduction of new equipment and
associated logistics systems, i.e. to 'train the trainers'.
Iran paid all expenses associated with the TAFTs and
70 per cent of the cost of the MAAG. The MAAG was largely
located in Tehran whereas 40 per cent of the TAFTs were
41located in the country.
These distinctions were generally valid, but it should 
be noted that in the 1950s and early 1960s, when MAAG 
strengths were generally larger worldwide, a large-number 
of MAAG personnel performed the same tasks currently assigned 
to the TAFTs in Iran.
The 'short-term' description of the TAFTs in Iran 
implied that any specific TAFT job or function would probably 
last for two or three years. It was, however, envisioned 
that new TAFTs would be constantly required over the next 
five to ten years if the major U.S. military programmes in 
Iran were to succeed. It was also thought that logistical 
and maintenance support for major systems would be a primary 
area in which the TAFTs would continue to play an essential
41 . .U.S. Mvlttary Sales to Iran, p.35.
42 • i •  ^ibid.
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The Iranian Government paid the costs for all but
43eight spaces in ARMISH-MAAG. It paid for the entire
costs of the TAFTs, including direct and indirect costs
such as pay, allowances, and retirement benefits; special
training associated with particular missions in Iran;
and transportation and administrative costs. From the
initial $16.6 million in 1973, the cost to the Iranian
Government for TAFTs - as FMS TAFT and support cases -
44increased to $9 3.4 million in 1976. TAFT performed the 
following main functions in the various services:
TAFT FUNCTIONS
AIR FORCE ARMY
Communications/Electronics
F-4 Maintenance
F-5 Mainentance
Aircraft Warning and Control
Logistics
Training and Administration 
F-14 Programme 
1-Hawk Programme 
TAFT support
Aviation
Logistics
Maintenance
Mise
Signal
1-Hawk Programme 
TAFT support
NAVY
Logistics and Supply 
Civil Engineering 
Communications 
Personnel
Training and Training aids 
Financial MGMT 
TAFT support
Ship Operations
Helo Operations
Aviation Maintenance
Repair
Maintenance
F-14 Programme3
P-3 Programme*3
a, b. Under operational control of Air Force
Source: United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p.143
4 3 This figure has subsequently been reduced to 4 slots.
44 United States Arms Policies in the Perszan Gulf, p.143.
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A U.S. Defence Representative (DEFREP) was appointed 
to provide advice and information in defence matters to 
the U.S. Ambassador to Iran. He was also required to 
provide information to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CARMISH-MAAG 
of Defence Department activities. He was also supposed 
to take local initiative toward improving the interface 
between noncombatant Defence Department elements, the U.S. 
Ambassador, and the Iranian defence establishment; and 
to perform representational responsibilities to the Iranian
defence establishment and to the U.S. Ambassador not otherwise
, 45 assigned.
The DEFREP arrived in Iran in September 1975 as a 
consequence of growing concern on the part of Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger and Assistant Secretary of Defense/ 
International Security Affairs Ellsworth over management 
of the rapidly increasing array of FMS programmes that 
had been initiated with the 1973 rise in oil prices and 
fast expansion of the Iranian Armed Forces. Some American 
officials had considered that the military sales programmes 
lacked essential controls, that neither the Embassy in 
Tehran nor Washington officials were receiving full infor­
mation on some arms sales to Iran, and that some elements 
of the Defence Department were cooperating with private 
U.S. firms in promoting arms purchases.
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With the increase in the volume of cash sales of 
highly sophisticated equipment, the Secretary of Defence's 
concern focused on the potential porblems Iran might face 
with respect to resource allocation and assimilation and 
an erosion of Iranian confidence in the U.S. Government 
that could raise serious policy questions regarding the 
U.S. Government's credibility. Prior to the DEFREP's 
appointment, Secretary Schlesinger had dispatched an 
unofficial representative to the Iranian Government, a 
retired U.S. Army colonel, Richard Hallock, with the 
mission of informing the Office of the Secretary of Defence 
on Iranian arms programmes and of advising the Iranian 
Government at the highest levels on its defence procurements.
The DEFREP's appointment was made for one year.
Mr Eric von Marbod was selected for this assignemnt.
His terms of reference had been negotiated within the 
Defence Department and with State Department officials. 
Following his arrival in Tehran, the DEFREP sought to 
keep the Iranian Government fully informed on all perceived 
problems and constraints involving acquisitions of new 
U.S. weapons systems. His mission, in the main, was to 
identify these problem areas and recommend solutions, 
together with insuring that the Defence Department remained 
an 'honest broker' in arms transactions between Iran 
and the United States. At the same time, he was charged 
with emphasizing that arms procurement decisions remained 
the responsibility of the Iranian Government, and that
110
his mission in no way represented a change in basic U.S.
, . 46 
p o l i c y .
It was found that the broad supervisory responsibility
of CARMISH-MAAG had not been complemented by a requisite
command authority. His coordination authority was inadequate
for the scope and diversity of security assistance
activities in Iran and, therefore, he did not possess full
supervision of support units or, in many cases, of offices
monitoring and managing key FMS programmes in the country.
The ARMISH-MAAG lacked sufficient staff to adequately
develop and implement some programmes.
Mr von Marbod completed 6 months over his 1-year
term and returned to the United States in March 1977.
The position of DEFREP was not refilled after his departure.
A considerable number of observers have considered the
appointment of a DEFREP to have been a positive and useful
step, particularly in light of the problems that have
emerged with respect to the management and implementation
47
of the FMS programme. Von Marbod had told the Iranian 
Government of actual or potential problem areas with weapons 
systems under contract, including those arising from
46
For details of the role of the Defence Representative 
in Iran also see U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p p . 47-48.
47 .
See United States, House of Representatives, Revzew
of Recent Developments in the Middle East - Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st 
Session, June 8 1977 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977), p . 79.
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construction of support facilities and manpower and 
logistics shortfalls. In addition, the Iranian Government 
had been made aware of perceived problems and constraints 
that might emerge from the introduction of new U.S. systems.
United States Defence contractors
ARMISH-MAAG had estimated that the civilian defence-
oriented U.S. community in the country would increase to
48
at least 34,000 including dependents, by 19 80. After
1975 more than 40 U.S. firms were engaged in military
contracts in Iran. However, the best estimate as of October 1,
19 75 was that forty-four firms employing 2,9 41 personnel
49
were operating in Iran. Sixty per cent of these personnel 
were located in Tehran. Their geographical distribution 
was as follows:
Table 3
Location of Personnel
Bandar Abbas
Tehran
Isfahan
1,758
836
163
Shiraz
Sharobi 53
23
16
5
4
1
82
Masj id-e-Soleman
Bushehr
Tabriz
Vahdati
Bandar Pahlavi
Total 2,941
Source: U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p . 36.
4 8
United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p . 145.
U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p . 36.
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The major U.S. firm involved in the larger military 
programmes was Bell Helicopter International. It was 
obligated to furnish in-country training and the development 
of a complete maintenance and logistics support system 
for the Imperial Iranian Air Force, and had about 2,400
personnel in Iran. More than 50 per cent of these employees
. . 50 . . .
were retired military personnel. Bell administrative
facilities were located in Tehran; its technical training
centre was at Isfahan, and a logistical division at
Mehrabad. The Grumman Aircraft Corporation, in conjunction
with the F-14 programme had by October 19 77 about 460
personnel at Isfahan, and anticipated that its Iran-based
employees would reach about 1,000, not including dependents,
51
by mid-19 81 before the programme's scheduled phase-down.
There were always problems in the involvement of a 
U.S. contractor, technical and advisory personnel in the 
operation, training, maintenance, and logistics of weapons 
systems sold to Iran. The large involvement of U.S. 
technicians could restrict U.S. foreign policy options, 
especially in the event of regional conflict. In addition, 
if the programmes did not develop as scheduled, Iranian 
attitudes towards the United States could become less 
favourable and, coupled with the expected growth of numbers 
of U.S. personnel, the chances of friction at the working 
level could increase.
United States Arms Policies in the Persvan Gulf, p . 146.50
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A large number of contractor personnel arriving in 
Iran experienced sociological and cultural difficulties, 
and attrition rates were reported to be high among those 
unable to adjust to the Iranian environment. An issue 
of particular concern with management and employees of U.S. 
firms was the change in the Tax Reform Act of 19 76 which
(1) reduced the amount of income U.S. citizens working 
overseas were permitted to exclude from reported earnings;
(2) excluded the application of foreign taxes as a credit
against U.S. income taxes; and (3) made the tax change
52
retroactive to 1 January 19 76.
The housing, education and other allowances were 
very high in the Gulf and an average American employee 
in the Gulf might have a taxable income of over $50,000 
annually before he even received his pay check. Many 
Americans refused to work for the reduced real income these 
tax provisions forced on them. This required United States 
employers to hire more non-Americans, thus reducing the
52
The provisions of the Tax Reform Act 1976 that caused 
major problems overseas were:
(1) The reduction of foreign source income inclusion from 
$20,000 ($25,000 after 3 years) to $15,000 for bona fide 
[U.S.] residents of a foreign country;
(2) Requirements that housing or other services in kind 
furnished to an employee be reported as income and taxed 
accordingly; and
(3) The provision taxing education assistance provided 
by employers as income to employed parents.
(See United States, Senate, Report (together with Dissenting 
Views) to the United States Senate of the Senate Delegation 
on American Foreign Policy in E u r o p e s the Middle East and 
India, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
September 19, 1978, p . 41.)
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monies transferred back to the United States. More serious,
however, was the fact that United States firms, to meet
these extra costs, were pricing themselves out of the Gulf
markets to European and Japanese competition. In recognition
53
of this, the Congress rescinded these provisions in 1978.
The following listing indicates American firms with con­
tracts in Iran and the number of personnel employed by each, as 
of October 19 75:
Table 4
List of Contractors and Personnel
Company Major field of activity Number of
Personnel
AAI Corp 
Augusta Bell 
Avco Corp/Lycoming 
B e U H e l i c o p t e r  Int. 
Booz Allen & Hamilton 
Bowen-McLaughlin-York 
Brown & Root E&C 
Cessna Aircraft Co. 
Collins Radio 
Computer Sciences 
C o r p .
Emerson Electric 
Epsco Inc.
General Dynamics 
General Electric 
General Motors/ 
Allison 
Grumman Aerospace 
C o r p .
Hazeltine Corp.
Hughes Aircraft
ITT
International
Technical Product 
Itek Corp.
Aircraft Electronics 
Aircraft Maintenance 
Aircraft Engine Maintenance 
Flight Training 
Programme Management 
Tank Rebuilding 
Shipyard Construction 
Aircraft
Communications Electronics
Computers Software 
Armament Maintenance 
Electronics 
Missiles
Engines and Armament
Aircraft Engine Maintenance
Aircraft Maintenance 
Electronics
Aircraft Electronics and 
Munitions 
Communications Electronics
Communications
Electronics
3 
10 
13
424
7
35
16
1
4
264
1
1
11
15
19
1
7
4
85
3
(cont1d)
5 3
David E. Long, 'The United States and the Persian Gulf', 
Current H i s t o r y , V o l . 76, N o . 443, January 1979, p . 30.
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Company Major field of activity Number of
Personnel
Kaman Aerospace Corp. Aircraft Maintenance 3
Litton Electronics 7
Lockheed Aircraft Maintenance 123
Logistics Support
Corp. Aircraft Miantenance 160
Martin-Marietta Electronics 4
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Maintenance 41
Northrup Missiles/Aircraft Maintenance 29
Page Communications Communications 5
Philco-Ford Electronics 35
Pratt-Whitney Aircraft Engine Maintenance .4
Raytheon Missiles 126
RCA Corp. Electronics 7
SDC Air Defence System Training 4
Singer Co. Electronics 1
Stanwick Shipyard Construction 107
Sylvania Corp. Electronics 3
Texas Instruments Armament 2
Westinghouse Electronics 140
Total 2,728
Source: U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p . 59.
United States Arms Policy: Main Interests and Objectives
The main interests and objectives of the U.S. arms 
policy towards the Persian Gulf, particularly Iran, can be 
gauged from a review of the volume of arms transferred.
The arms sales agreements between the United States 
and Iran were comparatively modest before the influx of 
petrodollars. This influx gave Iran the means to purchase 
almost any conventional weapons system it desired. In 19 70, 
Iran had placed Foreign Military Sales orders with the 
United States for $113 million; 2 years later, but still 
before the oil price increase, Iran placed orders for $519 
million of material. The trend was definitely upward, but
the totals were comparatively small in relation to the
116
enormous increases during the years that followed. For
example, as a result of the oil price increase in 197 3,
the Iranian orders from the U.S. rose to $2.2 billion in
1973 and $4.3 billion in 1974. The figures decreased in
the following two years - $3 billion in 1975 and $1.4 billion
in 19 76 - probably as a consequence of the world recession
54
and a lessening demand for the Iranian oil. In 1977,
however, the total had increased to $5.8 billion while the
agreements signed in 19 7 8 showed a significant reduction as
compared with the previous year, amounting to some $2.6 
55
billion. In all, the U.S. had signed approximately
$20 billion worth of sales agreements with Iran from 1950
5 6
to date. For details of arms sales agreements and 
deliveries see Table 5 below:
54 .See United States Arms Policies in the Perszan Gulf,
p p .135-136.
55
United States Arms Sale Policy, p p . 17-18. 
ibid., p . 17.
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Table 5
United States-Iranian Foreign Military Sales 
Agreements and Deliveries
[in thousands of dollars]
Fiscal year Agreements Deliveries
1950-66 292,494 47,292
1967 143,873 38,866
1968 69,038 56,717
1969 251,573 94,881
1970 113,154 127,717
1971 396,841 79,352
1972 519,110 214,807
1973 2,157,355 238,633
1974 4,373,225 510,347
1975 3,020,979 956,372
19 76a 1,382,062 1,231,600
Total 1950-76 12,796,327 4,050,103
1977b 5,465,600 2,433,000
cl
Includes transitional quarter (fiscal year 1977). 
Estimated figures.
Source: United States Arms Policies in the Persian G u l f , 
p . 135.
Iran in recent years had become the foremost purchaser
of U.S. arms. It is estimated that Between 1950 and 1976,
the United States had sold arms to Iran valued in excess
5 7
of $13 billion. The equipment provided included a wide 
array of items like cargo/transport aircraft, electronic 
warfare aircraft, fighters, helicopters, patrol aircraft, 
reconnaissance aircraft) tanker aircraft, utility/liaison
U m t e d  States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p . 136.
5 7
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aircraft, observation aircraft, destroyers, corvettes, 
submarines, fast patrol boats, landing craft, armoured 
personnel carriers, tanks, air-to-air missiles, air-to- 
surface missiles, drones, smart bombs, howitzers, self- 
propelled artillery, and radar systems. Under the existing 
laws, the U.S. Government had the authority to control 
all military export sales from the U.S., whether on a 
government-to-government or a commercial basis. Commercial 
sales, while on a smaller basis than government-to-government 
sales, have shown a steady increase, as indicated in 
deliveries since 1972. See Table 6 below:
Table 6
U.S. Commercial Military Exports to Iran
Fiscal year Thousands
1960-66 $ 5,905
1967 2,022
1968 5,147
1969 10,084
1970 9,811
1971 27,059
1972 36,975
1973 19,421
1974 35,322
1975 49,410
19 76a -
$ 201,156
Source: United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, 
p . 136.
The total dollar value of U.S. military equipment ordered 
by Iran as of 31 December 1976 is indicated in the Table 7 
below:
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Table 7
United States-Iranian Military Sales by Category 
[in thousands of dollars]
Category FMS
ordered
FMS
delivered
Undeliverec
balances
Aircraft 773,143 2 ,282,404 2,490,739
Ships 1,505,253 32,250 1,473,003
Vehicles/Weapons 538,063 292,764 245,299
Ammunition 837,416 403,610 433,806
Missiles 1,207,633 352,026 855,607
Communication
Equipment 367,534 135,569 231,964
Other equipment 245,987 111,347 134,640
Construction 572 592 21
Repair/Rehabilitation
equipment 132,114 7,688 124,426
Supply operations 522,885 166,490 356,395
Training 391,272 219,895 171,377
Other services 1,576,726 426,354 1,150,372
Undefined plus
adj ustments 345,309 345,309
Total 12,443,906 4 ,430,990 a 8,012,916
country programme
a Through the 1980s.
Source: United States Arms Policies in the Persian 
Gulf, p . 137.
Iran's rising graph of military expenditure since 1970 
showed a marked contract with its neighbouring countries. All 
put together, the U.S. arms sales to the Persian Gulf and the 
Red Sea regions occupied a significant portion of the global 
arms sales. See Table 8.
Foreign Military Sales Orders of Countries Visited 
[Dollar amounts in millions]
Table 8
Country 1970 1971 1972
Fiscal Year 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
estimated
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
Iran 113.1 397 .5 522.1 2,138.1 4,270.6 2,570.3 1 ,301.3 5,000.0
Saudi Arabia 44. 8 14.9 459 . 3 1,993.5 1,906.5 1,549.9 2 ,502.5 979.6
Bahrain - - - - - .018 - -
Kuwait - - (a) .053 29.0 377.8 130. 6 40.0
Oman - - - - - 1.6 .23
Yemen — — — — 2.6 . 37 138.5 2,0
Persian Gulf
Regional Total 157.9 412.40 981.4 4,131.65 6,218.7 4,499.9 4 ,073.1 6,021.6
Persian Gulf
Percentage of 16.7 26. 3 29. 8 71. 6 58.9 45 .6 48.7 63.4
World Total
Ethiopia 0.006 - 0.01 - 7.4 22.1 118. 8 25.0
World wide Total 945.5 1, 568.8 3 ,297.4 5,772.1 10,562.4 9,862.8 8 ,368.5 9,505.5
(a) Less than $550 •
S o u r c e : United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf, p . 50.
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Since World War II, the United States has officially
viewed the arms transfers as a useful instrument of their
foreign policy. American policy-makers have claimed
that arms sales strengthen collective defence arrangements,
maintain regional military balances, secure bases and operating
rights for the United States, and compensate for the with-
5 8
drawal of American forces. Besides all this, the U.S. 
had strategic, economic, political and commercial interests
59
m  selling arms to Persian Gulf countries, particularly Iran.
Strategically speaking Iran was the most 'important
6 0
real state' for the United States which existed between 
Israel and Japan. Armed with a wide array of sophisticated 
weapons purchased from the U.S. and Britain, the Shah's
61
empire fulfilled two major political-military missions:
1. As long as the Shah's government ruled, Iran was a 
bulwark against the spread of communism or radical Moslem 
nationalism in a key region of Asia, and
2. A militarily effective Iran would safeguard the oil 
shipments out of the Gulf from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
5 8
Leslie M. Pryor, 'Arms and the Shah', Foreign Policy,
V o l . 31, N o . 31, Summer 1978, p. 56.
59 . . .
K. Subrahmanyam, 'Military Aid and Foreign Policy',
Foreign Affairs R e p o r t s , Vol.XVII, N o . 11, November 1968, p . 112. 
0
Drew Middleton, 'Iran Upheaval Threatens U.S.',
International H e rald  T r i b u n e , 2 November 1978.
61 • i • j  i b i d .
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Arab Emirates and Iran itself to the U.S. and north western
62
E u r o p e .
While emphasizing the role of Iranian military strength 
for the stability of the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State, Alfred Atherton, once said that Iran 
and Saudi Arabia have continued to share 'the primary 
responsibility for stability in the Persian Gulf'. Describing 
further the U.S. technical cooperation with states in the 
Persian Gulf, Atherton said that Iran was 'a special case
because of a much higher degree of development and industri-
. . . . 63 
alisation.
On the geo-strategic salience of the Persian Gulf to
the U.S., Alvin Cottrell said:
We have entrusted our policy to two big 
kingships. If Iran goes under, it would 
be very doubtful if the Saudi regime 
could go it alone. The whole area is 
like a mosaic that can come a p a r t . 64
The deep strategic interests of U.S. with Iran have
been voiced through pronouncements by every U.S. president
since Truman. Jimmy Carter on the eve of the Shah's visit
to U.S.A. in 1977 said:
6 2
For West European abiding concern with the continuation 
of East-West detente, economic cooperation with the Soviet 
Union and future stability and continuity (of the Shah's) 
regime in Iran see, Karl Kaiser, 'Iran and the Europe of 
the Nine: a relationship of growing interdependence',
The World Today, V o l . 32, N o . 7, July 1976, pp.251-259.
6 3
Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 12 August 1974.
Alvin Cottrell, as quoted in Newsweek, 20 November 1978.6 4
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X
We look upon Iran's strength as an 
extension of our own strength and 
Iran looks upon our strength as an 
extension to theirs.65
On another occasion, Carter spoke of the deep person?
friendship with the Shah and the unshakable military alliance
between Iran and the U.S. He later remarked:
We have no other nation on earth 
with which we have closer consul­
tations on regional p r o b l e m s . 66
The most important 'regional problem' for the U.S.,
obviously, was the protection of sea routes by Iran in the
north-west quadrant of the Indian Ocean. In its May 1975
survey of the Persian Gulf region, the Economist noted with
sympathy this protective role assigned to Iran and wrote:
These sea-routes are the most unprotected 
parts of the Western economic system, and 
so long as inflation continues it is unlikely 
that the American or British or French navies 
will be able to afford to give them adequate 
supervision. The Shah's interest in the 
Indian Ocean complements the West's very neatly 
and it should be the aim of governments in 
Washington and London and Paris to coordinate 
the two as closely as p o s s i b l e . 67
According to Senator Abraham Ribicoff:
Iran is one of the most important allies 
the United States has. When you realize 
that 50 per cent of the world's oil comes 
through the Straits of Hormoz and the only 
armed forces to protect it are Iran's, to
President Jimmy Carter as cited in Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
19 November 1977.
6 6
Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 7 January 1978.
The Economist, 17 May 1975 (Survey Section).
6 7
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refuse [the Shah] arms would be sheer 
stupidity on the part of the United 
S t a t e s .68
f
Again, in an evidence given before the U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee of the Near East in July 1971,
J.E. Akins, Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy
of the State Department, said:
In terms of present investments as well 
as future dependence, the Persian Gulf 
oil fields are an important point of 
focus for American foreign and defence 
p o l icies.69
At the same time, American strategic planners cannot ignore 
the fact that the United States depends on Indian Ocean 
routes for strategic minerals and materials in Africa,
70
including beryl, chrome ore, copper, lead and uranium.
This extraordinary importance of the Persian Gulf area,
especially Iran, was revealed when President Carter signed
a memorandum in August 19 77. This memorandum came after a
six month National Security Council study that gave Iran
and its oil resources a new importance in American strategic
planning. The memorandum also ordered 'light deployment
forces' to be prepared to protect the Middle East and South
71
Korea in the event of any attack.
6 8
Senator Abraham Ribicoff as-quoted in 'Becoming a Middle 
East Super Power', The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel,
Oil and the Arabs, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Third edition, 
September 1977, Washington, D.C., p . 16.
69
R.M. Burrell, The Persvan Gulf, The Washington Papers, N o . 1, 
New York: The Library Press, 1972, p . 4.
70
H.M.L. B e n ,  'Super Powers and Arms Race in West Asia',
The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal,
New Delhi, Vol.IX, N o . 3, January-March 1977, p p . 302-303.
71
See Kayhan I n t e r n a t z o n a l , 17 September 1977.
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The U.S. strategic interest in Iran also stemmed from
the latter's proximity to the Soviet Union and the Arab world.
It is fair to assume that Iran being the closest ally of
U.S.A. in the area after Israel must have permitted some
U.S. surveillance and monitoring equipment against the
72
Soviet Union. Earlier, Rockwell International had
been involved in building an intelligence base from which
Iran could monitor military and civilian electronic communi-
7 3
cations throughout the Persian Gulf region. Besides Iran,
the United States had maintained access to four military
communications and intelligence facilities in the neighbour-
74
hood of the Gulf area. Diego Garcia is the principal 
American facility in the Indian Ocean region. An agreement 
was reached in December 1966, between Britain and the U.S. 
which provided for the construction of this naval facility.
In 1975 the U.S. had started upgrading it.
A modest upgrading to take larger transport aircraft, and 
deepening the lagoon to allow anchorage for an aircraft
72
This can be broadly deduced from a television address 
by President Carter that U.S. would need a year or so to 
put back the monitoring equipment lost in the recent distur­
bances in Iran for SALT II. (The Canberra Times, 2 May 1979).
73
The Mzddle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Ozl and the Arabs,
3rd edition, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 
September 1977, p . 12.
74 . .
These included a naval contingent in Bahrain, landing
rights on Masirah Island, Oman and the Kagnew station in 
the Eritrean Province in Ethiopia. The latter facility for 
U.S. presence and use was, however, terminated on 2 3 April 
19 77 at the direction of the Ethiopian Government when a 
U.S. reassessment was made. See United States Arms Policy, 
p . 10.)
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carrier, met resistance from the U.S. Congress, raised doubts
with the 'owners' (the British Labour government) and aroused
the condemnation of littoral states including Australia,
mostly for the wrong reasons. It was feared that what the
Pentagon was really seeking was a capacity to station long-
range strike aircraft in the island, and probably also to
erect naval facilities for servicing nuclear submarines,
and that this would spark off further competitive escalation
75
by the Soviet Union. The upgrading was sought in fact
because of the reluctance of the Europeans to allow American
war material stockpiled in Europe to be transferred to Israel.
This was mainly due to European nations' disillusionment
with Israeli intransigence after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
Moreover, in the absence of a Jewish lobby comparable to that
which exists in the United States, governmental attitude
had also shifted somewhat towards the Arabs, particularly
76
after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Hence, it was very probable 
that the Diego Garcia lobby in the Pentagon exploited the 
situation created by the 1973 War to further their objectives 
of upgrading, and to enlist the sympathies of the supporters 
of Israel in America by linking Diego Garcia to the Middle 
East situation. At present Diego Garcia deploys 
numerous surveillance flights, provides fleet 
replenishment services and is linked with the American
75
T.B. Millar, 'The Military-Strategic Balance', in Abbas 
Amirie (ed), The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International 
Politics , Tehran: Institute for International Political and 
Economic Studies, 1975, pp.94-95.
7
For a somewhat different interpretation of Diego Garcia's 
upgrading see Ranjan Gupta, The Indian Ocean: A Political 
G e o g r a p h y , New Delhi: Marwah Publications, 1979, p p . 48-51.
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network. It can also apparently receive, process and relay
transmissions from aircraft and satellites overflying
77
Communist nations.
The Iranian government tended to look upon this
American presence in the Indian Ocean as benign and as a
necessary antidote to actual or potential Soviet presence
in that area. Referring to this point the Shah once said:
I am not opposing the Diego Garcia 
base as long as there are other powers 
in the Indian Ocean ...78
The same theme was underlined by the then Iranian Ambassador
to the U.S. when he stated:
As long as one of the super powers 
[Russia] maintains an active presence 
in the Indian Ocean it makes it necessary 
for the U.S. to have its presence there 
for the maintenance of peace and stability.
7 7
For a technical analysis of Diego Garcia's functions and 
capabilities see Lenny Siegel, 'Diego Garcia', in Pacific 
Research, Vol.8 (March-April 1977), p p . 1-12. By mid-1976, 
Australia, a former opponent, agreed to increase air and 
naval surveillance in the Indian Ocean and possibly to take 
over some roles from the United States. It is estimated that 
about one in four deployments of Diego Garcia's surveillance 
missions are carried out by Australian P-3s. (D.L. Price,
'Oil and Middle East Security', The Washington Papers, Vol.IV, 
N o . 41, London: Sage Publications, p p . 77-78 and Henry S. 
Albinski, 'Australia and the Indian Ocean', Seminar paper 
read in Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian 
National University, Canberra, 5 April 1979, pp.12-13.)
For details also see, Propos ed Expansion of U.S. Military 
Facilities in the Indian Ocean, U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9 3rd Congress, 
2nd Session, 1974, Washington: Government Printing Office.
7 8 Shah replying-to questions from National Press Club 
during his visit to Australia. (See Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,
5 October 1974.)
79 . . .
As quoted in ibid., 11 June 1977.
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The U.S. strategic preoccupation with Iran and the 
Persian Gulf was validated when a sizable naval exercise 
MIDLINK was held in late 1974 to demonstrate strength in
8 0
sea-lanes carrying Persian Gulf oil to Western countries.
Annual naval exercises were held by the CENTO countries
in the area. Again in late 19 77, concentrated naval and air
manoeuvres were held in the Persian Gulf. The manoeuvres,
code-named MIDDLING, took place in a real tactical situation
which involved the naval and airforces of the member countries,
and included exercises in anti-submarine warfare, air defence
81
and anti-submarine attack. It was thought by some 
observers that the U.S. had also a contingency plan to 
despatch 100,000 combat troops to the Persian Gulf at 
two weeks' notice.82
At least as important as these strategic considerations 
was America's economic interest in Iran. The revolutionary 
changes that have occurred in the economics and politics of 
world oil in the 19 70s undoubtedly added a new dimension 
to the American-Iranian relations. Firstly, Iran emerged 
as the second largest exporter of crude oil after Saudi 
Arabia, with a production around 5.5 million barrels a day 
in the mid-1970s; secondly, it became the main supplier
8 0
This naval exercise was held under the auspices of CENTO, 
linking the U.S., Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in a 
military grouping and designed to help preserve peace and 
security in the region.
81
Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 26 November 1977.
8 2 Richard Burt, 'Asia's Great Game Moves With a Vengeance',
The New York Times, 9 July 1978.
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of America's ally, Japan; thirdly, as of 1970-71 the
United States had turned from self-suffiency to growing
dependence on imported oil, a dependence exemplified by over
4 0 per cent of its requirements being provided by foreign
84
oil m  the mid-1970s; and fourthly, the balance of 
payments of the United States as well as of other major 
consumers of imported oil was seriously affected by the 
quadrupling of the prices of crude decreed by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
following the Iranian-Venezuelan initiative of the Tehran 
conference in late 19 73. In the late 19 70s, the cost of 
imported oil in the United States was burdening the
8 5
American economy at the rate of $40-45 billion a year.
From the American point of view, the reliability of 
the Iranian supply was a critical consideration. Iran did 
not participate in the 19 73 oil embargo and in the councils 
of OPEC, and held an important swinging position on the
8 3
8 3
Besides Japan, Europe and Israel have a critical dependence 
on Persian Gulf oil. Israel, for example, depended on 
Iran for over 70 per cent of its petroleum needs.
84
Till November 1978 the U.S. bought about 919,000 barrels 
of oil a day from Iran, (less than 10 per cent) its 
second biggest supplier after Saudi Arabia. It took 
approximately six to eight weeks for the Iranian oil 
from the Persian Gulf to reach the U.S. (See Drew Middleton, 
'Iran Upheaval Threatens U.S.', International H e rald Tribune,
2 November 19 7 8.)
8 5 The above four main facts are taken from George Lenczowski, 
'U.S. Policy Towards Iran' in Abbas Amirie and Hamilton A. 
Twitchell (eds.), Iran in the 1980s, Tehran: Institute 
for International Political and Economic Studies, 1978, 
p p . 370-371.
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question of pricing. If the Shah chose to side with 
the price hawks, then there was an excellent chance that 
oil prices would increase significantly; if he decided to 
take a more moderate stance and to ally Iran with the 
Saudis in holding the line against higher prices, there 
would be no such increases. The latter is exactly what 
happened in January 1978.
Numerous other mutual economic interests tied America 
to Iran. The Shah paid premium prices for American military 
goods, with sales since 1972 amounting to a staggering 
$14 billion. At a time when increasing payments for foreign
oil had contributed to a worsening American balance-of- 
payments ledger,this kind of recapture of funds was not an 
insignificant factor.8^
In May 19 75, the two countries signed a trade agreement
designating $15 billion over a five year period for American
products which included arms, non-military trade products
and disbursement for development of Iran's industries,
food supplies, housing and public services. An additional
$7 billion was agreed to for 6 to 8 nuclear power plants to
be provided by the U.S. During 1976, a 4 year trade package
8 7
involving about $50 billion was being negotiated.
8 6
James A. Bill, 'Iran and the Crisis of '78', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.57, N o . 2, Winter 1978/79, p . 337.
8 7
The Middle East: U.S. P o l i c y 3 I s r a e l 3 Oil and the Arabs, 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Third edition, September 1977, 
Washington, D.C., p . 11.
Also in 1975, Iran proposed and then dropped a $300 
million loan-purchase investment in Pan American airways, 
ailing partly as a result of the higher oil prices. The 
rescue financing was to be part of Iran's planned $10-12 
billion long-range U.S. investments. This scheme was later 
dropped. ibid.
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Until the fall of the Shah hundreds of American banks
8 8
and businesses were involved in Iran. By the end of 1978 
over 41,000 American businessmen, diplomats, technical and 
scientific experts, military advisers and their dependents 
lived in Iran. On the other hand many Iranians also resided
89
m  the United States, including at least 30,000 students.
With increased U.S. purchases of petroleum from the
Persian Gulf and the rising prices of crude oil, the supply
of dollars in Arab hands had been growing at a spectacular
rate. Obviously, such a concentration of U.S. currency
becomes an independent source< of power and a potential threat
when one considers the fragile condition of the international
90
monetary system. A somewhat cautious assessment of this 
problem was offered by the Assistant Secretary Sisco in 
1973:
The Saudis and other oil rich [Arabian]
Peninsula states have begun to accumulate 
large foreign exchange reserves well beyond
8 8
For a complete list of U.S. companies doing business 
see Iran Almanac 1976 and book o f  facts, Fifteenth edition, 
Tehran: Echo of Iran, July 1976, p p . 419-477.
O Q
Bill, op. c i t . , p . 337.
9 0 According to the Central Bank Governor, Mohammad All 
Maulawi, Iran's foreign reserves in March 1979 stood at 
$15,000 million. Also, the latest estimates put Saudi 
Arabia's holdings at $60 billion, most of which is invested 
in the U.S. This large reserve fund is besides Saudi invest­
ment of a 142-billion dollar in development programmes, vast 
aid to Arab and African countries, and generous international 
contributions. (Nation Review, 10 May 1979 and 'Saudi 
Arabia - How True a Friend?' U.S. News and World Report,
2 April 1979.
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their needs. They have now indicated that 
if [oil] production is to rise beyond their 
income requirements, they must find productive 
outlets at home or abroad to invest their 
surplus revenues. This is a challenge to the 
consumer countries generally and to our American 
businessmen specifically.^1
The U.S.-Iran military relationship also bears a
commercial dimension. Immediately after the end of the
Second World War, the disposal of surplus weapons, most of
which went to the Third World countries, was more of a
92 .
commercial issue. Again, the shift m  Anglo-American
policy from arms aid to arms sales that took place in the
beginning of the 1960s was the result of accumulated balance
9 3of payments and increasing costs of defence burdens.
Ever since October 1971, when America's foreign-trade 
balance showed a net deficit for the first time since 189 3, 
the Nixon administration had regarded the balance of payment 
problem as a major foreign policy issue. As one solution 
to the problem, the Department of Defence launched after 
1972 an intensive campaign to expand sales of U.S. military 
equipment abroad. The Pentagon's hard-sell tactics had 
not been without success: while foreign sales of most U.S. 
manufactured goods had declined due to stiff competition
91 As quoted in the Special Oversight Report No. 4, p . 221.
9 2 For example, see the White Paper on Export o f  Surplus 
War M a t e r i a l , HKG, London, January 1956.
9 3
David J. Lousher, 'The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Instrument', O r b i s , V o l . 20, N o . 4, Winter 
1977, p . 936. Also see Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, pp.115-117; 155-157.
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from Europe and Japan, U.S. aerospace exports were rising
and in 19 72 were the only commodity to show a positive trade 
94
bal a n c e .
When Vietnam-related defence expenditure began to decline 
in the early 19 70s many U.S. aerospace firms experienced 
significant cutbacks in defence contracting and were forced 
to order massive layoffs of skilled and semi-skilled 
personnel. Some companies, particularly producers of attack 
aircraft and military helicopters predicted that termination 
of the war would precipitate the closure of entire production 
lines or even corporate bankruptcy. In order to forestall 
this eventuality, many companies launched intensive export 
drives designed to find foreign customers. This effort had 
been successful in rescuing several production lines scheduled 
for termination or sharply reduced output. Thus, McDonnell- 
Douglas kept producing F-4 Phantom jets at the rate of 20 
a month (some of which were sent to Saudi Arabia and Iran) 
even though production was once stated to be cut back to 
4-6 aircraft per month. Some production runs are now totally 
geared to the foreign market: Northrop Corporation, for 
instance, at one time planned to sell 1,000 to 1,500 F-5E
95
fighters abroad including 170 to Iran and 120 to Saudi Arabia.
9 4
This was largely due to the aggressive salesmanship of 
the representatives of Navy, Airforce and U.S. contractors 
for pursuing new arms markets in Africa and the Middle East.
(See 'Strong Export Drive Dismays Europeans', Aviation Week 
and Space T e c h n o l o g y , 4 June 1973.)
95
See Special Overszght Report N o . 4, p p . 225-226.
134
In addition to the above, many other Companies producing 
weapons were the main interested parties in boosting arms 
sales. In order to have smooth and expanded business, 
they have worked in collaboration with civil and military 
bureaucracies as also the political interests in their 
respective countries, which created what is widely known as
. . . 96
the military industrial complex. In Iran, these companies
have, on occasions, worked directly without consulting
their own governments. This has led sometimes to political
97and social scandals.
The widening of the arms market also enabled the Pentagon 
and the arms manufacturers to lower the per unit cost of 
weapons. By acting as a broker between foreign buyers of 
U.S. arms and the U.S. manufacturers, the U.S. government 
was able to save on its own military budget. It is estimated 
that by selling $8 billion worth of arms abroad, the U.S. 
was able to cut the other military costs by $560 million.
9 6 In this regard read Carroll, W. Pursell Jr., (ed.),
The Military Industrial C o m p l e x , New York: Harper and Row,
1972 and The Military Industrial Complex: A R e a s s e s s m e n t , 
California, London: Sage Publications, 1972.
9 7 .
See United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and 
United States Foreign Policy - Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 9 4th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1977.
The above hearings mainly deal with the Grumman's 
sale of F-14 aircraft to Iran through various sales agents 
of the company, who made direct contacts with Iranian higher 
officials in the Government.
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On an average a dollar's worth of military sales abroad
9 8
results in a 14 per cent saving to the Pentagon.
As aircraft and other military systems incorporate 
increasingly advanced technological improvements, the costs 
of research and development (R and D) and production engin­
eering consume a larger share of total acquisition costs.
R and D expenditures on the C-5A jumbo transport jet, for
99
instance, amounted to well over $1 billion. In order to 
pass on some of these mounting costs to its Allies, the 
Pentagon had intensified its sale efforts to some of the 
wealthy Persian Gulf states. 'The American government has 
loosened the wraps on what can be sold a b r o a d ' , Aviation 
Week reported in June 1973. The administration's cost- 
sharing strategy was more evident in the sale of F-14 Tomcats 
to Iran. By purchasing these navy jets whose production 
costs have consistently surpassed every ceiling set by the 
Pentagon, the Shah helped reduce overall development costs 
to the U.S. government and eased continued F-14 appropriation
r
requests through the Congress, where opposition to their
101
procurement was stiff.
The military sales to foreign countries also create 
the 'ripple effect'. They promote American technology and
9 8
See The Statesman, New Delhi, 2 June 1976.
9 9
Spectal Oversight Report No. 4, p . 226.
^ ^ Aviation Week and Space T e c h n o l o g y , 4 June 1973.
Special Oversight Report N o . 4, p . 226.
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products from military to non-military fields. It is 
estimated that for each $1 billion in military sales, 
approximately 47,000 jobs are filled in the military 
industry of the supplying country.
Military sales serve political purposes as well. Arms
transfers held keep governments friendly by creating a
103 . . .
situation of dependency. The weapons, along with military
and police training, reinforce the internal security system
104
of these governments, which later act as American proxies 
protecting American interests. Iran under the Shah was a 
classic example of this point.
Politically, foreign military sales also act as an 
instrument of foreign policy in American politics. Testifying 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 26 June 1968, 
the then U.S. Defense Secretary Clark Clifford observed:
10 2 .
United. States Arms Sales to the Perstan Gulf - Report 
of a study Mission to Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 94th 
Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1975, pp.25-26.
10 3 . .
This is done through the provision of spare-parts, training
facilities and the replacement of the weapon-systems to the
recipient countries.
10 4
The internal security system is strengthened by rulers 
in order to promote their perpetuation in domestic power 
structure. For a detailed analysis of this point see,
W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperatives : Strategies 
for Political Survival in Asia and Africa, New York :
Columbia University Press, 1969 and Franklin B. Weinstein,
'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to 
the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed 
Countries', World P o l i t i c s , Vol.XXIV, N O . 3, April 1972, 
p p . 358-381.
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The Foreign Military Sales Act will 
retain all the present controls. In 
addition, it will establish further 
restraints designed specifically to 
ensure that the military sales programmes 
will continue to be fully and responsively 
a sound instrument of foreign policy.105
The U.S. interests in West Asia are, however, succinctly
summarised by Robert Pranger, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense as follows:
First, the legal and political commitments 
which we have to states in the area; second, 
an interest in maintaining a viable military 
presence; third, an interest in the 
preservation of friendly governments; 
fourth, an interest in preventing full Soviet 
monopoly and reducing undue dependence on 
USSR; fifth ... access to oil; sixth, 
the maintenance of lines of communication.1^6 
Conclusion
To conclude it can be said that the American relationship
with Iran has undergone through various stages of evolution
since the beginning of the Second World War. Since then the
American presence in Iran had risen significantly,
particularly in the '70s. This presence had included people
from diplomatic, military and business and contractor class.
The American interests in Iran were motivated over these
years, cumulatively, by political, strategic, economic and
commercial interests. In fact for the U.S., Iran was
’too important in place, in power and in petroleum to lapse
107
into a conflict of moods'.
105
As quoted by Col. Rama Rao, 'Arms Transfer - An Instrument 
of Foreign Policy', USI Journal, April-June 1975, p . 125.
106
Testimony in Approaches to Peace in the Middle East,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, p . 3.
International H e r a l d  Tribune, 8 November 1978.
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CHAP T E R  V
IRAN'S ARMAMENT PROGRAMME: 
A CRITIQUE
138
Introduction
Iran's huge military armament programme was justified 
mainly by the Shah's threat perceptions to Iran's security 
(Chapter I ) . In addition, many other reasons were 
invariably advanced for the arms buildup. While most of 
these rationalisations of arms acquisition came from the 
Shah and the Iranian media, the Western press also generally 
supported this Iranian theme. In this chapter the various 
reasons put forward for the procurement of sophisticated 
weaponry by Iran are given. This is followed by a critique 
of most of these arguments.
(a) The purchase of arms is for political as well as for 
military ends. Designed for deterrence as well as defence, 
arms acquisitions clearly have a symbolic prestige dimension. 
Vis-a-vis the major powers, they are intended to raise
the cost of aggression and to complicate the cost-calculations 
of states contemplating intimidation and pressure.
Regionally, they serve notice of Iran's determination to 
insure its own security. As bargaining-chips, they are 
viewed as fungible assets, convertible into regional leverage 
and goodwill.^
(b) Iran's defence buildup has had a beneficial impact 
on the Persian Gulf region. Arms, though not directly or 
s o l e l y  responsible, have contributed to the stabilization
Shahram Chubin, 'Iran's Military Security in the 1980s',
The California S eminar on Arms Control and Foreign P o l i o y , 
Discussion Paper N o . 73, California, September 1977, p . 12.
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of politics in the region (by strengthening already
existing political restraints) and have muted any tendency
2
towards polarization.
(c) As the super-powers are situated - asymmetrically in
terms of geographic distance from the Persian Gulf and
as Iran lacks any tie to the U.S. comparable to that of
3
Israel, it is important to have a strong defence.
(d) In the light of the uncertainty of arms support in
times of conflict and the high speed of modern warfare,
4
it is imperative to stockpile weapons. Added to this 
is the continuous threat of embargoes and moratoria by 
big powers on arms sales to various regions.
(e) The focus on aggregate costs of military expenditures
has tended to exaggerate the scope of Iran's military
buildup. The arms purchases are deceptively large because
they include training, maintenance contracts and contracts
5
for infrastructure development. The total cost approach 
obscures the rise in inflation levels and by blurring orders
2
* Shahram Chubin, 'Iran's Defense and Foreign Policy' in 
Abbas Amirie and Hamilton A. Twitchell, (eds.), Iran in 
the 19 80s, Tehran: Institute for International, Political 
and Economic Studies, 1978, p . 319.
3 .Chubin, I r a n ’s Mvlvtary S e c u r t t y , p . 13.
4 .
Abbas Amirie, 'Strong defence buildup is source of stability
for Iran', Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 23 October 1976.
5
United States Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, Access to Oil - The United States Relationship 
with Saudi Arabia and Iran, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 
December 1977, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977, p . 82.
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and deliveries it ignores the very long lead-times involved 
in procuring modern weaponry and then the time-lag before 
absorption and assimilation.^
(f) The military development ultimately leads to economic 
development of the society e.g. the military construction 
may lead to the economic infrastructure by construction
of roads, ports and airfields and expenditures on dual- 
purpose items, e.g. air-traffic control and communications 
equipment.7
(g) There is a dire need for replacement, modernization 
and expansion.
Replacement refers to the numbers of aircraft, tanks, 
etc., that must be continuously acquired to maintain a 
stable inventory in the light of normal attrition and wear 
and tear. Modernization refers to the procurement of follow- 
on weapon systems to perform the same mission as a weapon 
in the current inventory. Given the rapid rate of technolo­
gical change, the life-cycle of modern weapons systems is 
relatively short (longer for warships and rifles, shorter 
for aircraft, avionics and missiles. The expansion refers 
to the expansion of missions not hitherto achieved, enabling 
the armed forces to undertake new or expanded missions.
These include: the acquisition of a limited sea-denial 
mission for a new blue-water navy; an enhanced air-defence 
capability including air defence fighters, missiles and 
radar; improved tactical mobility including the
g
Chubin, I r a n ’s Military S e c u r i t y , p . 15.
7 ibid.
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creation from scratch of a sizeable army aviation
(helicopter) unit and quick-reaction forces; and better
intelligence, including electronic equipment and
8
reconnaissance planes.
(h) Iran does not have an indigenous military industry 
capable of satisfying its elementary needs. Therefore, 
unlike the industrial states of the West, it has to 
purchase its military requirements from abroad.
(i) Iran is in a position to buy sophisticated weapons. 
Among the two groups of countries in the Middle East there 
are those who have the capacity to absorb the oil revenues 
(Iran, Oman, Iraq and Algeria) and those who cannot (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Libya) . ^
(j) The Western nations set up double standards for them­
selves and the less developed c o u n t r i e s . ^
A close review of most of these rationalisations 
reveals that they form corollaries of the central argument
8 ib i d . , p . 16.
9
Chubin, op.cit., p. 333.
^  Alvin J. Cottrell, 'Explaining Iran's Actions', Kayhan 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 21 December 1974.
In this the author argues by comparing Saudi Arabia and 
Switzerland. According to him, both of these countries 
have approximately the same population while, geographically 
speaking, Saudi Arabia is 15 times larger and has nearly
4,000 miles of coastline, while Switzerland is landlocked. 
Saudi Arabia is more vulnerable to direct and indirect 
threats than Switzerland and yet the latter has a better 
equipped defence capability. (For details see Amir Taheri, 
'Kennedy ignores the "How, Why and Who" on Persian Gulf 
Arms', ibid., 7 June 1975.)
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advanced, i.e. the grave threat to Iran's security from 
its neighbours, particularly the Soviet Union.
As regards the Shah's fear from the Soviet Union in 
the north, all evidence of Soviet foreign policy and 
behaviour during the two decades since Stalin seemed to 
suggest that there was no reason to assume that it would 
attack a country situated outside its Eastern European 
front-yard. The possibility of such an attack on Iran 
was particularly remote, for the Soviets were gettinq Iranian 
petroleum and natural gas at reasonably cheap rates. The 
historical fear of Soviet encorachment remained the Shah's 
primary security concern until the early 1960s. By then, 
Soviet propaganda against his regime had lessened, and
the Shah declared his intention not to allow the stationing
13
of American nuclear missiles in Iran. He made official 
visits to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1965 
and 1966, during which he signed a number of commercial 
agreements. The most important of these provided
that the Soviets construct a steel mill at Isfahan, in
14
exchange for the Iranian natural gas.
12
A pipeline till November 1978 supplied 10 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas in a year to the U.S.S.R. T i m e 3 
13 November 1978.
13 In an exchange of Notes on 15 September 1962, the 
Iranian Government gave the Soviet Government an assurance 
that it would 'not allow any foreign Power to establish
rocket-launching sites of any kind on Persian territory'.
Keesing 's Contemporary Archives 1961, p . 18986.
14 .
This draft agreement was signed m  Tehran on 5 October
1965. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1965, p . 21010.
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The improvement in relations with the Soviet Union was 
reflected in a speech by the former Iranian Prime Minister 
Amir Abbas Hoveida in February 19 6 7 to the Majlis when he 
categorically said that Iran had no longer anything to fear
from the Soviet Union and that the dangers it was facing
i
now came from the south. He also stated that the Government
had decided to send the armoured units stationed in the
north near the Soviet borders south to the Persian Gulf
15
area. In February 1967, again the two nations announced
a $110 million agreement to exchange Soviet military
equipment which included non-armoured vehicles, troop carriers,
and anti-aircraft guns for Iranian natural gas and other
16
raw materials. By 1970, a gas pipeline from south­
western Iran to the Russian frontier had been completed.
In February 19 75 , major economic agreements involving nearly 
$3,000 million were reached between Iran and the Soviet 
Union. In September 1975, Iran and the Soviet Union signed 
a protocol for the development and modernization of the 
railway network in the north-western parts of Iran. The 
agreement provided for the establishment of a new railway 
line that would connect Qazwin to A-ffstara, the Irano-Soviet 
border town located on the Caspian sea coast. According 
to this agreement, the Soviet Union was to participate in
See Asia R e c o r d e r , 1967, p . 7599.
16
Leslie M. Pryor, 'Arms and the Shah', Foreign Policy,
V o l . 31, N o . 31 (Summer 1978), p . 58.
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a joint project with Iran for laying a new set of tracks
17
along the existing 650 kilometer T e h r a n - T a b n z  line.
In all, by 1975, the Soviet arms transfers to Iran had
18
amounted to $589 million while the economic aid reached
19
to a figure of $750 million.
The Shah's fears from the Soviet Union were also to
a great extent unfounded as the Soviet threat would have
caused the Arab states and Iran to embargo Eastern European
countries. Also, it could even prompt the Western European
nations to retaliate by reducing their purchases of Soviet
oil. The loss of oil revenues, which were the largest
component of Soviet foreign exchange earnings, would be
sorely felt. Oil is not the only restraining factor, for
any provocative actions directed against the Shah would
upset the Muslim population in southern Russia, where many
residents share family ties with Iranian Muslims in Mazandaran 
. . 20
and Azerbaijan. Even in 1978, when there was a popular mass
17
H.M.L. Beri, 'Super Powers and Arms Race in West A s i a 1,
The Institute o f  Defence Studies and Analyses J o u r n a l , New 
Delhi, Vol.IX, N o . 3 (January-March 1977), p . 309.
18
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (Washington, D.C.:
ACDA, 1976), Table V, p . 78.
19
Orah Cooper, 'Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World', in 
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in 
a New P e r s p e c t i v e 3 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, Table I, 
p . 194.
20
Besides the oil and gas flow, there was also a fear of 
Muslim revivalism spilling over into the Soviet Union southern 
frontiers comprising Turkoman, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Azeris and 
Georgian Muslims. Moreover, if the present differential 
rates of increase continue for the rest of the century, the 
Soviet population is expected to rise to about 320 million.
Out of this the Central Asians woyld constitute about
63 million, as compared to approximately 170
Russians. It is estimated (cont'd)
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movement against the Shah in Iran, the Soviet Union maintained
a generally cautious policy.2'*'
The Shah's threat scenario of the possibility of the
Soviet attempts to interdict the Western shipping along
the sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf with Australia,
Japan and Western Europe (via the Cape of Good Hope) also
22
needs to be closely examined. It is doubtful whether 
this could in any way bring substantial benefits to Moscow.
It is difficult to imagine the Soviets to interdict seaborne
oil supplies when there exists a strong possibility to 
counter-interdiction of their own shipping at the choke- 
points of the Turkish Straits, the entrance to the Baltic, 
and the entrance to the Sea of Japan. Were circumstances 
such that they believed this interference necessary, there 
ars three ways in which it might be done. The first would 
be to use diplomatic pressure, backed by military threats, 
to persuade the local governments to cut off oil supplies
20 (cont'd)
that by the end of the century the growth rate in Soviet 
Asian population will level off (like Transcaucasia and 
Kazakhstan) due to control of endemic diseases, drop in 
infant mortality and increasing economic prosperity. (For 
a detailed discussion on the population aspect in Soviet 
Asia read Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1973, p p . 30-65.
21
However, after the Shah's departure from Iran in January, 
1979, the Soviet press begun to criticize him explicitly 
and to speak favourably of Khomeini. (Further examined in 
Chapter V I .)
22
On the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, see 
Michael McGwire, 'The Proliferation of Maritime Weapon 
Systems in the Indo-Pacific Region', paper prepared for 
the conference on 'The Proliferation of Weapons in the Indo- 
Pacific Region', Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 26-28 July 1977.
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at source. The second would be to bomb the wells, pipelines,
pumping stations and terminals from airfields in the Caucasus,
little more than an hour's flying time away. The third
recourse - naval warfare against tankers - would seem likely
to be more hazardous than either of the first two because of
the long distance from main fleet bases and less effective
23
because of the possibilities of counteraction. Furthermore,
the Soviet Union would have no assurance that the resulting
conflict would be localized. Moreover, the Soviet merchant
marine has grown from a strength of 4 83 ships (1.9 million
deadweight tons) in 1953 to 2,140 ships (15.4 million dead-
24
weight tons) in 19 73. The Soviet Union has an economic 
interest in increasing the income earned by its expanding 
merchant fleet. The Soviet trade with the countries of the 
Indian Ocean basin has increased from over 200 million
25
roubles in 1960 to over 1,400 billion roubles in 1973.
However, sometimes the importance of the Indian Ocean 
as a year-round maritime trade route between the European
2 3
Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Development of Soviet Strategic 
Thinking Since 1945', Canberra Papers on Strategy and. D e f e n c e 3 
N o . 2 3 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1972), 
p p . 41-42. Also for a more detailed examination of these 
aspects of Soviet naval strategy see G. Jukes, 'The Indian 
Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', Adelphi Papers No. 87 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1972).
24 . . .  
Robert T. Ackley, 'The Merchant Fleet', in Michael McGwire
and John McDonnell (eds), Soviet Naval I n f l u e n c e , New
York: Praeger, 1977, Table 14.1, p . 293.
25
Richard B. Remnek, 'The Soviet Presence in the Indian 
Ocean: Current Realities and Future Prospects', paper 
prepared for the annual meeting of the Association for 
Asian Studies, San Francisco, California, March 24, 1975, 
Figure I, p . 5.
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and Far Eastern ports of the U.S.S.R. is unduly emphasized.
The reality, however, is that the overall volume of traffic
between the Soviet, European and Far Eastern ports by sea
is very little compared with the tonnage that passes by
rail through the land. This is because the bulk of internal
trade conducted by the Soviet Far East with other parts of
the Soviet Union is not with the European U.S.S.R., but
with Central Asia and the Ural region. Thus in 196 7 nearly
24 million tonnes passed by rail and approximately 120,000
27
tonnes passed by sea. This percentage may have increased 
over the last few years due to the vulnerability of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in the event of war with China thus 
increasing the importance of the sea route. However, the 
escorting of merchant shipping past the Chinese coast would 
entail a heavy burden on the Soviet Pacific fleet, given 
that the Chinese navy is not of negligible size. Hence the 
capacity of the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
is being increased by progressive electrification and a 
duplicate line is being built about 200 miles north of it.
It is assumed that a war with China will not be a prolonged 
affair. Hence the Soviets would rely for supply of the 
Far East on a combination of rail transit to railheads 
sufficiently distant from the frontier, coupled with road
2 6
For example in this regard see Dmitry Volsky, 'A Strategy 
without a future', New Times, N o . 33, August 1978, p . 5.
27
See affirmation of Geoffrey Jukes to the Australian 
Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence,
Australia and the Indian Ocean Region (Canberra: Government 
Printers, 1976), pp.673-674.
2 6
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transit or airlift from there to points nearer the front 
line; shipping via northern ports and north-south rivers; 
airlift; transits via the very roundabout Indian Ocean route;
or via the slightly shorter northern sea route during the
2 8
three months of the year when it is open.
In addition, the acquisition of Soviet base facilities
in the Indian Ocean, particularly Aden, Berbera, Socotra,
Visakhapatnam and Umm Qasr have been often cited as a source
of increasing threat to the Western interests in the safe
29
passage of the Gulf oil. No doubt the deployment of
Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean began in 196 8 and
30
has led to a sizable presence since then. But reports
about Soviet bases need to be evaluated with care. First,
31 .
the word 'base' is often used m  an ambiguous and, 
therefore, misleading fashion. Mere access to replenishment 
and repair facilities does not mean the acquisition of 
exclusive base rights. For example, it would be inaccurate 
to suggest that India's coast port of Visakhapatnam and 
Iraqi port of Umm Qasr are, in any meaningful sense, Soviet
29
For example, refer to Sharnaz Boushehri, 'Australia and 
Its Allies', Kayhan International, 28 September 1974.
30
By 1969 a permanent Soviet presence had been established. 
Since then an average of four to six Soviet ships and two 
to three submarines have been maintained in the waters of 
the Indian Ocean, with an increase in their numbers during 
political crises like the October 19 73 Middle East conflict 
and the Bangladesh war. (See Geoffrey Jukes, 'Soviet Policy 
in the Indian Ocean', in Michael McGwire, Ken Booth and 
John McDonnell, (eds), Soviet Naval Policy (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), p . 308.
31
A base technically should have facilities for docking, 
berthing, rest and recreation, radio communication, air 
communication etc. (See Jukes in Australia and the Indian 
Ocean, p p . 664-667.
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bases. Speaking specifically in the case of Umm Qasr, 
it can be said that most of the visits by Soviet ships to
this port from June 19 71 to June 1976 were made by oil
33
tankers and not warships. This meant that the Soviets 
were buying oil in Iraq, and using it to replenish their 
Indian Ocean squadron at sea or in Berbera.
"Moreover, a distinction can be drawn between U.S. bases 
and facilities (e.g. in Diego Garcia) with those acquired 
by the Soviet Union at various times in the Indian Ocean. 
Diego Garcia was granted to one outside power (U.S.A.) 
by another outside power (U.K.) and not by a sovereign 
Indian Ocean littoral government. On -• the contrary, the 
bases given to the Soviet Union by different governments 
were withdrawn by Egypt in 19 72 and Somalia in 19li. Con- 
quently, Diego Garcia is less vulnerable to the effects of
domestic politics as compared to the facilities that the
34
Soviet Union relies upon.
32
32 . . . 
Knowledgeable United States officials have testified
that there is no evidence to indicate the existence of 
Soviet naval bases either in India or Iraq. See for example, 
Atherton's testimony in U.S. Congress, House of Represen­
tatives, South A s i a , 1974: P o l i t i c a l s Economic and 
Agricultural Challenges > Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on the Near East and South Asia, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session,
12 and 24 September 1974, p . 32; and U.S. House of Represen­
tatives, Review o f  Recent Developments in the Middle East - 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 
East of the Committee on International Relations, 95th 
Congress, 1st Session, 8 June 1977, Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977, p . 101.
33
See Australia and the Indian Ocean Region - Report from 
the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976); 
Appendix A, pp.211-235.
34
For details regarding historical, topographical and 
strategic aspects of Diego Garcia read Ranjan Gupta,
The Indian Ocean - A Political G e o g r a p h y , New Delhi:
Marwah Publications, 1979, p p . 32-36; 49-53.
Second, an examination of Moscow's relationship with
countries like Egypt and Somalia suggests that the
guaranteed access to military facilities is a function
of the Soviet Union's political relationship with the host
country. In the case of Somalia, it was reported in 1975
that United States' aerial photographs had revealed the
existence of a missile storage and handling facility as
well as a runway in Berbera, a port that the Soviets helped
35
to modernize. However, as a consequence of Soviet 
reluctance to allow Somali arms to be used for the 'liberation 
of Ogaden, the Soviet-Somali relations deteriorated sharply 
and the rights acquired in Berbera were nullified.
Thus, while the Soviet Union may have acquired port 
facilities in a number of littoral states, it does not 
possess exclusive and guaranteed bases. As Michael Klare 
has pointed out:
Nowhere does it [the U.S.S.R.] have 
access to full service installations that 
can compare to the United States Navy 
facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines,
Yokosuka in Japan, or Rota in Spain.
United States' bases, moreover, are 
usually secured by treaty and defended 
by American forces, whereas many of the ports 
now used by Moscow would be closed to Soviet 
vessels in the event of hostilities.36
Also, the Indian and Pacific Ocean operations play 
a secondary role in the Soviet depictions of future war.
35 See USSR and Third World, Vol.5, No.5 (13 May-6 July 1975) 
pp.218-255-257.
3 6
Michael T. Klare, 'Superpower Rivalry at Sea', Foreign 
Policy , N o . 21 (Winter 1975-1976), p . 165.
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This is natural enough, since the Soviet Union has no
coastline on the Indian Ocean, and its Pacific provinces
are far from its most vital areas. The Indian Ocean
ranks even lower in priority than the Pacific Ocean.
The small squadron maintained there since 196 8 has a flag-
showing role, and is probably concerned to accumulate
operating experience in case U.S. missile submarines are
ever deployed near the Arabian Sea, from where they could
attack almost all Soviet targets from Moscow in the west
to Central Siberia in the east. It is highly unlikely
that the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron is intended for
action against Indian Ocean sea routes, or to cut off
Western oil supplies. In fact Soviet presence comprises
mostly of the fishing fleet. The importance of fish to
the Soviet diet is high and the Soviet catch is the third
37
largest m  the world. Moreover, because of the country's
relative remoteness from the best fishing grounds which are
found off the southern coasts of Africa, and west and east
of the Cape of Good Hope, a strong and well equipped fleet
of trawlers and fish carrier/processing ships is required.
Consequently of the 5,924 Soviet ships of over 100 tons
registered in 1970, 2,683 were trawlers and 372 fish carriers
and/or factory ships; a little under two-fifths of world
trawler tonnage and just over four-fifths of fish carrier/
3 8
factory tonnage.
37 UN Statistical Yearbook 1968, p p . 157-158.
3 8
Lloyd's Register o f  Shipping 1970, Statistical Tables;
Tables 11 and 12.
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While economically fishing accounts for much of the 
Soviet maritime activity in the Indian Ocean, politically 
the Soviet Union has continued to play a generally low-key 
posture in the region. In sum, the entire thrust of Soviet 
diplomacy since the death of Stalin has been to urge Third 
World countries towards a non-alignment which is consistent 
with reception of goodwill visits from Soviet warships,
39
but not with the provision of permanent bases for them.
That the S h a h 's. fears of Soviet expansionism were 
exaggerated and that the Soviet Union generally pursued a 
cautious and low-risk policy in the Persian Gulf region 
was made evident by its attitude and relations with the 
countries in the area. For example, Moscow had not taken 
open sides in the long-standing Iran-Iraq border dispute; 
had generally kept quiet about the Shah's military buildup; 
had refused to support Iraq's claim to Kuwaiti territory; 
had discouraged Ba'athist adventurism; had urged Baghdad
39
G. Jukes, Adelphi Papers No. 87, p . 20. For a low-profile 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean also see G. Jukes, 
'The Soviet Military and A s i a 1, World Review, Vol.9, No.l, 
March 19 70, pp.18-26; 'The Cape Route, The Indian Ocean, 
and the Soviet Union', World Review, Vol.10, N o . 2, July
1971, p p . 3-12; and 'U.S.S.R. - and the Indian Ocean', 
Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol . 45, N o . 10, 6 April 1970, 
p p . 147-160.
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to come to terms with the Iraqi Kurds; and had provided
only token support for the Palestinian Front for the
Liberation of the Arabian Gulf in its skirmishes with the
40
Omanis and their Iranian allies.
To sum up it can be said that
looking backward a decade or two, 
the conclusion is not unwarranted 
that the Soviet impact on develop­
ments in the Gulf has been insignifi­
cant - perhaps less significant than 
in any other region of the world that 
has attracted Soviet interest since 
Khrushchev embarked on a 'forward p o l i c y 1 
in the Third World in the mid-1950s.41
Likewise, Iran's military involvement in the Dhofar 
province of Oman and the forceful occupation of the three 
Gulf islands were strongly justified on security grounds. 
According to the Shah if the Dhofari rebels got control
40
Pryor, op.cit., p. 64.
41
For details of this lacklustre performance of the 
Soviet foreign policy in the Persian Gulf see Alvin Z. 
Rubinstein, 'Soviet Persian Gulf Policy', Middle East 
Review, Vol.X, N o . 2 (Winter 1977/78), New York, p p . 47-55.
For a good background study also read John C. Campbell,
'The Super Powers in the Persian Gulf Region' and T.B., Millar, 
'The Military-Strategic Balance' in Abbas Amirie (ed),
The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International P o l i t i c s , 
Tehran: Institute for International, Political and Economic 
Studies, 1975, p p . 39-75 and 77-109.
154
of the Straits of Hormuz, Iran 'could be directly in the 
* . 42 line of fire .
But the fact was that the Dhofari rebels were quite 
far away from the Straits. In view of the conventional 
type of weaponry needed, such as artillery and ordnance, 
besides supply and training, the Dhofari rebels could do
little to impede Gulf traffic, even if they were right
43
on top of the Straits. And unlike certain other strategic
straits such as the Straits of Tiran leading into the
Gulf of Eilat or Bab el Mandeb or the Jubal Straits leading
into the south and north end of the Red Sea, it is
impossible to block Hormuz by sinking a tanker
44
in the navigation channel. The Hormuz Straits are 
fairly wide and deep for effective physical t^astruction.45
4 2
In this context also see the Shah's interview with the 
Saudi Arabian newspaper Aukaz as reported in Kayhan 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 5 June 1976.
4 3
U.S. House of Representatives, The Persian Gulf3 1974: 
M o n e y 3 P o l i t i c s 3 A r m s 3 and Power, Hearings before the Sub­
committee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, July 30, 
August 5, 7 and 12, 19 74, Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975, p . 250.
44
U.S. Mzlitary Sales to Iran, p . 9.
45
The width of Hormuz Straits at the narrowest section is
21 nautical miles. For a comparison of the width of the 
principal straits and channels in the Indian Ocean region 
see Feranc A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: 
The Balance of P o w e r 3 New York: The Free Press, 1976, 
p p . 265-266.
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There was even less likelihood of attack from Saudi
46
Arabia or the relatively tiny Persian Gulf emirates, 
for their energies were (and are) still focused on oil 
production, domestic development, and overseas investment. 
Afghanistan, Iran's financially deprived neighbour, did 
not pose any credible military threat. The former President
Daud's government significantly improved relations with
4 7
Iran between 1973 and 1976. Also by 1976, Afghanistan
4 S
and Iran had signed several cooperation agreements.
Iran is reported to have pledged in principle to Kabul 
an aid project for construction of a railway line which 
would link Tehran to Kabul. This project with an estimated 
cost of $1,266 million (based on 1975 prices) was included
in Afghanistan's 7 year plan running from March 1976-March
* 9
1983. Afghanistan's economic situation has continued to 
deteriorate over the past few years. During the Daud regime,
4 6
For a comparison of the relative military strength of 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirate states with Iran see The 
Military Balance 1970-71 to 1978-79, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.
47
The relations between the two countries started improving 
when they signed an agreement for sharing the Hirmand river 
waters on 13 March 1973. The agreement, consisting of 12 
articles and 2 protocols and ratified after two years, called 
for the distribution of the Hirmand river waters during 
drought seasons. (See Kiumars Mehr-Ayin, 'Pact seals sharing 
of Hirmand Waters', Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 11 June 1977.)
48
Among these notably were: the trade and technical cooper­
ation agreement signed in October 1975. Iran in January 1976 
provided Afghanistan with a $10 million loan for the purchase 
of buses and to finance certain feasibility studies. Another 
$10 million loan was extended in May to help Afghanistan 
establish an export bank, (ibid.)
49 . .
ibid., 21 January 1978.
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the number of unemployed Afghans increased to over
5 0300,000. The country's seven-year economic development 
plan was a shambles. From an anticipated development 
budget of about $400 million for 1976-1977, only slightly 
more than one-third was spent, and from a development budget 
of $570 million for 1977-78, only about one-sixth was spent.
The Shah's fears of large scale insurrection in Iranian
Baluchistan were also far from genuine. Baluch was not
52a major factor in the growing anti-Shah movement. This 
was because firstly, the Baluch areas constitute a relatively 
small corner of the country. Secondly, the Baluch have 
not posed a significant military challenge to Tehran since 
they were decisively defeated in 1928. Using sophisticated 
military surveillance, well-directed largessa to tribal 
chieftains, and a few cautious economic development 
programmes, the Shah had kept organized opposition to a 
minimum. Thirdly, unlike the British and the post­
independence rulers of Pakistan, who have given the Baluch 
some access to education, Iran had done little unti 1 recently 
to open up its Baluch areas to the outside world. There is 
no Baluch intelligentsia in Iran comparable to that found 
in Quetta and Karachi. And finally, Tehran had also stepped 
up development spending in the last few years and the Baluchis
5 0 Hannah Negaran, 'Afghanistan: A Marxist Regime in a 
Muslim Society', Current History, Vol.76, N o . 446, April 1979, 
p . 173.
See Martin Wollacott, 'Baluchistan's Chance to Assert its 
Identity', The Guardian, 18 March 1979, p . 8.
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were benefiting from large-scale smuggling operations between
Pakistan, Iran and Persian Gulf ports, which the government
53
made no effort to stop.
As for the Shah's fears of Pakistani Baluchistan,
it is worth noting that its population is heterogenous.
Besides Baluchis, many other ethnic groups including
B r a h u i , P.ashtun, Hindu, Punjabi and Sindhi live in
Baluchistan. Moreover, the Baluchis, who constitute less
than 50 per cent of the population are divided into 500
tribes and clans. It was this diversity of the ethnic
groups which confined insurgency to areas in central
Baluchistan in the 1973-76 period. The Mekranis, for example,
who are not Baluchis and who occupy the coastal areas of
Baluchistan, did not participate in the revolt against the
central government. In order for the leftist insurgents
in Baluchistan to develop a province-wide organizational
network, they would have to overcome the problems posed by
54
ethnic and tribal diversity, and mutual suspicions.
Iran's threat perceptions from its other immediate 
neighbour, Iraq, were also sometimes magnified and exaggerated 
beyond proportions. There is no gainsaying the fact that 
relations between the two countries remained unfriendly 
for a long period. Iraq was militarily and economically 
supported by the Soviet Union; it was responsible for 
promoting many subversive movements in the area; and it 
was the only country which rivalled Iran's position in the
Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', Foreign 
Policy, N o . 32, Fall 1978, p p . 155-156.
Negaran, op.cit., p . 175.
54
158
Gulf. But this hardly justified the Shah's feverish arms
acquisition programmes. When asked at a press conference
whether the quantities of weapons he was buying were
essential and where the threat lies, the Shah said he was
unable to name the countries he considered a threat.
However, he gave a hint when he referred to a country with
one-third of Iran's population which possessed as many
55
tanks and aircraft as he had. The reference was obviously 
to Iraq which had then a population of about 11 million 
compared to Iran's about 33 million. The above statement 
by the Shah needs examination. Though in 1976, there was 
not much variation in the quantity of tanks and combat 
aircraft, still as far as quality was concerned the Iranian 
armed forces were far more modernized than the Iraqis.
By the end of 1978, the Iranian inventory of arms showed 
both a quantitative and qualitative edge over Iraq through 
the procurement of items like F-14A and Chieftain tanks.
(For a comparison of relative military strength see Appendix 
I) •
There have also been some political changes between 
the two countries which did not justify the arguments 
advanced in favour of the procurement of arms. On 23 June
^ The Statesman , New Delhi, 8 August 1976.
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19 76 Iran and Iraq exchanged documents of an agreement
in Algiers ending years of dispute between the two countries.
Iraq and Iran have in the main lived up to both the letter
and spirit of this Agreement which ended the Kurdish
insurrection. Since then the relations between the two
countries had been 'correct but on the cool side'.
Despite the Shah's fears from Iraq, it was up till 1978
. . .  56
unable to challenge Iran militarily. The Ba'athist 
leadership appeared constantly absorbed in an unending 
fight for survival against rival factions in the army, 
the secret police, and other groups. The regime, narrowly 
thwarted a 1973 coup, and Ba'athist introspection is 
reinforced by the realization that any other attempt could 
be made at any time. More importantly, Iraq would probably
have to secure Soviet assent and support before fighting a
5 7major war with Iran. For a variety of reasons, Moscow's 
consent was not likely - most probably due to the fear 
of upsetting -the fruitful economic relationship with Iran.
The Iranian argument that its arms buildup was essentially 
defensive in nature and that it enhanced the regional 
stability by deterring aggressive tendencies within the 
various Gulf states, was also questionable.
56
According to the Congressional hearings, 'each country 
recognizes the other as its principal potential military 
adversary or as its principal rival for political power 
in the Gulf [and] Iraqi defences are focussed towards Iran 
but there is not an unusually high number of Iraqi troops 
on the Iraqi-Iranian border'. (See Review of Recent 
Developments in the Middle East 1977, p.109.)
See Pryor, op.cit., p. 53.
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In fact, the available evidence shows that as judged 
by the quality, variety, rapidity, sophistication and the 
offensive nature of the weapons sought, the Shah's military 
procurement programme had not been shaped exclusively 
by defence considerations alone. This becomes obvious 
when the Iranian capabilities are compared with those of 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia - the only two major powers in the 
area. (For a comparison of Iran's military capability 
vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, see Appendix 2.) Iran's aggressive 
military policies were reflected in achieving a capacity 
for sustained intervention on the Arab side of the Gulf; 58
along her eastern borders in any likely subversive movement
59
in Baluchistan; and the commitment to a big power Iranian 
role in the north-western quadrant of the Indian Ocean.
Also, the Iranian purchase of some weapon systems could hardly
5 8 The military involvement in Oman is a notable example.
On the capability for intervention outside its borders, 
the Shah once said that Iran could land an armoured division 
on the other side of the Persian Gulf in a few hours' time 
by landing craft, which it did not possess then. See the 
Shah's interview to the Chicago Tribune in Tehran as reported 
in the Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 19 November 1977.
59 At the height of fighting in Pakistani Baluchistan in 
late 19 74, American-supplied Iranian combat helicopters, 
some of them manned by Iranian pilots, joined the Pakistani 
airforce in raids on Baluch guerrilla camps. These AH-IJ 
Huey-Cobra helicopters provided the key to victory in a 
crucial battle at Chamalang in early September when a force 
of some 17,000 guerrillas of the Marri tribe, one of the 
27 major Baluch sub-divisions, was decimated. (See Harrison, 
op.cit. , p .139.)
6 0
For example, in this context refer to the Shah's speech 
in which he stressed the fact that Iran's security perimeter 
no longer stopped at the Strait of Hormuz but extended 
beyond to the Indian Ocean. (Kayhan I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,
5 November 1972.)
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be justified on defensive grounds alone. For example,
the Spruance class destroyer seemed superfluous for a
military establishment designed primarily for territorial
and maritime defence. On the contrary, they were armed
for coastal bombardment, anti-shipping attacks as well as
anti-submarine warfare. At 7,800 tons, they are heavy
vessels with more than twice the displacement
of America's World War II destroyers and equal in weight
to the Soviet light cruiser. The opponents of this weapon-
system, led by the Republican Les Aspin (D, WCS) argued
that the vessel had no conceivable defence function in the
Persian Gulf proper (where the largest Iraqi and Saudi
warships are patrol boats and minesweepers), and presumably
61
were intended for the Indian Ocean. The F-4 fighter 
bombers which were designed primarily for the deep-penetration 
airstrikes and a capability enhanced by the inflight 
refuelling capacity had developed an operational range
upto 1,400 miles permitting attacks as far as Cairo, New
6 2
Delhi and Istanbul. Similarly, the buying of the F-14
6 3
Tomcat and F-16s was questionable for defence purposes only.
M.T. Klare, 'Arms for the Shah: Hoist with our own 
Pehlavi', The Nation, 31 January 1976.
62 . . 
ibid.
r o
The offensive nature of these weapon systems is implied 
in the criticism of their being 'high technology, heavy, 
and difficult to maintain, underpowered, and expensive'. 
(Chubin, Iran's Military Security in the 1980s, p . 19.)
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The procurement of the Hovercraft could also be criticized 
on the grounds that they had no defensive function and
were meant to be used for amphibious assaults on the
64 . . . .
other Gulf states. Moreover, the interest in acquiring
the Boeing AWACs was criticized on reasons of advanced
technology, lack of training and maintenance facilities
and the possibility of their being used in an aggressive
mode not only against the U.S.S.R. but also against the
Persian Gulf states. ^
On some occasions Iran's heavy arms buildup was defended
for promoting regional stability in the area. In some parts
of the world, a balance of arms can help to confer
stability - as in Europe, and at times even in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. But for this several conditions are
necessary: among these, for both sides the performance of
weapons must be related closely to the ability tc command
and control them. Weapons must not be so powerful or
distances between contending military forces (or cities)
so short that the nation striking first could gain a decisive
advantage, for this could lead to hair-trigger reactions
66
and even war by accident.
^  For example, in a smoothly-executed combined operation 
on 29 November 1971, just prior to the British withdrawal 
from the Persian Gulf, the Iranian Navy hovercraft disgorged 
troops on the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 
Tumbs. (See R.D.M. Furlong, 'Iran - a power to be reckoned 
with', International Defense Review, Vol.6, N o . 6, December 
1973, p . 719.)
Chubin, Iran's Military Security in the 1980s, p. 20.
^  Edward M. Kennedy, 'The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or 
Arms Control?' Foreign Affairs, Vol.54, No.l, October 1975, 
p . 25.
163
But in few countries of the Persian Gulf do any of 
these conditions for a stable balance of military power 
exist; and all of these conditions exist in no local state. 
The command and control arrangements tend to be poorly 
situated to the high performance equipment they are intended 
to manage. The terrain along the Persian Gulf generally 
tends to be flat while along the Iranian borders with 
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq, it is generally treeless. 
Distances are too short between potential adversaries in 
the Persian Gulf region, as much of the equipment was 
designed for use in Europe. Moreover, the area generally
lacks the natural barriers that in other places could serve
• , 67 to separate potential opponents.
In fact Iran's military buildup did more to threaten 
regional stability rather than promote it.^8 The 1974 report 
of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
r
Pryor, op.cit., p . 67.
‘)8 This theme comes out clearly in United States Arms Sales 
to the Persian Gulf - Report of a study Mission to Iran,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 94th Congress, 1st Session, May 
22-31, 1975, Washington: 1975, p p . 13-16, 22-25 and 33.
Also for a perceptive analysis of the main factors 
leading to violent outbreaks in the Persian Gulf see 
Ferenc A. V a l i , 'Conflicts and Arms Races Between Littoral 
States of the Indian O c e a n ' , a background paper for the 
Conference on 'Arms Proliferation in the Indian and Pacific 
Ocean Area', Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 
26-28 July 1977, pp.24-29.
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studied the effects of conventional arms transfers on 
regional stability in the Persian Gulf's military environ­
ment. The report concluded that while massive arms transfers 
were seldom the primary cause of regional conflict, they 
do increase the likelihood of hostilities by altering 
the power-balance and increasing regional concern about the 
recipient's military intentions. Also, the report warned 
that acquisitions of advanced weapons system may result in 
miscalculations by the countries involved and lead to open 
hostilities.
For a statistical analysis of the effects of sharp 
increases in military assistance on international conflict 
and cooperation on the part of recipient nations see Donald 
A. Sylvan, 'Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance 
Increases for International Conflict and Cooperation',
The Journal of Conflict R e s o l u t i o n , Vol.XX, N o . 4, December 
1976, p p . 609-636.
In this investigation, twenty-five annual observations, 
from 1946 through 1970, of 15 Asian nations serve as the 
data base. The key findings are: (1) sharp increases in 
military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient 
nation's international conflict and cooperative behaviour;
(2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction 
of that behaviour change is toward increased conflict and 
decreased cooperation; and (3) a two-year lag between 
military assistance and behaviour change of recipient 
nations is statistically supported. The effects of increased 
capabilities as well as bureaucratic politics, habit, 
expectation, and prior deals are offered as possible reasons 
for these results. The findings seem to refute the argument 
that giving military aid to a nation not involved in a war 
will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future 
conflict.
For likely dangers of excessive U.S. military support 
to Iran also see, Realities of the Middle East - A Report 
by Senator George S. McGovern to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 
May 1975, Washington: 1975, and Kennedy, op.cit., p p . 14-35.
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The Iranian stock argument for quick stockpiling of 
weapons (due to the uncertainty of arms support in times 
of conflict and the threat of embargoes) also needs a close 
scrutiny.
As mentioned earlier, in the beginning of 19 7 3 the
Shah embarked on a vast expansion and modernization programme
for the airforce, army, and navy simultaneously. The
initial assessments of this strategy in 1976 revealed
serious absorptive problems, a finding which was confirmed
70
in a December 19 7 7 study.
The Imperial Iranian Air Force had been the Shah's 
personal priority and faced fewer problems than the other 
services in attracting qualified recruits and retaining 
talented and imaginative personnel. However, both studies 
revealed shortages of trained pilots and trainable candidates, 
shortage of instructor pilots, shortages of ground crews 
and maintenance personnel, and severe difficulties for the 
logistics system in locating and providing spare parts to 
individual units. On the one hand, the training of new 
pilots was not able to keep up with the expanded number 
of planes. On the other hand, the arrival of new generations 
of aircraft frequently resulted in a degradation of military 
capability as the best pilots from existing programmes were 
diverted to new programmes.
The best documented example of this 'degradation' 
phenomenon had been the shift of the most capable air crews
7 0 See U.S. Milztary Sales to Iran and United States Arms 
P oli cies in the Persian Gulf.
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from F-5Es to the more sophisticated F-14s. But the
problem of pilots for the F-14 programme was not unique.
The same process of 'poaching' took place with regard to
maintenance crews for the F-5Es. Programmes of lower
priority to the Shah than the F-14 (e.g. the I-Hawk air
defence package, one of the largest and most complex of
the programmes undertaken by the Iranian military) had
71faced similar or larger difficulties.
One could hypothesize on the basis of data from 
the airforce experience that expansion and modernization 
problems would be even more severe in the services that 
received less personal attention from the Shah. The 
evidence available through the end of 19 7 7 from the ground 
forces and the navy is consistent with that hypothesis, 
with major absorptive problems in the helicopter programme 
(army), self-propelled howitzer programme (army), tank
programme (army, with most of the armour provided by the
. . . . . 72
British), and naval training and electronics programme.
After the initial surveys of 1976 and 1977, there 
was some improvement in the worst areas, and some decline 
in other areas. The problem was not lack of effort on 
either the U.S. or the Iranian side, but rather the 
unavoidable strain associated with so massive a military 
buildup. Thus, even before the social upheavals of 1978, 
the pattern of lowering current combat capability in order 
to make room for ever larger amounts of new military
71 ibid.
72 . . 
ibid.
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equipment cast doubt on the proposition that 'more is
7 3better' in the Iranian context. Rather, from a purely 
military point of view (laying aside for a moment the 
argument about the need to shift expenditures from the 
military to the civilian sector) the strategy of slowing 
down and drawing out the pace of new weapons acquisitions 
had much to recommend it. A more temperate approach 
to arms buildup would have allowed the Iranian armed 
forces to focus their efforts o n (1) improvement in the 
ability to handle equipment already delivered on order;
(2) building a reliable logistics system; (3) broadening 
repair and maintenance programmes; (4) strengthening 
command and control; (5) conducting more practical exercises 
and practice operations; (6) hardening military facilities; 
and (7) extending the road, railroad, and airport networks 
in a way that would provide major military as well as 
civilian benefits.
Moreover, a military argument could be made in favour 
of a more moderated and better balanced approach to the 
Iranian defence buildup programme. It would have strengthened 
regional stability in a crisis situation. In fact the
7 3 That Iran faced serious problems of absorbing large 
amounts of sophisticated equipment, even simple equipment, 
was not merely restricted to the military sector. Iranian 
economists described the same problem in the civilian 
sector, e.g. 'to allay the transportation bottleneck,
2,000 trucks were ordered. When they arrived, there was 
a shortage of drivers. When the drivers were imported, 
there was a shortage of garages, spare parts and so forth'. 
(See Amirie and Twitchell (eds.), Iran in the 19 80s, 
p . 126.)
pattern of rapid equipment accumulations by Iran and other 
Persian Gulf nations made them highly vulnerable during 
an emergency. It was very likely that in an actual combat 
setting most of the weapons in Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia 
would not survive much beyond the first strike or two.
This led to a highly unstable environment for crisis 
management, with a strong motivation on all sides for pre­
emptive attack whenever tensions mounted. Better logistics 
and improved maintenance programmes would have reduced 
the vulnerability of existing weapons. A broader infra­
structure with a network of roads, railroads, and aircrafts 
would have allowed for more measured patterns of mobiliz­
ation and a less precipitous response to a threat.
The contention that military development eventually 
leads to the economic development of a society merits a 
close analysis. No doubt the military in a developing
state is called upon to perform certain useful functions
74 .during peace time. But the role of military assumed
by many as the champions of modernization, stability and
industrialization in the Third World is not wholly true.
This nature of modernization and industrialization, wherever
74 .These may include promotion of literacy and health
facilities in the rural areas, building of road and dams
in difficult terrain and provision of relief opportunities
in times of emergencies, e.g.earthquakes, floods, droughts
and epidemics.
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brought about by the military regimes in the Third World,
75needs to be evaluated cautiously and carefully.
Some writers assume a negative correlation between
7military expenditures and development. The 'guns vs
butter' analogy is used in the economic context of resource
77scarcity and opportunity costs' to explain why this 
negative relationship exists. The proponents of this school 
of thought assume a zero-sum social market-place: what 
is spent in one sector is taken away from another. They 
maintain that buying arms utilizes scarce foreign-exchange 
resources that could be used for more constructive 
developmental purposes in industrializing countries. Even
7 5 See for example m  this context, Claude E. Welch, 'Long 
Term Consequences of Military Rule: Breakdown and 
Extrication', The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.l,
N o .1, 1978, pp.139-152 and Mary Kaldore, 'The Military in 
Development', World development, Vol.4, No.6, 1976, 
pp.459-482.
7 6 Fred M. Gottheil, 'An Economic Assessment of the Military 
Burden in the Middle East, 1960-80', Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, September 1974, pp.502-513. 'Whatever else 
may be said about the economics of national security, few 
would disagree with the proposition that opportunity costs 
associated with military expenditures are positive for any 
size expenditure and for any nation' (p.502).
77 The term 'opportunity costs' refers to the economic 
concept that if resources (labour, capital, etc.) are 
scarce, then an increase in the production of one commodity 
(e.g. guns) requires a reduction in the output of some other 
commodity (e.g. butter). The amount of 'butter' which must 
be foregone is the opportunity cost of the additional 'guns'. 
See Stephen P. Dresch, 'Disarmament : Economic Consequences 
and Developmental Potential', paper submitted to the Center 
for Development Planning, Projects and Policies, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, December
1972.
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military grant-aid programmes require expenditures on 
infrastructure, the diversion of skilled manpower from 
the civilian sector, and operation and maintenance costs 
not covered by military programmes. Whatever positive 
spin off effects military expenditures may have, these
analysts argue, they cannot be as productive as direct
7 8investment in development .
Arms buildup may be viewed as having stimulated 
modernization impulses. It can be agreed that arms buildup
has created channels for the transfer of ideas and
79technologies to the Third World. However, the ideas and
7 8 The United Nations has also presented this argument:
'One aspect of the economic and social impact of the arms 
race is the constraining effect on consumption, private 
and public, and on growth. The considerable importance 
of this factor is already suggested by the size of military 
expenditures. In individual countries these vary greatly.
In extreme cases, it was noted, upwards of 30 per cent of 
the output is devoted to military purposes; in other cases, 
the diversion is small, less than 1 per cent. Typical 
figures are in the range from 2 to 8 per cent. In all cases 
resources are involved which could be put to better use'. 
(See Eaonomic and Social Consequences of the Armaments 
Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and 
Security - Report of the Secretary-General, August 12,
1977 (A/32/88) , recently revised and published as Economic 
and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military 
Expenditures, Report of the Secretary-General, 1978 
(A/32/88/Rev.l).
7 9 •For example, the defence programme like the construction
of Khatimi Air Base outside Isfahan has transformed within 
a thirty-month period, an isolated sixty-four mile patch 
of 'desert' into an area which will serve as a commercial 
airport as well as military facility. (For details see 
Stephanie Neuman, 'Security, Military Expenditures and 
Socio Economic Development: Reflections on Iran', Orbis, 
Vol.22, No.3, Fall 1978, pp.588-592.)
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technologies flowing through such channels have neither
been of the desired kind (so as to encourage need-based
and self-reliant development) nor gone to the areas where
it is required within. Hence the development resulting
from such channels in the Third World tends to be lopsided
and dependent. It has created centre-periphery relations
within the societies giving rise to inequality, displacement
(migration from rural to urban areas), tensions and violence.
Edward Kennedy emphasized the same point when he said:
... military modernization that is out of 
step with the modernization of society 
as a whole must be a risky gamble in the 
Persian Gulf.SO
Conclusion
It becomes obvious in the light of the above discussion 
that Iran under the Shah faced no real military threat 
from Russia, Iraq or Afghanistan. Its relations with Iraq
improved considerably after the March 1975 accord. Hence
81most of the Shah's threat perceptions were either unfounded 
or exaggerated beyond proportions. This becomes under­
standable in the context of his highly personalised nature 
of rule which did not have any feedback from domestic 
sources. It seems that while the issue of regime security 
was foremost in Iranian defence planning, the Shah's 
priorities reflected threat perceptions more appropriate
"8 0 Kennedy, op.cit., p.23.
81 For an illuminating discussion on threat perceptions read 
Raymond Cohen, 'Threat Perception in International Crisis',
Political Science Quarterly, Vol.93, No.l, Spring 1978, 
pp. 9 3-10 7.
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to the past than the present. Historically, the Shah's 
problems have stemmed from separatist movements and armed 
tribal rebellion, of question of loyalty inside the 
military, and from an inability to control Iranian territory 
in terms of communications and transport. As the Shah 
faced no genuine military threat from across the borders 
in military terms, various ingenious arguments were marshalled 
as justification for his ambitious armament programme.
CHAPTER VI
THE REVOLUTION OF 1978-79: 
A CHANGE IN PERCEPTIONS
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Introduction
The fundamental characteristics of Iran until the 
1978-79 Revolution seemed fixed and familiar. It was 
a country that was strong, proud, confident and yet 
militaristic, repressive and self-centered. It was a 
price 'hawk' on oil, but a dependable supplier to the 
United States, Israel and South Africa. It was paranoid 
and interventionist around the Gulf, but a supporter of 
conservative pro-Western regimes. For more than a decade, 
both critics and admirers of the Shah's regime tended 
to take the benefits of a stable Iran for granted. For,
Iran was a guarantor of the regional status quo and a 
counterpoise to emerging radical regimes. It was a secure 
supplier of oil to all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and an invisible but palpable presence behind the governments 
that favoured a moderate solution to Middle East problems.
And finally, it was a dampener of Soviet ambitions and 
a dependable ally of Europe and Japan as well as of the 
United States on most geopolitical issues.'*'
In terms of essentials of political power, the Shah 
appeared to hold all the trump cards. He had absolute 
control of the organized state machinery, exercized direct 
command over the impressive military establishment 
(255,000 army, 100,000 airforce, and 28,000 navy), had a
^ Theodore H. Moran, 'Iranian Defense Expenditures and 
the Social Crisis', International Security, Vol.3, No.3, 
Winter, 1978/79 , p.178.
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ubiquitous security apparatus and enjoyed unprecedented 
wealth from oil revenues (averaging nearly $20 billion a 
year from 1974 through 1978). An authoritarian system so 
meticulously built up and sustained was not expected to 
succumb to civilian revolution short of a lost war with 
foreign powers.
And yet in the course of 1978 this imposing power 
structure crumbled with a speed that was astonishing. The 
Shah left Iran on 16 January 1979, after nearly a year of 
turmoil, ostensibly on a vacation but probably never to 
return. The Regency Council and the Cabinet of Shahpur 
Bakhtiar which he left in a caretaking capacity lasted 
hardly a month. By 11 February 19 79, the regime collapsed 
and the army surrendered to the revolutionary group rallied 
around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a 78-year old religious 
leader returning to Iran after a 15-year exile. It is 
indeed ironical that the Shah who always perceived security 
threats to Iran mainly from external sources was visibly 
shaken when the opposition came from internal sources, 
i.e. his own people. Thus his glorious image of a 'Great 
Civilization' came crashing down in the wake of nation-wide 
disturbances which started in early 1978.
In this chapter an attempt is made to analyse the 
role of internal 'threats' to the Shah's regime during the 
Revolution; the conduct and role of the armed forces 
during and after the Revolution; the new security outlook 
of the present regime and the resulting implications for 
Persian Gulf countries and the Super-Powers.
17 5
The Shah believed that the threats to Iran and to 
2himself were mainly from sources outside Iran. He thought
that these threats could be neutralised by seeking support
from outside forces, i.e. from the West and especially
from the U.S.A. He blamed the U.S.S.R. for the events
in Iran. He linked the developments in Iran to a grand
conspiracy involving the Soviet and Cuban presence in the
Bab al-Mandeb region. He also saw the 27 April 1978 coup
d'etat in Afghanistan as a part of the main plot and tried
3to revive the old slogan of 'threat of encirclement'
to gain the support and sympathy of the West. He threatened
the West that if he went not only would Iran be split into
three or four autonomous pieces but part of it might even
be acquired by the U.S.S.R. as 'Iranistan'. He also
threatened the West that a change in Iran would mean 'either
the beginning of World War III or the strategic surrender
4of the Western world'. The Shah thus equated his survival 
as a monarch with the survival of Western security. He 
. believed, or pretended so, that only a small minority was 
opposed to him and that the people were with him. In 
answer to his increasing unpopularity he is reported to 
have said that it was only a minority which was against him
2 The Shah in fact assumed that a threat to monarchy was 
also a threat to Iranian security and national integrity.
See the Shah's interview with U.S. News and World Report,
2 6 June 19 78.
4 Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'Tea with the Shah', Newsweek,
20 November 1978.
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while the majority were his supporters. On another occasion
he apparently referred to his popularity saying:
Nobody can overthrow me. I have the 
support of 700,000 troops, all the 
workers and most of the people.6
It may not be possible to assess the relative strength
and importance of the various opposition groups that formed
a loose coalition in removing the Shah from his throne.
But it is not difficult to identify these main opposition
groups. They were: the middle class, the Islamic religious
classes, the workers and the students.
5
The Middle Class
The Iranian middle class consisted of low and medium 
level bureaucrats,teachers, technicians, the professional
7class, and small businessmen including the 'Bazaris1 . Due 
to rapid modernisation of Iranian society the professional 
middle class more than doubled in size between 1956 and
1976, leaping from six per cent to thirteen per cent of the 
total employed population. When the merchants and businessmen 
are brought into the calculations, the percentage of middle
The Observer (London) , 7 January 1979 quoted in Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 January 1979.
r 'Nobody Can Overthrow Me - I Have the Power', the Shah's 
interview with Dennis Mullin of U.S. News and World Report,
2 6 June 1978.
7 These 'Bazaris' were adversely affected by the Shah's 
economic policies that had progressively elbowed out this 
traditional merchant class in Tehran's downtown Bazaar in 
favour of the nouveau-riche businessmen. This new business 
class was facilitated by Western education and engaged in 
lucrative import-export ventures. (See Kai Bird, 'Making 
Iran Safe for Theocracy', The Nation, New York, 19 May 1979.
Also see Don A. Schanache, 'Iran's Bazaars Reveal Power',
International Herald Tribune, 16 January 1979.
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classes in Iran increases to over 25 per cent of the population
which is a very large middle sector for any developing
8 9society. Not only was the middle class denied political
participation but it also suffered due to economic hardship.
The fixed-income group was crushed by the rising inflation,
while lack of suitable employment for educated Iranians
added to the growing discontent. An analysis of the social
background of several hundred active opponents of the
regime apprehended, imprisoned or executed by the Iranian
police between 1972 and 1976 indicates that well over 90
per cent were young men and women of this professional
middle class.^  The Shah and his ruling group called
this section the 'pseudo-intellectuals' and 'negative
people'. In this way he underestimated the power of the
disgruntled middle class in a developing society.
The liberal-democratic groups in Iran sprang from
the middle class. The groups to occupy prominence in
liberal democratic group in Iran were: the Iran Nationalist
o James A. Bill, 'Iran and the Crisis of '78', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.57, No.2, Winter 1978/79, p.33.%
9 Members of this class also included the foreign-trained 
engineers and scientists who did not want to return to 
Iran from abroad, the physicians who returned but then 
refused to stay, the professional administrators who 
passively opposed a system they despised, and the teachers 
who used their positions to undercut a government they 
considered unresponsive to their needs.
^  Bill, op.cit., p.334.
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Party of Dariush Farouher, the Iran Party of Shahpur Bakhtiar,
and the Society of Iranian Socialists of Dr Karim Sanjabi.
These groups comprised the Union of National Front Forces,
or the National Front as it was commonly called. It lost
some of its strength and cohesion when Bakhtiar agreed to
the Shah's request to form a government just before he
left Iran. ^  Another very important liberal-democratic
group was the Iran Liberation Movement led by Mehdi
12Bazargan which had been formed in 19 61. Among the liberal- 
democratic groups it was closest to the Islamic Movement 
and also had links with the 'Mujahedeen1, a guerrilla 
organization. Some of the members of these liberal- 
democratic groups also formed the Iranian Committee for 
the Defence of Liberty and Human Rights, which acted not 
only as a new pressure group against the Shah and a channel 
of Communication with pro-nationalist elements outside 
Iran (especially in the U.S.A.) but also as a forum which 
helped to consolidate the operational unity of various 
political groups in Iran and thus helped to evolve a common 
front.
Another group was the Pan-Iranist Party led by Mohsen 
Pezeshkpour. Standing on the extreme right this party
^  On 4 January 1979 an Imperial decree formally appointed 
Shahpur Bakhtiar as the new Prime Minister of Iran following 
the resignation of General Golam Reza Azhari. (See 
Chronologies of Major Developments in Selected Areas of 
Foreign Affairs, January 1979, Foreign Affairs Committee 
Print, p.9.)
12 'Bubbling to the Surface', The Economist, 3 February 
1979 .
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unblushingly modelled itself on the Nazis with the same
type of uniform, salutes and slogans: 'Blood, earth, race'.
The very much larger Iran of its dreams would comprise
areas where Persian or Persian dialects are spoken and
would thus include Tadzhikistan, Afghanistan, the Pushtu,
13Baluchi areas and Bahrain. It was used as a pressure 
by the Shah whenever he wanted to assert his claim over 
Bahrain. This group, though active, was not reported to 
have played an important role in the Iranian revolution.
Till the last few months of the Shah's reign, the 
liberal-democratic groups were more inclined to work 
within a framework that would retain the institution of 
constitutional monarchy but with in-built restraints on 
the absolute powers of the monarch. As late as November 
1978, Dr Sanjabi was arguing for the return to a
14constitution and, by implication, to constitutional monarchy.
Dr Sanjabi was also supported by some important Islamic 
leaders like Ayatollah Shiariatmadari who, while supporting 
the constitution, was also demanding the formation of the 
council of the Ulema, as provided for in the constitution, 
to review the laws from the angle of Islamic justice. The 
Shah, however, reacted too slowly to their demands and 
finally Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been working not only 
for the removal of the Shah but also for an end to the 
monarchy in Iran, steamrolled his point of view. Thus 
this became the basis of the Iranian movement during the 
last two months of the Pahlavi dynasty.
See The Times, 24 November 1978.14
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The liberal-democratic groups used the Human Rights
15movement, especially in the U.S.A., to gain limited 
political support from the American administration, a 
limited freedom of action in Iran as well as a forum to 
air their political views abroad. This resulted in the 
expression of concern for human rights violations in Iran 
by a number of private and international organizations and 
even sparked interest in the Congress. In its Briefing 
Paper on Iran and its 1977 Report, Amnesty International 
described arbitrary political arrests, the alleged use of 
torture, the lack of legal safeguards and unsatisfactory 
trial procedures. In 19 76, two reports of the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) also discussed violations of 
civil and political rights in Iran, although they praised 
other aspects of Iran's judicial system and her encourage­
ment of women's rights. In 1977, representatives of both 
organizations visited the Shah, who expressed a willingness
15 The Human Rights Movement in U.S.A. gained momentum when 
in the early 1970s, U.S. Congress took the lead in enacting 
legislation dealing with the protection of Human Rights.
This was primarily in the form of amendments to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. One such amendment was Section 32 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which tied United 
States foreign aid to the incidence of political prisoners 
in foreign countries. By 19 76, the two principal sections 
of the 1961 Act as amended were Sections 116, which bans 
bilateral economic assistance to any government consistently 
engaging in gross violation of internationally recognized 
human rights. It also calls on the Secretary of State to 
prepare an annual report on the international status of 
human rights. The Section 502 states the framework for 
United States human rights policy (United States House of 
Representatives, Human Rights Conditions in Selected 
Countries and U.S. Response, Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 25 July 1978, p.7).
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to receive suggestions about improving the situation.
The Shah also invited the Red Cross to inspect Iran's 
prisons.
Subsequently, Iran took other steps to protect the
human rights of her citizens. According to the State
Department report on human rights practices in Iran in
19 77 some 'potentially significant improvements' were made
in the military court system, which heard state security
16cases. To some degree, these improvements were
influenced by an increased awareness worldwide of the need
to protect human rights, emphasized by United States policy.
They came, moreover, at an opportune time, when the liberal-
democrats had also started publicising their cause more
openly. The Shah was thus caught in the web of a Human
Rights programme. Even Dr Henry Kissinger, in an interview
with Trialogue, accused President Carter of encouraging
revolution in Iran by making Human Rights a vocal objective
of U.S. foreign policy. He preferred quiet diplomacy to
17achieve the same objective.
16 United States Congress, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices; Report submitted to the Committee on 
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives 
and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the 
Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 3 February 1978), p.351.
17 . •International Herald Trzbune, 6 February 1979. Trzalogue
is the publication of the Trilateral Commission, a non­
partisan organization focusing on North America, Europe 
and Japan.
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Tudeh Party
Another important political group that also staked
18a claim of being anti-Shah was the Tudeh Party, as the
Iranian Communist Party is known. Though treated as
a major threat to the monarchy in the 19 40s and 1950s,
the Tudeh did not play a very crucial role in the final
19overthrow of the Shah's regime. There were several reasons 
for the Tudeh's inactivity. It was banned in 1949 following 
an assassination attempt on the Shah. It had been suppressed 
so long by the Iranian security forces that it had ceased
18 The Iranian Tudeh Party (Party of the Masses) was formed 
by a group of German-educated Marxist intellectuals in 1941.
19 This is, however, not to deny the significant role of 
the Tudeh Party's weekly publication called Navid, which 
started appearing regularly in the streets of Tehran in 1978.
It is said that the KGB's covert publishing efforts were 
also involved in this publication. Unlike the bulletins of 
other Left-wing groups which are crudely roneoed and often 
semi-legible, this Tudeh Party organ was beautifully typed, 
reduced in size by photographic process, and printed by offset. 
It carried messages from Iraj Eskandary, the Moscow-based 
First Secretary of the Tudeh Party, in support of the pro- 
Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Vietnam, while 
censoring the Chinese.
In an article that appeared in issue No.48, published 
on 1 October 19 78, Navid attacked the Iraqi regime for what 
it called a 'dirty conspiracy' against Ayatollah Khomeini 
who was expelled from Iraq for refusing to give up his 
campaign against the Pahlavi dynasty. The attack on Iraq 
came in the wake of the Iraqi purge of Communists and the 
quest for Western arms and nuclear reactors. Every issue 
of Navid carried slogans demanding a political general strike 
and appeals to the armed forces to mutiny against the Shah.
It specialized in disinformation themes and defended the 
Concept of a convergence between Islam and Communism. (See 
Robert Moss, 'The Campaign to Destablise Iran', Conflict 
Studies, No.101, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
November 1978, pp.7-8.)
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to be an effective force within Iran. Moreover, the 
Soviet-Iranian rapprochement of 1962 indirectly hurt the 
party's image when the U.S.S.R. began to openly support 
the Shah in his domestic policy, especially the 'White 
Revolution'. This led to a split in the party and the 
more radical factions broke off. During these days of 
forced inactivity in Iran the Tudeh was not able to maintain 
an effective power base. The Tudeh, however, did claim 
influence among the workers, especially the oil workers. 
Nourredin Kianouri, one of the leaders of the Tudeh Party, 
in an interview with Edward Behr of Newsweek, maintained 
that the old Tudeh members among the working class had 
once again become active and indirectly claimed that the
20workers in the oil field obeyed the Tudeh party members.
This claim is, however, difficult to substantiate. The
Tudeh also delayed joining the anti-Shah movement till very
late. But, once the Iranian Revolution was nearing its
final victory, the Tudeh not only came out in support of
the Revolution but Nourreddin Kianouri vehemently assured
Tudeh support even for the Islamic movement led by Ayatollah
Khomeini. He even supported the Ayatollah's demand for
an Islamic republic and said:
I believe that there are no overwhelming 
differences between scientific socialism 
on the one hand and the social content of 
Islam on the other. On the contrary, they 
have much in common.2^
2 0 'We must guard against a coup', Newsweek, 29 January 
1979 .
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Besides the Tudeh's role, it would be in order to
mention the Soviet Union's role in the Iranian revolution
The 1978 disturbances in Iran brought a complex reaction
from the Soviet Union. Generally, the Soviet Union
followed a restrained, watchful and 'wait-and-see' policy
towards Iran. But the Soviet information media did not
hide their sympathy with the opposition forces. The use
of phrases such as the'popular struggle', 'clashes between
population and police' and 'mass actions of the working
22people demanding democratic liberties' showed clearly
enough the sympathies for the side they favoured. The
Soviet media generally ignored and sometimes denied the
fact that the opposition came initially from religious
circles opposing the Shah's reforms. At the same time,
they were careful to give the appearance of having nothing
to do with these events, generally quoting what others
said about them and keeping their criticisms indirect.
Also used was the device of attacking others while meaning
the Shah (in the same way, that they had attacked National
Security Adviser Brzezinski while meaning President Carter,
or, after the deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations,
attacked Egyptian journalists while meaning President Anwar
es-Sadat). For example, New Times attacked Mahmoud Jafarian
(Deputy General Secretary of the ruling Rastakhiz party
23 .and Chief of the Pars state news agency) in what seemed 
to be a reply to statements by the Shah.
22 New Tzmes (Moscow), No.35, August 1978, p.10. TASS in 
English, 8 September 1978, quoted in Foreign Broadcasts 
Information Service (U.S.S.R.), 8 September 1978, p.F5.
2 3 Pavel Mezenstev, 'Jafarian's crooked mirror', New Times, 
No.33, August 1978, pp.12-13.
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By a similar token, great care was taken by the 
Soviets not to support directly and officially the Communist 
Tudeh party or any other opposition or revolutionary group. 
But relations with Tudeh representatives were maintained. 
They appeared in the U.S.S.R. at CPSU Congresses and 
meetings and opportunities were given to them to express 
themselves in the Soviet press. For example, a statement 
of the Tudeh Central Committee was published in the 
Paris Communist newspaper L'Humanite on 6 September 1978 
and called for the overthrow of the Shah's monarchy and 
explusion of the American military advisers and officials. 
This was quoted in part in Pravda, which omitted direct 
calls for the overthrow of the regime in order to prevent
24Iranian accusations that the Soviets endorsed such calls.
Resistance Movements
A major component of the anti-Shah movement in Iran 
was the clandestine armed resistance movement. These groups 
included the 'Mujahedeen' and the 'Fedayeen'. Both were 
not monolithic structures but were composed of factions 
based upon personal loyalties and ideological orientations. 
The 'Mujahedeen' was reportedly formed in 1965 and wanted 
an Islamic republic which would emphasize the egalitarian 
elements in the original doctrine of Islam. Its symbol
24 See Aryeh Yodfat, 'The U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf 
Area', Australian Outlook, Vol.33, No.l, April 1979, p.65.
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was a clenched fist holding a gun. The Mujahedeen further
spawned a group called Mujahedeen-Marxist, whose objective
is a people's democratic republic. But from it another
faction, called the Struggle for Freedom, further split
off. This last group goes in for armed action and large-
2 6scale recruitments, mostly of the oil workers in Iran.
The 'Fedayeen' was from the beginning a left-wing
movement and believed in Marxism-Leninism. Also formed
in the late 1960s, the 'Fedayeen Khalq', (Fighters of the
People) regarded the 'Mujahedeen' as a useful staging post
from religious to secular socialism. The two groups have
invariably cooperated closely. Although they have been
fairly active for about eight years, they recently split
into three main groups. One was close to the Tudeh Party;
the second was led by Bijan Jazani; and the third was
formed by Ahmedzade and Pouyan (both killed now) and was
believed to be the extreme radical wing preaching the
. . 27principle of armed uprising. There was also another, 
radical group, Cherikh-e-Feda-ye Khalq (The Guerrilla 
Organization of the Devotees of the People) which emerged 
in 19 71. It was reported to have been trained by the radical 
Palestinian group, Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP). It was subsequently implicated in the
28attack on the American Embassy in Tehran on 14 February 1979.
25 'Bubbling to the surface', op.cit., p.36.
2 6 ibid. The Left claimed that out of the 60 members of 
the strike committee in Abadan (a major town of oil 
refineries) as many as 55 were leftist, including Tudeh 
party members. (ibid., p.37.)
27 ibid., p.37.
2 8 See International Herald Tribune, 15 February 1979.
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The resistance movement thus reflected the wide
spectrum of political groupings in Iran, ranging from
extreme left to ultra right. The liberal-democratic
groups, except that of Bazargan, did not have links with
the resistance groups, maybe because of the ideological
constraints of the liberal-democratic movement itself.
The resistance groups had their links with the Palestinian
guerrilla organizations, especially the PLFP and Al-Fatah
(PLO). The PLO had close ties with the Islamic groups
as was reflected by the close contacts between Yasser Arafat
29and Ayatollah Khomeini after the Revolution. These
resistance groups became active in the seventies when they
shifted their area of operation into the urban areas from
organising bases in the mountainous terrain in the north,
30near the Caspian Sea. In February 1971, a small band of 
guerrillas attacked a gendarmerie post at Siakhal in the 
northern province of Gilan. In military terms the attack
29 Internatzonal Herald Tribune, 19 February 1979. In the 
words of Ahmed Jibril, of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine: 'We trained them [the resistance groups] in 
everything from propaganda to the use of weapons'. For 
details see 'Arafat and Khomeiny add up to a deadly duo',
The Age, 24 February 1979. Also see PLO Chief, Yasser 
Arafat's interview in Time, 9 April 1979.
30 The area of operation was the big cities and urban areas 
where they tried to intensify their guerrilla activity.
In Maoist terms, opposition to the Shah had reached stage 
two, i.e. guerrilla warfare (the Maoist conception is 
subversion, guerrilla activities, then, finally, open warfare 
at a conventional level). See David Lynn Price, 'Oil and 
Middle East Security', The Washington Papers, Vol.IV,
No.41, (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1976), 
p.49.
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was indecisive, but it became mythified in the guerrillas'
31hagiography. After two years, the guerrillas claimed 
to have killed over 200 'enemy troops, police and Savak
thugs', to have carried out 81 bomb attacks and to have
32 . . .expropriated over 40 banks. An American military adviser,
Colonel Hawkins, was killed on 3 June 1973 and two American
army Colonels, Turner and Sheafer, were murdered on 21 May 
331975. It was felt that by the summer of 1975, the Iranian 
security forces had begun to close in on the terrorist 
networks. But although there was a marked diminution in 
terrorist activities after mid-1975, following a strong 
campaign against leftist activities, incidents of guerrilla 
attacks and terrorism continued to take place. For example,
10 terrorists were sentenced to death on 1 January 1976 for
. 3 4  murdering the U.S. advisers.
The terrorists played an important role during the
last days of the Pahlavi dynasty when their military training
proved useful in fighting against the troops loyal to the
Shah. The unity of purpose, however, failed to consolidate
the resistance movement into a cohesive force capable of
projecting itself as an independent factor in Iranian politics.
31 .. . , ibid.
32 • ,  ibid.
33 Conflict Studies, p.8.
34 For a chronological survey of the various terrorist 
activities during 1975 and early 1976, see Iran Almanac 
1976 and book of facts> Fifteenth Edition (Tehran: Echo 
of Iran/ July 1976), pp.105-106.
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The resistance movement disintegrated after the 1978-79 
revolution and each group went back to its old linkage 
with the parent group and started making a bid for power.
The Student Community
The Iranian student community has been among the
most vocal groups against the Shah's monarchy. Of the
35estimated 50,000 overseas Iranian students, several
thousand were believed to have enlisted in revolutionary
and terrorist organizations, including some 500 who gave
up their studies some years ago and had become, in effect,
3 6professional revolutionaries. It was estimated that more
than 100 anti-Shah publications were issued in West
Europe and the United States, many of them subsidised 
37by Libya.
Among left-wing Iranian student groups (which also 
included Iranian exiles) abroad that had played a significant 
anti-Shah role were the following:
(a) The Iranian Student Association (ISA) in the United 
States, which organized demonstrations in step with the 
growing unrest in Iran in the third quarter of 1978. On
1 September 1978, 500 supporters of the ISA clashed with
35 George Lenczowski, however, thinks that the number of 
overseas Iranian students was about 70,000. See George 
Lenczowski, 'U.S. Policy Towards Iran' in Abbas Amirie and 
Hamilton A. Twitchell, Iran in the 19 80s, Tehran: Institute 
for International Political and Economic Studies, 1978, p.370.
3 6 Conflict Studies, p.10.
police outside the Los Angeles Times building in Los
Angeles to protest against what was described as 'impending
military intervention of the United States in Iran'.
Banners with the slogan 'Victory to the Armed Struggle in
Iran' and bearing the insignia of the Organization of the
People's Fedayeen Guerrillas (OIPFG) - crossed Kalashnikov
3 8rifle and sickle - were carried during the march.
(b) The Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom 
in Iran (CAIFI) led by Reza Baraheni, had succeeded in
39attracting an impressive range of radical American support.
The 'Paris network' included a number of prominent 'Islamic 
Marxists' such as Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was reported to 
have placed his house at the disposal of Ayatollah Khomeini 
after he was expelled from Iran and was refused right of
residence in Kuwait and Turkey (the countries to which he
r: . , . ,* 40first applied).
(c) Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU). 
One of the most articulate of the foreign-based dissenting 
voices was that coordinated by the Confederation of Iranian 
Students based in Frankfurt, Germany. It was a loose 
organization with branches in other countries, particularly
in Britain and the U.S.A. Frequently, CISNU attempted to 
disrupt the Shah's state visits to European countries and 
the United States. In 1977 there were 15 extremist Iranian
3 8 ibid. Also refer to the Shah's interview to U.S. News
and World Report, 26 June 1978, p.37.
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organizations in West Germany, with 86 branches and an 
estimated membership of 1,500. However, CISNU was riven 
by internal dissensions between 'social revolutionaries' 
(Frankfurt Group, with branches in 16 German cities) and 
various Maoist Groups (Aachen, Mainz and Hamburg) with 
between them some 23 local branches.4'*'
(d) Islamic Group. Probably the most important component
of the anti-Shah movement was the Islamic Group. The
Shah's most serious failure of policy was the complete
and bitter opposition he engendered from the religious
classes. Unlike most of the Muslims of the Middle Eastern
world, most Iranians are the adherents of a minority sect
42of Islam known as Shi'ism. Their religious leaders, 
reverently called 'Mujtahids' are generally men of great 
learning, integrity and popularity. They are renowned for 
the simplicity of their standard of living and are among 
the most democratically chosen grassroots leaders in the 
contemporary Middle East. Millions of dollars pass through
41 Conflict Studzes , p.12.
42 Shi'ism traces its heritage back to Ali, the cousin 
and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. In Iran, the des­
cendants of Ali represent . a chain of charismatic leaders 
(imams), the twelfth of whom went into occultation in 
940 A.D. The Shi'ite leaders today, known as 'mujtahids', 
are representatives of this last imam and wield great 
spiritual, economic and political power. Since 1501 when 
Twelver Shi'ism became the state religion of Iran, the 
secular Shahs have ruled partially in the shadow of the 
'mujtahids'. Iran has been the scene of tension between 
the secular and religious leaders ever since. For details 
of the history and philosophy of Shi'ism read, 'Iran's 
brand of Islam as a religion of opposition', The Times,
24 November 1978.
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the hands of Iran's top 'Mujtahids' every year, for they 
serve as social welfare agents throughout the country, 
accepting the religious dues of the faithful and then 
distributing them to the needy. In this sense the 
'Mujtahids' are quite different from the masses of Shi'ite
clerics or mullahs, some of whom are corrupt and espouse
. , . . , . . 43socially regressive policies.
The 'Mujtahids' have on occasion opposed a number of
the Shah's reform programme, specifically with respect
to land reform and women's rights. Although they deny this,
there is little doubt that they felt threatened by the
forces of modernization. In 1977-78 the cabinet of Premier
Jamshid Amouzegar reduced a $80 million subsidy given
regularly to mosques and religious foundations to a reported
44$30 million. The Shah, instead of reaching an accommo­
dation with the powerful religious establishment, chose
45to crush it. Recalcitrant 'Mujtahids' were harassed;
43 .The mullahs have also played an important role in orches­
trating and mobilising the anti-Shah movement. For example, 
see Joseph Kraft, 'Mullahs Make Case for Shah', International 
Herald Tribune, 1 September 1978, and Nicholas Gage, 
International Herald Tribune, 11 December 1978.
44 George Lenczowski, 'The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector'
Foreign Affairs, Vol.57, No.4, Spring 1979, p.806.
45 One reason why Ayatollah Shariatmadari turned against the 
Shah's regime was that troops reportedly entered his home and 
killed one of his followers before his eyes. Ayatollah 
Khomeini's father was reportedly killed by agents of the 
Shah's father, King Reza Shah, and it is believed that the 
secret police, Savak was implicated in the death of his elder 
son in 19 77, though he was supposed to have died of a heart 
attack in prison. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was exiled 
after the religious riots of June 1963 and lived abroad for 
almost fifteen years till his triumphant return after the 
departure of the Shah. Ayatollah Taleghani was another notable 
religious figure who was imprisoned and harassed by the 
Shah's security forces.
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some were imprisoned and others executed. The government 
took greater and greater control of the religious endow­
ments and the Shah appointed men of military background 
to positions of authority over holy shrines in cities such 
as Mashed. The religious presses were closed down while reli­
gious gatherings were regularly broken up by security forces.
In May 1976 the Shah replaced the Shi1 a Islamic calendar 
based on the solar year since Prophet Muhammad's 'Hijra'
by the Imperial calendar dating from the foundation of
46the Iranian Empire by Cyrus the Great. Thus the Islamic 
year 1355 became the Imperial year 2535, a difference of 
1,180 years. It was a grand symbolic assertion of the 
Achemenian legacy as the central spiritual fact in Iran's 
history.
The Shah's press frequently indulged in attacking
and casting serious aspersions on the character and
47personality of the religious leaders. It was, in fact, 
the publication of such provocative material that triggered 
the first anti-government riots in the holy city of Qom 
on 9 January 1978. According to the'Iranian Liberation 
Movement', then based in Paris, more than 100 demonstrators"
were killed, 500 wounded and 4,000 arrested by the security
48 . .forces. This was followed by violent demonstrations in
49Tabriz where by 2 June the death toll had risen to 5,000.
46The new calendar system came into effect on 20 March at 
3.30 p.m. after having been approved by a joint session of 
the two Houses of Parliament. See Iran Almanac 1976, p.54.
47 See Lenczowski, op.cit., p.806.
4 8 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1978, Vol.XXIV, p.28939.
49 See the chronology of events in Iran (1978-79) in The
Canberra Times, 18 January 1978.
194
By the end of August 19 78, the Shah was forced to
reverse his campaign against the Shi'ite establishment.
He sought to placate the rioting masses whose religious
feelings were greatly excited during the Muslim fasting
holy month of Ramzan. The portfolio of the Minister of
State for Women's Affairs was abolished in the new cabinet
of Sharif Enami while a new one was created for dealing
with the Waqf i.e. the religious endowment organization.
The controversial I.mperial calendar introduced two years
before,which had greatly evoked the resentment of the clergy^,
was scrapped in favour of the traditional Islamic calendar.
The new government also banned the casinos and
gambling houses. Enami reiterated the Shah's promises
about liberalising the political situation and said that
all political parties would be allowed to operate freely
in Iran. Consequently it was reported on 29 August that
fourteen political parties had expressed their desire to
50operate openly. The opposition, however, was sceptical
of the offers of the new government. While Ayatollah
Shariatmadari said that he and his supporters would give
51the new government three months to meet their demands, 
Ayatollah Khomeini denounced them as a plot to destroy the 
Islamic movement.^
50 See The Canberra Times, 30 August 1978.
51 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1979, Vol.XXV, p.29386.
52 ibid.
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The Armed Forces
The armed forces kept on supporting the Shah's regime
till the last. On 6 November 1978 the Shah handed over
the task of running the country to General Gholam Reza
53Azhan, the then Chief of Staff. The role of the military
in Iran at that juncture could be divided into two main
categories. In one case the military acted as an instrument
of the regime to control a difficult situation, and if need
be, to form a caretaker government on behalf of the Head
of State till a civilian government could take over. In
another case, the military elite sought to control the
civilian government either by offering it conditional
support or by intervening militarily in certain situations
and thereby trying to force the civilian government to
follow a course determined by the military group. The
military government of General Azhari illustrated the
first case while the role of the military group after the
departure of the Shah represented the second facet of the
military rule in Iran.
By handing over the administration to the army the
Shah hoped to gain some tactical advantage. He hoped to
bring relative stability by following a tough policy against
the riots and mass demonstrations. The new government
paraded tanks and APCs in the cities in a massive show of
54strength and an eight-hour night curfew was imposed.
5 3 The Canberra Times, 7 November 1978.
See The Canberra Times, 12 November 1978.54
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. . 5 5General Oveisi, the former Chief of the Iranian Land 
Forces, was appointed as the new Labour Minister to restore 
law and order and handle the striking oil workers by 
forcing them to once again start oil production. The new 
government used force in controlling demonstrations.
Several of the liberal-democrat leaders, including Dr Karim 
Sanjabi, were arrested. All educational institutions 
were closed and important newspapers, radio and TV stations 
were controlled by the army.
The Shah, taking advantage of the new military government,
tried to do some spring cleaning. He ordered the arrest
of twelve leading Iranian personalities, including Gen.
Nasiri, the ex-Savak chief and Dr Hoveyda, the former prime-
minister and private adviser to the Shah.“*^  The Shah also
set up two boards to investigate the property and holdings
of the members of the royal family and to turn them over,
if and when necessary, to charitable organizations. He
also promised to clean up the Pahlavi foundation that was
associated with the corruption in royal circles. The
Shah sought this opportunity to gain sympathy from the masses
and restore his lost credibility. He said:
I commit myself to make up for past 
mistakes, to fight corruption and 
injustice and to form a national
55 . .General Oveisi had also played a key role in suppressing
the June 196 3 riots in Qom that were inspired by the
religious leaders, and was known for his tough policies.
The Canberra Times, 10 November 1978.5 6
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government to carry free elections 
... Your revolutionary message has 
been heard. I am aware of eve 
you have given your lives for.
The military government was the last ditch stand of 
the Shah. Since it was working under the shadow of the 
the Shah it could not be an alternative to the political 
system that had become the target of popular opposition.
The anti-Shah forces rejected the military government as 
they had rejected the Enami government earlier. The military 
government could neither control the street demonstrations, 
and coerce the oil workers so as to increase production, 
nor could it obtain the cooperation or at least the neutrality 
of the opposition groups. After General Azhari's resignation, 
the civilian government of Shahpour Bakhtiar relied on 
the reluctant support of the U.S.A. and unpredictable pro- 
Shah elements in the armed forces. He was faced with a 
military group that was beyond his control and which was 
prepared to push him to the extreme in its fight against 
the anti-Shah forces. Bakhtiar, however, succeeded in side­
tracking the hard-liner, General Oveisi, and instead got 
General Abbas Gharabaghi as the new Chief of Staff. But 
Bakhtiar never had real power. It rested with the armed 
forces loyal to the Shah. He was seen
at best, as a Kerensky, a social- 
democrat caught up in a revolution, or, 
at worst, as a post-imperial f r o n t - m a n . 58
57 Quoted in 'Showdown for the Shah', Newsweek, 20 November
1978.
5 8 'The coming of an obdurate messiah', The Economist,
3 February 1979.
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Since Bakhtiar was a nominal head of the government
and because the real power rested with the armed forces,
the main struggle was between the army and the opposition.
The direct confrontation between them could be traced back
to the riots in Tabriz on 18 February 197 8 when the army
59was called to restore order. Since then the army was
increasingly used to quell the demonstrations, often brutally,
leaving behind thousands of dead and wounded. For example,
the suppression of the demonstration in Tehran on 8 September
1978 by the army resulted in more than 50 dead. Subsequently,
6 0martial law was decreed for six months. Gradually, the
context of this confrontation began to change. It was
no longer the armed forces versus the masses but the pro-
Shah elements in the army versus the forces allied to the
opposition. This change had come about because of the split
in the armed forces as was shown in the fighting at the
Doshan Tappeh airbase, Lavizan barracks and at the
61Niavaran Palace. During these incidents, the units of 
the Imperial Guard, the 'Javidan', still loyal to the Shah, 
were confronted by the civilians, including the members 
belonging to the 'Mujahedeen1 and 1Fedayeen1 groups and 
the pro-Khomeini elements in the airforce. The defeat of 
these troops meant the end of the Pahlavi dynasty. The
59 According to the opposition, nearly 100 people were 
killed and about 650 wounded as a result of the army action. 
The official sources, however, placed the figures to 9 dead 
and 200 wounded. (See Asia Recorder 1979, Vol.XXV, No.7, 
p.14739 . )
fi 0
The Canberra Times, 9 September 1978.
See International Herald Tribune, 13 February 1979.61
1Shah, who had so laboriously built up his armed forces, 
was no doubt disillusioned when they collapsed in the face 
of a popular revolution.
Many reasons suggest themselves for the Iranian armed 
force's failure to uphold and protect the system. Primarily, 
the Iranian military proved to be an inadequate instrument 
against the mass movement. Military force might be used 
to coerce the population, especially in big cities, but 
it cannot make the people support the regime. It cannot 
even prevent the surreptitious undermining of the system 
through passive resistance, strikes, sabotage, terrorism 
and finally popular rebellion. The army was brought to 
break up the anti-Shah demonstrations but it could not 
produce oil, or re-open schools, shops, banks or government 
offices. Moreover the army, by siding with the Shah, 
even lost the chance of acting as an independent political 
force capable of taking over the control of the situation 
through a military coup d'etat. By supporting the 
unpopular and crumbling monarchical system it had lost its 
credibility and legitimacy as an independent entity.
Even though some members in the top leadership may
have wished at some point to stage a coup they were prevented 
6 2from doing so. The Iranian armed forces lacked cohesion.
6 2 In this context the role of General Huyser, the American 
Deputy Commander in NATO, can be pointed out. The General 
arrived in January when the Shah was about to leave Iran, 
and is reported to have conferred constantly with Iranian 
military leaders for over a month. According to reports 
he or others warned the top Iranian military leaders against 
staging a coup and possibly even threatened to withhold 
military supplies if a coup was attempted.
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The Shah, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
took personal interest in defence affairs. The Shah
spent more than two days per week on military matters and
had very ably fractured the command structure of the three
services (army, navy and airforce) with no intermediate
levels of communication between their headquarters in
Tehran. They maintained liaison through the Shah's command
staff which was headed by the Premier. It is said that
not only were all important military decisions taken with
the Shah's concurrence, but the mere movement of a company
from one location to another had to be cleared by him in 
6 3advance. The three services were compartmentalised and
the Shah, who 'ruled with the best talents of the lion and 
64the fox'. would play off one group against the other very 
ably.
A significant factor in preventing military officers 
from gaining power independent of the throne was their 
professional insecurity. High ranking officers could be 
subject to imprisonment, retirement, or exile. And officers, 
who acquired skill in working with extra-military groups, 
were particularly suspect.
The major test of the Shah's regime after he assumed 
the throne in 1941 was the Mossadeq crisis of 1953. In 
that crisis, the army remained basically loyal to the Shah.
6 3 Yousef M. Ibrahim, 'Army's Loyalty to Shah is basis of 
New Regime', International Herald Tribune, 16 November 1978.
Bill, op.cit., p.325.
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Yet, many high-ranking officers who had played prominent
roles in removing Prime Minister Mossadeq and restoring
the Shah found that their influence cost them their positions.
While the Shah was out of the country in August, 1953,
the army, under the direction of United States advisers
and Iranian officers loyal to the Shah, arrested Mossadeq
and defeated his followers. Several loyal officers became
extremely powerful as a result of the August 'coup',
including General Fazollah Zahedi, who was appointed Prime
Minister to replace Mossadeq. Upon his appointment, Zahedi
purged the General Staff, the National Police and the
Gendarmerie, removing anyone who appeared to be disloyal
to the Shah and arresting 600 members of the army who were
6 5accused of being Communists. Because the Shah was clearly 
dependent on Zahedi at a time when the Shah had determined 
to rule rather than reign, he forced Zahedi to resign in 
1955.
In the 1978 uprising, many high government officials
were removed by the Shah. One of them was General Nematullah 
6 6Nassiri, who had been head of Savak for 14 years. The
6 5 See Ann T. Schulz, 'Iran: The Descending Monarchy',
Current History, Vol.76, No.443, January 1979, p.34.
6 6 It was Nassiri's attempted arrest of nationalist Premier 
Mossadeq which precipitated the CIA-assisted coup of 1953 
restoring the Shah to power. A classmate of the Shah's at 
Tehran Military Academy and one of 170 Iranian police officers 
to receive training in the U.S. and AID's Public Safety 
Programme,Nassiri served as Chief of the State Police before 
taking over the reins of Savak in 1965. It was in this 
capacity that General Nassiri gained worldwide notoriety 
for routinely employing the most barbaric forms of torture 
imaginable against the Shah's political opponents. (See 
Christopher Paine, 'Shah's crisis shakes the West', Nation 
Review, 25 January 1979.)
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Shah later agreed to bring Nassiri to trial, even though 
a trial would subject his regime to potentially damaging 
scrutiny.
It is no wonder that the Western officers sent to
Iran for training programmes found the Iranian army to
be one of the most secretive and introverted of any
6 7armies in the non-Communist world. The Shah had
perfected and over-insured the security apparatus to keep
a tab on the loyalty of his all key military figures. At
the same time he did not want to depend upon one intelligence
organization for all information. Hence the army's
intelligence organization was rivalled by the Shah's
special office organization and the State Security and
Information Organization (SAVAK). All these organizations
reported to him directly. Other people, who reported
to the Shah directly were: the Air-force Commander, the
Chief-of-Staff, the Minister of War, the heads of the
Gendarmerie, City Police, and the Imperial Guard. In this
6 8manner, their reports could be checked and cross-checked.
Hence politically ambitious officers in the Iranian armed 
forces, if they existed, had to be extraordinarily sycophantic 
in order to succeed.
6 7 For example, every officer promoted over the rank of
major was personally endorsed by the Shah; no officer,
not even a General, was allowed to leave Iran without the
Shah's personal permission; and every morning a private
parade of 90 minutes was held by the commanding officers in
which the troops recited the prayers and slogans of 'Khoda,
Shah, Nishan' (God, Shah, Fatherland). The Times, 28
November 1978.
6 8 Price, op.cit., pp.44-45.
The Iranian armed forces were also suffering from
other major weaknesses. It was a conscript army and
assuming that even one third of the armed forces was
composed of the conscripts, who probably reflected more
sharply the growing discontent of the masses, it constituted
a grave political risk. It was the army, supposedly the
'least westernized' of the three services, which contained
6 930 per cent as draftees with little or no education,
which was ultimately called upon to face demonstrations
in the streets. The Shah's regime's penchant for exaggerating
Iran's military capabilities, coupled with the fact that
arms purchases have often lavishly lined high officials'
pockets, was very demoralizing for the mid-echelon officers
and soldiers. For example, it is reported that about
$253 million were transferred hurriedly to the foreign
banks from Iran in September/October 1978 by 13 high ranking
military men. These included Generals Hassan Toufanian,
70Nematollah Nassiri, and Gholam Ali Oveisi. In addition, 
thousands of Americans in Iran had contributed to the inflation 
of housing and food costs in Tehran, and their Iranian 
counterparts had not been able to keep up with American
Ibrahim, p.2.
70 A partial list of such transfer of accounts for September/ 
October 1978, compiled by workers at Iran's central bank, 
however, pushes the figure to US$2.4 billion. (For details 
of the personalities involved in high corruption and ill- 
gotten wealth see Paine, op.cit., p.280.)
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lifestyles. This lavish style of living by the
foreigners was seized upon by Khomeini in inciting the
soldiers against their high officers.
Another source of political weakness in the Iranian
armed forces was the result of its rapid expansion and
modernization. The Iranian armed forces expanded from
161,000 in 1970 to 413,000 in 1978.72 The Army doubled
in strength to 285,000 but the Airforce increased to 100,000,
which meant an expansion of 600 per cent. The armed forces'
budget increased from $880 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion
in 1977, an almost 1100 per cent increase in these seven
73years. This rapid expansion and modernization of the 
of the armed forces, especially of the Airforce, introduced 
into the armed forces young Iranians from the lower and 
middle classes. They had acquired a relatively higher 
(technical) education and were more politicised. This 
group also began to act within the armed forces as an 
articulator of anti-Shah feelings and finally supported
71
71 . . .According to a Senate Report, due to a significant
housing shortage throughout Iran, a 3-bedroom apartment
would cost a rent of about $2,000 per month in Tehran.
Some Iranians blamed the influx of U.S. personnel for
their high cost. (See United States Senate, Senate Delegation
Report on American Foreign Policy and Non Proliferation
Interests in the Middle East - Report pursuant to Senate
Resolution 167 of May 10, 1977; 95th Congress, 1st Session,
June 1977, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1977, p.24.)
72 See The Military Balance 1970-1971 and 1978-1979,
London: IISS, pp.39 and 37.
7 3 See U.S. Senate, U.S. Mtlitary Sales to Iran - A Staff 
Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 
July 1976, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976, p.13.
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the opposition against the pro-Shah forces. The role
of these technicians and other officers during the fighting
between the pro-Shah 1Javidan1 and the Airforce troops
. . 75at the Doshan Tappeh airbase illustrates this point vividly.
Finally, the task of protecting the dynasty was
specifically assigned to the Imperial Guard and the
Rangers - elite forces that remained loyal to the Shah
till the last. They were also the most favoured troops.
Thus they became the final targets of attack and when
they ultimately gave in, the final collapse of the monarchy
76came.
74
New Outlook after the Revolution
77The successful Iranian revolution of 1978-79 brought 
some fundamental shifts in Iran's foreign policy posture.
As a new regime its policies and perceptions were radically
74 For example, the strike of 3,800 Iranian Airforce 
officers and enlisted men at the West Iranian airbase of 
Shasrokhi and the Gulf base of Bandarabbas was directed 
at the expulsion of U.S. military advisers from Iran.
(See International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1979.)
'Can the Army Hold?' Newsweek, 12 February 1979 and 
ibid., 13 February 1979.
7 6 For an analysis of the collapse of the Shah's armed 
forces read 'Too many swords too little spirit', The 
Economist, 24 February 1979.
7 7 •According to reports the death toll m  the Iranian
Revolution had reached 10,000 killed in the last 15 months.
It is also estimated that in the final 48 hours 860 people
died and 3,500 were wounded. The Australian, 15 February
1979 .
The Iranian Revolution has been called 'as the first 
Third World revolution, one which is neither Marxist nor 
capitalist but indigenously Islamic'. For the unique 
aspects of the Iranian Revolution see the Special Report on 
'The World of Islam', Time Weekly, 16 April 1979.
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different from the Shah's 37-year old monarchy which had 
built up Iran into a regional power. The main features 
of the new regime are:
(1) Abolition of the monarchy and promulgation 
of the Islamic order in Iran.
(2) A policy of political non-alignment and policies 
less favourable to Western interests.
(3) Complete severance of diplomatic and economic 
links with Israel and South Africa.
(4) Militancy on oil prices and conservation in 
production policy, and
(5) Direct interest in the Arab-Israel conflict 
signified through the visit to Iran of Yasser 
Arafat, the PLO chief.
Iran's new military role is different from the regional
military role previously pursued by the Shah. Iran is at
present following a neutralist or non-aligned policy and
7 8has left the Central Treaty Organization. The definition
of her security has narrowed down and now coincides with
her national territory. This had become apparent when
Prime Minister Bakhtiar served notice on the U.S. saying:
'We will not, from now on, be the policeman of the Persian 
79Gulf'. This probably meant that Iran from then onwards 
would neither play an active part in the Persian Gulf nor
78 The Canberra Times, 15 March 1979.
79 . . .Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar as quoted in U.S. News 
and World Report, 15 January 1979.
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extend assistance to nearby states threatened by subversion.
Furthermore, her military build-up would be arrested and
fewer resources spent on defence. Earlier in November 1978
in an interview with the Shah the Newsweek summed up:
What was planned on paper was too 
ambitious. Iran will now have to 
lower its sights across the board, from 
nuclear-power plants to advanced 
military aircraft. By forcing the pace of 
modernization and industrialization ... 
too many corners were cut with arbitrary 
decisions.80
The revolutionary government, by early February 19 79,
had cancelled about $7 billion worth of contracts with
81the United States out of about $12.1 billion. The biggest 
single order of cancellation was for the 160 F-16 fighters 
($3.6 billion) whose delivery was expected to start in
19 80. The order for an advanced air defence system based 
on 7 E-3 AWACS aircraft ($1.3 billion) had not actually 
been placed but it was so close that everybody had been 
counting on it. Besides these two major cutbacks, Iran 
has already cancelled half of the $800 million contract 
for 4 destroyers and seems likely to cancel the other 2 as
8 0 Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'Tea With the Shah', Newsweek,
20 November 1978.
81 In fiscal year 1978 the U.S. Defense Department sponsored 
foreign military sales of $13.5 billion to all nations.
Of that total, Iran accounted for $2.6 billion, or 19.1 
per cent. In terms of actual undelivered orders now 
pending from U.S. companies the total worldwide is $44.1 
billion. Of that sum, Iran's portion is $12.1 billion, 
or 27.4 per cent. (See Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway, 
'Exporting Iran's Wealth', Nation Review, 25 January 1978.
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well. One of the 3 submarines on order from America has
been dropped along with a job lot of lesser deals on military
8 2vehicles and spares. Earlier in early January the Iranian
government also cancelled a $575 million contract with
Bell Helicopters to produce nearly 400 helicopters by
1973. Previously the Shah had decided to postpone a
$1.4 billion contract with Grumman and Hughes to produce
8 3F-14 fighters for the airforce. This was done in the 
face of a widespread criticism of his economic policies 
which diverted large sums for the defence buildup.
The Iranian government also wants to cancel most, 
if not all, of its defence contracts with Britain. The 
government-to-government deals are dominated by orders 
worth roughly $2 billion for 1,300 Shir-1 and Shir-2 tanks
scheduled to be delivered in the spring of 1979 and running
till 1985. Other orders were: 4 naval support ships to
be built by Yarrow for about $140 million; about $160
million for building a base maintenance facility for tanks
at Darud in Iran; and commercial defence contracts for
Rapier short-range anti-aircraft missile systems for
$800 million with the British Aeroscope. Finally, Swan
Hunter had a fleet support ship almost completed and Vosper
Thorneycroft stands to lose a contract of about $20 million
84to refit British-built ships in Bandar Abbas.
8 2 The Economist, 10 February 1979.
8 3 Time, 8 January 1978.
The Economist, 10 February 1979.84
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Furthermore, it is likely that a major sales agreement 
between U.S. and Iran for over $25 million in 1978 and a
proposed sale of $1,255 million in 1979 will be severely
4. w i 85 cut back.
Iran's regional role in the Persian Gulf has been
adversely affected by the disintegration of the armed
forces. The new regime came into being successfully only
after the Revolution had eroded the two major national
institutions, the monarchy and the army. The new government
faces a challenging task of creating anew a superstructure
because the old one has been completely destroyed. Most
of Iran's airforce has been grounded because of lack of
spare parts for its American-built aircraft« According
to the Assistant Prime Minister, Mr Entezam, about 95 per
cent of the country's huge military helicopter fleet was
out of action in March 19 79 and the bulk of the airforce
8 6was 'a useless heap of scrap material'. Up to June 1979
as many as 291 higher officials of the Shah's regime had
been sentenced and executed by the Islamic revolutionary
8 7courts. This included at least a dozen of the top officers
of the Armed Forces. Moreover, 250,000 i.e. about 60 per
8 8cent of soldiers had either deserted or gone home.
8 5For complete details see U.S. Congress, House of Represen­
tatives, United States Arms Sale Policy and Recent Sales to 
Europe and the Middle East - Hearing before the subcommittee 
in Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International 
Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 5 October 1978, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, 
p p .18-34.
The Age, 19 March 1979.
o 7
The Australian, 7 June 1979.
International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1979.8 8
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According to a Western military attache,
The command structure has collapsed.
Each unit now votes for its officers 
and the 'Komiteh' in the barracks 
decides what the troops will do.89
The soldiers that will serve the army will presumably 
belong to one of the three factions: pro-Khomeini, 
pro-radical and,quite possibly, pro-Shah elements biding 
for time. Undoubtedly, some elements in the armed forces 
were opposed to the Shah and joined with Khomeini to 
overthrow the old system. But it would be wrong to assume 
that all of them would unquestionably support the leadership 
of the new Islamic group. The better educated and politicised 
among them, especially the technicians, the NCOs and even 
some junior officers might well support the liberal-democrats 
or even the radicals. Any attempt to weed them out would 
further erode the efficiency of the Iranian armed forces.
Thus, even if the Islamic group recognises the armed forces 
it does not necessarily mean that it would strengthen it like the 
Shah. This is one reason why the new regime is trying 
to create other institutions like the National Guard. The 
present regime has started taking cautious steps to reorganize 
the armed forces. General Mohammed Wali Qarani, a close 
supporter of Khomeini, was appointed as the new Chief of 
Staff. But he could not do much without an officer corps 
which he had no power to create. Moreover, it was reported 
that he could not restrain the Islamic Group from interfering
8 9 See 'Is Time Running Out for Iran's New Rulers?' 
U.S. News and World Report, 28 May 1979.
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. . 90m  military matters. He was assassinated soon and
succeeded by General Nasser Farbod who was prepared to
go along with the Islamic group. He wanted to organize
the new army on the basis of Islamic principles. He had also
promised to equip it with the latest equipment and weaponry.
The present regime has also tried to use the army to
bolster its image, as the old regime did. It ordered the
army to parade in the cities, before the March referendum,
and to demonstrate not only its strength but also its
solidarity with the new system. The military parade was
a poor show, and it probably had the same effect upon the
Iranian people as similar parades held during the previous
regime. The present regime is faced with a dilemma: if
it creates a really effective military machine it cannot
be sure that the machine will not turn against it. And,
if it does not create an efficient army it cannot rely
solely upon the National Guard and the Islamic militia to
counter the possible threat from the minorities as well
as other political opponents in Iran.
The new regime, like the Shah's regime, has on a
number of occasions taken recourse to the use of the armed
forces in dealing with its minorities. In Iran, the
Persian heartland is surrounded by non-Persian minorities
like the Arabs in Khuzistan, the Baluchis, the Turcomans,
. . .  91the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds. They are ethnically,
linguistically and culturally different from the Persians.
90 See International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1979.
91 Also for details of the various tribes inhabiting Iran see 
Iran Almanac 1976, pp.356-357.
212
Most of them belong to the Sunni variation of Islam. The 
Pahlavi kings had subjugated them by force of arms and 
by other means like demographic redistribution of population 
and grant of economic, administrative and social incentives. 
They also tried to inculcate in them a sense of Iranian 
national consciousness. The process had not been completed 
fully and, therefore, after the overthrow of the Pahlavi 
dynasty these minorities started to reassert their identity 
and began demanding autonomy. Their main demands were 
recognition of their separate cultural identity which 
included the recognition of their language for educational 
purposes, a greater share in government revenue and a 
larger participation in the decision-making process.
The Kurds were the first among the other non-Persian
minorities to demand autonomy in Iran. It is estimated
that out of a total of nearly 14 million Kurds spread
throughout the adjacent areas of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey
and the Soviet Union, the Iranian Kurds constitute some
922 million. The fighting started soon after the Revolution 
when the Kurds raided police and gendarmerie posts and 
government offices and also attacked pro-Khomeini militia 
that was despatched to quell the movement. The towns of 
Sanandaj and Naqadeh became the main centres of Kurdish 
resistance. The Iranian armed forces even used helicopter 
gunships to dislodge the Kurds but they held to their 
position. Their demand for autonomy was accepted by the
New York Tzmes, Weekly Review, 25 March 1979.9 2
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government before the March referendum but was subsequently
9 3rejected.
Another ethnic group, the Turcomans, came into conflict
with the new regime. This trouble in the north can be
traced not so much to the Turcoman nationalism per se but
to the disputes between the Turcomans who had lived there
and the Persians who moved there during the days of the
Pahlavi dynasty and were given a favoured treatment by the
regime. The new Islamic regime also tried to strengthen
the hands of the Persian population living there. Arms
were handed over to them and the newly formed militia was
also composed of Persians. The tension that was being
generated exploded on 26 March in armed conflict between
the Turcomans and the Persians. Gonbad-e-kavus became
the centre of Turcoman resistance. The Iranian forces
used the Scorpion light tanks, APCs as well as aircraft
against the Turcomans. An estimated 200 people were killed
94in the battle. An uneasy cease-fire was announced on
2 April but there is no reason to believe that the mutual
hatred that was accentuated by the recent fighting would
subside. Turcomans, like the Kurds, had boycotted the
March referendum and there is no sign that they will easily 
give up their demand for autonomy.
9 3 See Internatzonal Herald Tribune, 24-25 March 1979; 
ibid., 26 March 1979; ibid., 22 March 1979.
9 4 See 'Iran Military Moves North as Turkoman Battle Ends', 
International Herald Tribune, 4 April 1979, and 'Turkomans, 
Militiamen Ignore Iran Cease-Fire', ibid., 3 April 1979.
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In Khuzistan, or Arabistan as the Arabs used to call
that area, the demand for autonomy is a reflection of the
impact of Atab nationalism and pan-Arabism that was promoted
by Iraq and which became a part of the Iraq-Iran rivalry.
The Arabs of Khuzistan are not only conscious of their
Arab heritage but are well aware of the fact that they
also occupy the major oil-bearing area of Iran. When Arab
workers, who represent at least 20 per cent of the work
force in the oil industry, challenged the new government,
Khomeini ordered troops to quell the unrest ruthlessly.
Backed by tanks and helicopters, the government forces
fired into Arab strongholds in the southern port city of
Khorramshahr, where leaders of Iran's nearly 2 million
Arabs were demanding autonomy. Their religious leader,
Sheikh Shabbir Khaghani, warned that the Arabs might strike
unless the government halted its attacks and agreed to
safeguard minority rights. The Arab extremist groups
have also threatened to sabotage key oil installations,
which has led to a state of emergency in Khorramshahr,
the first anywhere in the country since the overthrow of
95the Shah. According to a self-appointed spokesman
of the Arabs, more than 170,000 AK-47 rifles have found
their way into Arab ha.nds since the fighting erupted in
96June.
9 5 'Iran: Challenging the Ayatollah', Newsweek, 11 June 1979.
9 6 The town of Khorramshahr is reported to be extremely 
tension-ridden because of the recent happenings, and has all 
the signs of racial and class struggle. See Liz Thurgood, 
'Crushing dissent', The Australian, 7-8 July 1979.
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The contraction of Iran's regional responsibilities
has reduced its importance in the Persian Gulf area and
has affected both the political balance in the Middle
East and the East-West strategic balance. It is assumed
that Iran's foreign policy will be more concentrated, with
less emphasis on military security and more on declarations
of militant nationalism. At best, this sensitivity to
the condition of the Third World could produce an Iranian
foreign policy comprised of equal parts of nationalism
and pragmatism, similar to Algeria's. At worst, it could
degenerate into indiscriminate interference and the export
97of revolution, on the Libyan model.
Most of the governments in the Middle East have 
experienced the shock-waves of the Iranian revolution. 
However, the immediate effects of the crisis will be felt 
most by Iran's smaller neighbours in the Gulf. Due to the 
relinquishment of its regional responsibilities, internal 
weakness, domestic preoccupations, and a somewhat neutral 
foreign policy, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf 
will be altered. The Saudi-Arabian monarchy has most to 
fear from the developments in Iran. According to some opinion 
the Saudi monarchy is reasonably safe from a mass upheaval 
like Iran because of more revenues, co-optation of the 
religious establishment in planning modernization, the hold 
of important political positions by the military and the
9 7 Shahram Chubin, 'Repercussions of the Crisis in Iran', 
Survival, Vol.XXI, No.3, May/June 1979 , p.99.
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absence of a strong middle class. Nevertheless, Saudi
Arabian government can be criticized on human rights issues,
corruption, an unequal income distribution, over-rapid
9 9growth and especially, subservience to Western influence.
In varying degrees all the oil-producing states are vulnerable 
to domestic ferment with increased economic growth but 
relatively also political development. In addition, 
the effect of strikes in Iran on the attitude of workers 
in key industries may have an enduring legacy in the Gulf.
9 8
9 8 For example, see Amos A. Jordan, Jr., 'Saudi Arabia:
The Next Iran?' Parameters, Vol.IX, No.l, March 1979, pp.2-8; 
Arnold Hottinger, 'Does Saudi Arabia Face Revolution?1 The 
New York Review of Books, Vol.26, No.11, pp.14-15; and 
Peter A. Iseman, 'Will Arabia be the next Petro-domino?'
Nation Review, 22 February 1979.
99 A good instance of this over rapid growth is the proposed 
plan to set up two new industrial cities at an approximate 
cost of $70 billion. These cities, conceived as modern 
industrial settlements in which Bedouins and immigrant 
workers (at an estimated ratio of 30 per cent Saudis to 
70 per cent immigrants) would work in huge state-owned 
petrochemical enterprises. A high-powered commission 
comprising European, Arab and American experts, have given 
a totally negative view of the project (if it goes as it 
was planned), for economic and sociological reasons. (See 
Arnold Hottinger, 'Does Saudi Arabia Face Revolution?'
The New York Review of Books, Vol.26, No.11, 28 June 1979, 
p . 14.
^  The rapid economic growth has come about with substantial 
increase in oil revenues to the Middle East countries.
There is a strong likelihood of a widening gap between 
rich and poor, powerful and powerless, personal and 
intergroup competition for power. (For details read Ian Smart, 
'Future Political Patterns in the Middle East', The World 
Today, July 1976, Vol.32, No.7, pp.243-250.)
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This has caused apprehension among most of the Persian
Gulf Sheikdoms, including the fear of Soviet encirclement
and of U.S. vacillation in times of need.^^
The Iranian revolution has brought change thus affecting
the overall balance of forces in the Middle East, whereby
the position of 'moderates' has weakened. This might
have a strong impact on Saudi Arabia. First, with the
common bond of monarchy between Iran and Saudi Arabia
having been snapped, the chances of future rivalry may
increase."^2 Second, Iran no longer shares a common security
theme with the Saudis, having broken away from the West,
the bilateral dialogue may now be more direct and firm thus
increasing the possibility of friction. Third, Iran's
reversion to neutralism exposes Saudi Arabia's uncomfortable
isolation in the Persian Gulf and OPEC politics. This
exposure and pressure is further increased by the Iraqi-
10 3Syrian rapprochement since November 197 8, and by the 
failure of the Camp David formula to bring peace in the 
Middle East. There will be considerable incentive for Saudi 
Arabia not to isolate itself further by supporting Camp David 
or by increasing her production so as to freeze oil prices.
'Elsewhere on the Persian Gulf - More Fear and Suspicion', 
U.S. News and World Report, 2 April 1979. Also see the inter­
view of Khalifa bin Sulman al Khalifa, Prime Minister of 
Bahrain in ibid., p.29.
10 2 For example, see Paul E. Erdman, The Crash of '79, New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1976.
10 3 For the factors underlying the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement 
see Marvine Howe, 'Surrounded by Turmoil, Iraq is Shifting 
its posture', The New York Times, 7 January 1979 and 'Iraq 
and Syria: A New Axis for Unity', Time, 12 February 1979.
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The low profile military role now taken by Iran has,
perhaps, the most strategic significance for any one country
in the case of Oman. It was Oman which was Iran's closest
Arab ally before the revolution and the one most exposed
to local subversion. Iranians' decision not to continue
support for that government has underscored the effect of
104the regime change m  Tehran on Gulf security. Overlooking
the main shipping channel from the Musandam Peninsula,
Oman has few sources and fewer friends to secure her against 
either internal disorder or subversion instigated from 
across the border in the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yeman (PDRY), where a Soviet-Cuban presence has increased 
in recent years. ^  This withdrawal of the Iranian guarantee 
leaves few options for Oman. Britain is unwilling to 
increase her commitment, and Saudi Arabia cannot provide 
military assistance. However, to fill the void in Oman,
Egypt has offered,at considerable political risk, to act 
as an all-purpose policeman, in exchange for modern weapons, 
worth billions of dollars, from the United States. This 
offer, contingent on the achievement of a peace settlement 
with Israel, reflects Egypt's changed security perceptions,
104 It was estimated that about 2,000 Iranian soldiers had 
agreed to stay in Oman until the Sultan requests their 
departure. The withdrawal of the contingent was ordered 
by the new government in Iran following the Shah's downfall 
in January 1979.
10 5 For the Sultan of Oman's threat perceptions after the 
Iranian revolution read excerpts of his interview in Time,
4 June 19 79.
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and as an earnest Cairo has dispatched 200 troops to Oman
10 6to replace the contingent withdrawn by Iran.
The change in Iran may also have implications for
Iraq, its immediate neighbour and a
... principal potential military 
adversary or ... principal rival 
for political power in the G u l f . 1 0 7
The relations between the two governments have been
'correct, but on the cool side1 since the Algiers Agreement
which was signed on 6 March 1975. However, if the new
regime in Tehran saw itself as the protector of the Shia
population the most natural focus for its attention would
be Iraq, the plac.e of the sect!s most holy shrines. The
ruling Ba'ath Party belongs to the Sunni sect whereas the
majority of Iraqis are Shias. The discrimination against
them by the ruling elite has led to their greater radical-
ization as is seen from their increasing involvement with
10 8the Iraqi Communist Party. Neighbouring Turkey, whose
1 0 fi Chubin, op.cit., p.100.
107 .U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Revvew of
Recent Developments in the Middle East - Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee
on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Session,
8 June 19 77, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1977, p.104.
10 8 The Iraqi Communist Party is a strong opponent of the 
ruling Ba'ath Party. It is estimated that nearly 3,000 
Communists have been killed or executed in Iraq since 1963.
The latest reprisals against them were taken in May 1978 
when 39 alleged Communists were executed and 8 of them 
arrested by the ruling Ba'ath Party. (See Time, 12 February 
1979; and The New York Times, Weekly Review, 7 January 1979. 
Also see Thomas W. Lippman, 'Iraq Accuses Communists of 
Planning Coup d'Etat', International Herald Tribune,
9 April 1979.
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persistent economic woes and endemic political violence
has led to the imposition of martial law in many provinces,
109faces the potential for discord between rival factions. 
Similarly Pakistan, whose former popular Prime Minister 
was executed by the military government in April 1979/ is 
vulnerable to a Left-Right coalition able to exploit the 
gulf between rich and poor. If the central governments in 
Islamabad and Tehran weaken, this may induce the Baluchi 
populations straddling their border to co-ordinate their 
efforts for an independent Baluchistan. Likewise a 
weakening of the government in Tehran would further strengthen 
the separatist tendencies of the Kurd population. This 
revival of Kurdish nationalism in Iran could have profound 
effects in Iraq and Turkey, whose Kurdish populations number 
two and three million respectively. Also, the pro-Moscow 
regime in Afghanistan is coming under strong pressure from 
the rightist elements, who derive inspiration materially and 
morally from the Islamic fundamentalist governments in Iran 
and Pakistan.'*'"^
109 See John Torode, 'The coming crisis is of Turkish democracy', 
The Guardian, 10 June 1974; and Michael Getier, 'Turks 
Apprehensive about Nation's Future - Iranian Unrest is a
factor', International Herald Tribune , 6 February 1979.
110 For a comprehensive analysis of the Baluchistan problem 
see Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', Foreign 
Policy, No.32, Fall, 1978, pp.136-160.
 ^ ^ See 'Where War is Like "a Good Af fair" ',Time, 14 May 1979. 
Also see Hannah Negaran, 'The Afghan Coup of April 1978: 
Revolution and International Security', Orbis, Vol.23, No.l, 
Spring, 1979, pp.93-113; Hannah Negaran, 'Afghanistan: A 
Marxist Regime in a Muslim Society', Current History, Vol.76,
No.446, April 1979, pp.172-175; 'Moscow's Afghan Quagmire', 
Newsweek, 11 June 1979; and Robert Trumbull, 'Afghan Guerrillas 
Operating from Bases in Pakistan', International Herald 
Tribune, 17 April 1979.
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The immediate practical problems created for the
United States by a neutralist regime in Iran were clear:
to minimize the disruption in the relationship so as to
conserve access to oil, protect U.S. technological secrets
(e.g. in the avionics packages on the F-14s), protect its
citizens, and salvage as much as possible in the way of
bases, facilities and monitoring stations on Iranian
territory. Despite the estrangement in relations with the
U.S.A., Iran still needs to be dependent upon the West
in general and U.S.A. in particular because of the educational,
economic and military infrastructure having roots in the West.
It was with this background that the new Chief of Staff
after the revolution, General Qaraney, indicated that
hundreds of U.S. military advisers would be asked to return
so that Iran could once again start using even part of
its military equipment. He also admitted that Iran could
112not do without foreign advisers. Nevertheless, the with­
drawal of guaranteed access to Iranian air and naval 
facilities, on which much of American contingency planning 
for the Persian Gulf was based, means Washington has to 
revise her assumptions and probably search for substitutes. 
Besides this, the setback in Iran has challenged the United 
States' assumptions of the 'regional security' and the 
'twin-pillars' policy. More fundamentally, it raises 
questions about the precise meaning of security in areas 
undergoing rapid economic growth through ambitious industrial­
isation programmes. According to Robert McNamara of the 
World Bank,
International Herald Trzbune, 20 March 1979.1 1 2
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the nations of the world are spending 
over $400 billion [on weapons] a year - 
more than is spent on research for the 
production of fuel, health, education 
and food combined. 113
The failure of America in South Viet Nam and Iran underline
the fact that security is not possible through the acquisition
of weapons only.
The Iranian crisis has also dealt a severe blow to 
the issue of American influence and commitment to its allies. 
It was an Iran on the brink of civil unrest that the 
Carter Administration inherited and embraced as an ally, 
despite doubts about her human rights record. Yet as events 
unfolded in 19 78, the Administration's policies appeared 
half-hearted and contradictory.
There were errors of omission and commission; foremost 
among them was the failure to appreciate the gravity of 
the situation in time and devote systematic presidential 
attention to it. Washington's assessments were generally 
naive than those of other governments and independent 
observers and this failure in analysis narrowed its existing 
policy options. These options were further squandered by 
the style in which the Administration conducted its foreign
113 James Reston, 'Security means more than hardware',
The Age, 28 May 19 79. Also read Maxwell D. Taylor, 'The 
Exposed Flank of National Security', Orbis, Vol.XVIII,
No.4, Winter 1975, p p .1011-1022.
223
policy. Inconsistent statements, contradictory assessments
and a half-hearted approach had a negative effect on America's
. . . 114credibility as an ally.
This loss of will by U.S.A. for its allies in time
of need was particularly noted by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi
government not only faulted the U.S. for failure to help
the Shah in time to save his nation from revolutionary
chaos but also believed that America lacked the will to
stop Russian encroachment on the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
The Saudis have seen Soviet gains in Ethiopia, South Yemen
and Afghanistan as part of an overall Kremlin design to
encircle the Arabian Peninsula and topple its conservative
115regimes, and gain control over the West's oil lifelines.
A degree of confirmation of these fears came in late February, 
when South Yemen, a base for Soviet activities in the region 
invaded North Yemen, a close ally of Saudi Arabia.
114 For the fallacies of American perception about Iran 
and the vacillating policies followed during the last days 
of the Shah, see Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, 'The 
Iranian Domestic Crisis: Foreign Policy Making and Foreign 
Policy Goals of the United States', Journal of South Asian 
amd Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.3, Spring 1979, pp.36-56; 
also see Bill, op.cit., pp.338-340.
In this context also note Brzezinski telephoning the 
Shah on President Carter's behalf (in November 1978) and 
reportedly telling the Shah that whatever action he thought 
necessary to restore order would be supported by the U.S.
(See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'U.S. Policy on Iran:
Back to Fundamentals', Washington Post, 8 November 1979.
115 'Elsewhere on the Persian Gulf - More Fear and Suspicion', 
U.S. News and World Report, 2 April 1979. For a contrary 
view also see Peter Mansfield, 'Arabs and the Iranian 
revolution', The Listener, 22 March 1979.
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The U.S. government has, however, tried to allay
116these Saudi anxieties. On 25 February 1979, Energy
Secretary James R. Schlesinger and Defense Secretary
Harold Brown affirmed U.S. vital interests in the Persian
Gulf and the use of military force to protect these interests,
if threatened. The same theme was reiterated more
emphatically by President Carter in a televised news
117conference on 27 February 1979.
By mid-March, an American naval task force, made up
of the aircraft carrier CONSTELLATION, a guided missile
cruiser and three other combat ships, was on patrol in the 
118Gulf of Aden. Loud suggestions were also made by the
U.S. to permanently station an Indian Ocean task-force, 
based probably at Diego Garcia. This policy was explained 
as follows:
The carrier force is intended to 
warn the Soviet Union against nourishing 
South Yemen in its new war with Yemen, the 
naval presence to help fill the gap in 
American contingency planning left by the 
transformation of Iran, from a well-armed 
ally standing between the oil-rich states of 
Middle East and the Soviet Union and
116 A good reflection of Saudi Arabia's anxieties can be 
found in 'How Far Will U.S. Go to Protect Mideast Oil?' 
and Saudis 'No Longer Have Confidence in U.S.', U.S. News 
and World Report, 12 March 1979.
117 See 'Mixed Signals from Washington', ibid., pp.24-25.
118 'Saudi Arabia - How True a Friend', U.S. News and World 
Report, 2 April 1979.
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Afghanistan, into an Islamic Republic 
unfriendly to the United States and 
hostile to I s r a e l . 119
By mid-19 78, Saudi Arabia was the third largest
purchaser of American armaments after Iran and Israel and
its request to buy 60 F-15s, the world's most advanced
120fighter plane, had finally been proved. These planes
are scheduled to be delivered in 1981 under a $2.5 billion 
deal that was concluded in 197 8. Other contracts approved 
last year include $460 million for building aviation 
facilities, $272 million for a naval expansion programme,
$800 million to strengthen naval shore establishments and
121$200 million for Army logistics training and maintenance.
The U.S. military sales to Riyadh from 1975 through 1978
totalled $15.3 billion. Out of this, arms worth $5.1 billion
122have been delivered and paid for in cash.
Although the Saudis clearly favour a heightened American 
role along the Persian Gulf, they have failed to spell out 
publicly what they want the U.S. to do. They are reluctant 
about having American forces on their soil and want no part
119 Drew Middleton, 'Showing the flag isn't what it used 
to be', New York Times, Weekly Rdview, 11 March 1979, p.2lE.
120 'Focus on Saudi Arabia: Part One', International 
Herald Tribune, Supplement, 15 February 1978, p.45.
121 'Saudi Arabia - How True a Friend', U.S. News and World 
Report, 2 April 1979, pp.23-26.
ibid.122
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of any Washington-backed regional-security scheme. The
recent re-activation of U.S. Government plans drawn up
four year ago to dispatch a 110,000 man task force to
'go to any hotbed of tension in the oil-rich Persian Gulf1
is the latest attempt to reassure the Gulf governments
123of U.S. resolution of help in case of need.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it stands 
to gain from the revolt in Iran. Broadly speaking, the 
Soviet Union always liked to see the following developments 
in the Persian Gulf area: increased conflicts between 
the countries of the area and the Western world; an under­
mining of traditional pro-Western conservative regimes;
a complete removal of China's influence from the area;
124and an expansion of the area's ties with the U.S.S.R.
More specifically, in the case of Iran it wanted a diminishing
of the ties between Iran and the U.S.A., between Iran and
Western Europe, and between Iran and the PRC. It wanted
to see a reduced Iranian intervention in the region's
affairs; less Iranian accumulation of Western-made arms;
125and closer relations between Iran and the Soviet Union.
123 According to the new NATO Commander, General Bernard 
Rogers, the force would be based in the 82nd Airborne Division 
whose headquarters are located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
(The Australian, 4 July 1979.)
124 Aryeh Yodfat, 'The U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf Area', 
Australian Outlook, Vol.33, No.l, April 1979, p.60. For 
a good analysis of long term, intermediate and short term 
objectives of Soviet foreign policy in the Persian Gulf 
(1967-1976) also see A. Yodfat and Mordecai Abir, In the 
Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian 
Gulf, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1977.
ibid., p.64.I25
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Since the Shah was closely identified with the West, his 
removal was widely considered a direct set-back for his 
Western allies. It exposed the limits of their influence 
and undermined the credibility of their commitments. In 
addition, the upheaval in Iran was anti-Western in a deeper 
cultural-spiritual sense; as a protest movement against 
indiscriminate modernization it served as a warning to other 
Muslim nations.
The current political situation in Iran is unpredictable. 
For both the Soviet Union and the West the outcome is 
uncertain, and they both share a desire for some predictability 
or stability. Continued turmoil, economic dislocations 
and national disintegration pose problems for both blocs, 
interrupting the supply of oil to the West and gas for the 
East. But this shared interest, whether for access to 
resources or in the avoidance of super-power confrontation, 
does not go much further. The West's desire for a strong 
centre to ensure Iran's national unity and the maintenance 
of her territorial integrity contrasts with the Soviet
12preference for a weak central government with looser control.
Soviet support for the revolutionary opposition is, 
therefore, understandable. Despite the religious overtones 
which give the opposition a semblance of legitimacy, it 
lacks the attributes of a strong stable Islamic government.
At present the opposition has splintered into groups of 
varying degrees of radicalism and secularism which cannot
Chubin, op.cit., p.103.126
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guarantee a stable coalition and strong government able to
127challenge the Soviet Union. Iran will now be much weakened
in its relations with Moscow, more susceptible to pressures
and more tempted to accommodate her interests. The
one important exception is the price of gas supplied to
the southern provinces of the Soviet Union, which will be
12 8increased to the prevailing world price. The new
government is going to be more militantly nationalistic 
with regards to its natural resources and may, therefore, 
be reluctant to engage in the barter of Iran’s oil for 
East European goods like the previous regime.
127 For a survey of different political parties and groups 
challenging Khomeini's rule in Iran see 'Bubbling to the 
Surface', The Economist, 3 February 1979, pp.36-37; Kai 
Bird, 'Making Iran Safe for Theocracy', The Nation, 19 May 
1979; and The Australian, 1 June 1979. In the words of 
Professor Ann Lambton: 'Factional strife, in one form or other, 
has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times'. 
Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, 'Factionalism in Iran:
Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46)', Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol.14, No.l, January 1978, pp.22-55.
12 8 Chubin, op.cit., p.103. The export of Iranian gas 
to the Soviet Union started in 1970 and is due to expand 
with the completion of a second pipeline in 1981. By this 
practical, if uncomplicated, arrangement both Iran and 
the Soviet Union gain hard currency. The price Iran has 
charged for gas delivered for Soviet consumption has 
nonetheless been below world market price. This reflects 
not merely the Shah's acknowledgement of a political 
relationship, but the hard commercial fact that the Soviets 
are the only likely buyer of natural gas from Iran.
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Conclusion
To conclude it can be said that the Iranian Revolution 
of 197 8/79 has demonstrated the Shah's gross misperceptions 
of security threats to Iran. While he assumed the foreign 
military threat as the sole danger to Iran, it was the 
internal threat of his own people (the religious class, 
the middle class, the resistance groups, students and 
workers) which challenged him and his regime directly.
Thus his armed forces, trained and armed to counter external 
threats and project Iran's regional power across the borders, 
were called to suppress the demonstrations in the streets.
The troops, generally, remained loyal to him but could 
not hold out for long in face of the popular upsurge of 
the masses. They were handicapped by a lack of co-ordination 
at the higher levels, the desertion of conscripts, pdftiti- 
cisation at the junior levels and the general inability 
to perform a task for which they were not trained. The 
new regime assumed power after destroying the two strong 
institutions of the monarchy and the armed forces. However, 
the new regime had again to rely on the armed forces to 
suppress dissident forces and assert its legitimate 
authority. There have been some fundamental shifts in 
the foreign policy posture of the new government in Iran. 
Among other changes, the concept of 'security' has been 
redefined. Iran has now renounced the claim of acting 
as a guardian of the Persian Gulf region; adopted a 
non-aligned foreign policy position quite unsympathetic 
to the West, particularly the U.S.A.; severed its diplomatic
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and economic links with Israel and South Africa; aligned 
itself more with the Arab-Israeli settlement in the 
Middle East through recognition of PLO and adoption of a 
militantly national policy over its oil production and 
conservation.
After reversal of American influence in Iran, the 
Persian Gulf may attract a larger and more visible Western 
presence. This may include, in addition to arms sales to 
friendly regional states (the Yemen Arab Republic, Egypt 
and Turkey) new military bases and more frequent naval 
deployments by the U.S.A. Diego Garcia might be expanded 
to facilitate access and airlift into the area, or Oman's 
Masirah island further developed. But the increased 
involvement may not be given a purely military dimension 
as was shown in the case of Iran.
The generally inward orientation of Iran's policy 
(due to internal problems) and the contraction of its 
regional responsibilities are likely to have wide-ranging 
repercussions in the Middle East. Besides creating something 
of a power vacuum in its own area, it may alter the balance 
of power in the Persian Gulf and the overall strategic 
balance. However, future increased pressures from the 
Soviet Union and Iraq, the economic imperatives of co­
operation with the West and a possible emergence of moderate 
regime in Iran may lead to a new pragmatic shift in its 
foreign policy.
CONCLUSIONS
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The Shah's heavy and hectic military buildup programme 
was motivated by a combination of varied factors. Amongst 
these were Britain's announcement of military withdrawal 
from the Persian Gulf in January 1968 followed by the actual 
pull-out in December 1971 thus creating a vacuum; the 
decision taken by President Nixon in May 1972 to sell Iran 
virtually any conventional weapons it wanted; the Shah's 
desire to buy top-of-the-line military equipment from 
ready cash available as a result of the quadrupling of oil 
prices after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; the threat perceived 
to the safe passage of Iranian oil in the Persian Gulf 
through the Straits of Hormuz to the Sea of Oman and the 
north west quadrant of the Indian Ocean; the rise of 
separatist movements in Pakistani Baluchistan and Oman; 
the fear of military intervention from the north (by the 
Soviet Union) and the west (Iraq); and the thrusting 
political, strategic and commercial interests of the West, 
particularly the U.S. in providing armaments to Iran.
Most importantly, it seemed that the Shah's arms 
acquisition programme was primarily designed to preserve 
his regime and his nation and only secondarily to promote 
a 'Pax Americana' in the Persian Gulf. By linking the 
obscure and the obvious threats, the Shah perceived 
dangers from all directions. The weapons he had purchased, 
the way he organized the military and the police, and the 
experience that the Iranian military gained in armed combat 
all pointed to the high priority he assigned to the . security 
of the monarchy.
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While the issue of regime security was foremost in 
Iranian defence planning, the Shah's priorities reflected 
threat perceptions more appropriate to the past than the 
present. Historically, the Shah's problems had stemmed 
from separatist movements and armed tribal rebellions, 
from questions of loyalty inside the military, and from an 
inability to control Iranian territory in terms of 
communications and transport.
Thus by 19 78 Iran's weapons inventory included a 
wide array of sophisticated weapon systems. While the 
other Gulf states (except Iraq) were planning to develop 
military responses limited to specific scenarios, Iran had 
been aggressive in purchasing equipment suitable for 
diversified and multifaceted military responses. In the 
style of the U.S. and the Israeli armies, Iran was keen on 
establishing a potent offensive capability to project its 
military strength beyond its borders.
Thus Iran's security doctrine was different from those 
of its Arab neighbours. In the last eight years, the 
Iranian Air Force had acquired a marked capability for air- 
superiority, interception and close air support. Armed 
with different kinds of missile systems, the Air Force 
was acquiring the equipment necessary to control the 
regional air space and to move large quantities of men and 
material rapidly by air.
The Iranian Army was developing a heavily mechanised 
and primarily air mobile force designed to have the capacity 
for projecting itself rapidly and efficiently in the direction
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of any conflict which might arise within Iran's growing 
security perimeter. For example, by undertaking a military 
commitment in Dhofar province of Oman the Shah was providing 
valuable operational training for an army heretofore 
untested in combat, logistics, and local maintenance and 
support - all crucial factors in the establishment of a 
potent offensive capability. Also, Iran's massive import 
of heavy and light tanks,armoured personnel carriers in 
combination with a large number of helicopters provided the 
army's equipment base for an effective offensive 
capability.
The Iranian Navy, which was also procuring the variety 
of equipment necessary for the maintenance of several 
missions, had already established a capability to patrol 
the shallow Gulf waters and to project Iranian military 
forces ontotheArab side of the Gulf. The acquisition of 
larger surface vessels, such as U.S. 'Spruance' class 
destroyers, was intended to give the Iranian Navy a growing 
equipment base from which to contemplate a 'blue water' 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The acquisition of 
P-3C maritime patrol aircraft complemented Iran's growing 
surface vessel presence in the Gulf of Oman-Indian Ocean 
area by adding a capability for maritime reconnaissance. 
Furthermore, the purchase of fast patrol boats armed with 
the latest types of naval SSMs provided Iran with the 
equipment necessary for vigorous coastal protection and 
Gulf surveillance.
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Thus Iran's security doctrine underwent the most 
extensive transformation of all the Gulf states since 1970. 
The Shah felt Iran's responsibilities to include protection 
of the oil lanes and the Gulf; intervention on behalf of 
the conservative Arab states across the Gulf if threatened 
with internal or external overthrow; a vigilant stance 
against Iraq, cooperation with Pakistan to contain secession­
ist sympathies along their joint border; and the extension 
of Iran's military power into the Indian Ocean.
However, the Iranian armed forces faced problems 
i.e. lack of a sound infrastructure (communication facilities 
like roads, ports and railways); trained technical 
personnel; maintenance facilities and an efficient 
administrative cadre. The large quantity of arms bought 
within a short span of time led to slippages in nearly 
all major programmes. These slippages resulted from short­
falls in training, construction, maintenance and logistical 
support. In this case the Iranian Airforce, to which the 
Shah gave personal priority, faced comparatively lesser 
problems than the other services in attracting qualified 
recruits and retaining talented and imaginative personnel. 
However, there was a general shortage of trained pilots 
and trainable candidates, shortages of instructor pilots, 
a dearth of ground crews and maintenance personnel, and 
acute difficulties for the logistics system in locating 
and providing spare parts to individual units.
It can be deduced from the airforce experience 
that the strains of expansion and modernization were more
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seriously felt by other services e.g. army and navy which 
did not receive so close an attention by the Shah. For 
example, the helicopter, self-propelled howitzer and tank 
programme (in the army); and naval training and electronics 
programme (in the navy) faced serious problems of absorption 
and maintenance.
The Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 has brought into 
focus certain important issues. Firstly, the question of 
'national security' has been seriously challenged. While 
the Shah was feverishly arming Iran in face of perceived 
external threats, it was his own people who revolted, 
fought against the armed forces and ultimately brought down 
the monarchy.^ Secondly, Iran was a classic case of the 
militarization of a developing nation going beyond its 
security needs. It also demonstrated that military moderni­
zation, if carried out in isolation of the society as a whole
For details of the Shah's corrupt, repressive and inept 
economic policies which led to the mass upsurge see Amin Saikal, 
The Emergence of a State from Dependence to Regional Power:
The Case of Iran3 1953-1979 (Unpublished Ph.D thesis), Canberra: 
Australian National University, July 1979. Also see Robert 
Graham, The Illusion of Power, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1978; Predrag Antic, 'Iran's Drama and the Great Powers',
Review of International Affairs3 Belgrade, Vol.XXVIII, No.18,
5 December 1978, pp.26-28; James A. Bill, 'Iran and the 
Crisis of '78', Foreign Affa irs3 Vol.57, No.2, Winter 1978/79, 
pp.323-342; Theodore H. Moran, 'Iranian Defense Expenditures 
and the Social Crisis', International S e c u r i t y , Vol.3, No.3, 
Winter 1978/79, pp.178-192; George Lenczowski, 'The Arc 
of Crisis: Its Central Sector', Foreign Affairs3 Vol.57,
No.4, Spring 1979, pp.796-820; Shahram Chubin, 'Local 
Soil, Foreign Plants', Foreign Policy, No.34, Spring 1979, 
pp.20-23; and Nikki Keddie, 'Iran: Is "Modernization" 
the Message?' Middle East Review, Vol.XI, No.3, Spring 1979, 
pp.55-56.
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may lead to harmful consequences. And where the growth 
of imported arms continues on an exponential course, a 
developing country will outstrip its ability to overcome 
economic, political and social handicaps. In their pursuit 
for more armaments, civilian aristocracies and military 
elites will find themselves more isolated from the people 
who prefer bread to weapons. Lacking democratic 
institutions and processes of advice and consent, many 
leaders of the developing nations are convinced, short­
sightedly, that it is to their advantage to suppress by 
force any popular movement for reform. The recent experience 
in Iran proved that even the most modern army cannot depend 
on arms alone to defend itself against a popular movement. 
Thirdly, no armed forces can retain popular support for a 
long period on borrowed concepts of security. The Shah 
and his military policies came to be closely identified 
with the strategic and political interests of the U.S. 
in the Persian Gulf. In fact his elaborate armament 
acquisition programme to meet declared security threats 
to Iran had little meaning for the common man.
The new Islamic Government assumed power in Iran after 
destroying the two strong pillars of the Shah's regime: 
the armed forces and the monarchy. The new government 
has given up the military role of acting as the guardian 
of the Persian Gulf. It has dropped its membership of CENTO 
and has made drastic cuts in future arms purchase 
programme. With its contracted regional responsibilities, 
its definition of security has narrowed to coincide with a
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more realistic appraisal of national security. Due to the 
weakness of the army (as a result of 1978/79 Revolution), 
the rising unrest of minorities and the estrangement from 
the U.S., Iran's foreign policy has become non-aligned, 
yet militantly nationalistic on issues like oil prices 
and conservation of resources. However, this posture may 
change significantly as a result of the economic realities 
which the new government may be called upon to face in the 
near future.
The Iranian Revolution is also bound to have wide- 
ranging implications for the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East region. In the light of the recent Iranian experience 
most of these states would have to reassess afresh their 
concept of security and review with increasing scepticism 
their heavy arms buildup programmes.
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APPENDIX 1
IRAN
Population: 36,365,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 413,000.
Estimated GNP 1977: $72.6 bn.
Defence expenditure 1978-79: 700.4 bn rials ($9.94 bn).
$1 = 70.45 rials (1978), 71.2 rials (1977)
Army: 2 85,000.
3 armd divs.
3 inf divs.
4 indep bdes (larmd, 1 inf, 1 AB, 1 special force).
4 SAM bns with HAWK.
Army Aviation Command.
760 Chieftain, 400 M-47/-48, 460 M-60A1 med tks, 250 Scorpion 
It tks, Fox, Ferret scout cars, about 325 M-113, 500 
BTR-40/-50/-60/-152 APC; 710 guns/how, incl 75mm pack,
85mm, 330 105mm, 130mm, 155mm, 203mm towed, 440 M-109 
155mm, 38 M-107 175mm, 14 M-110 203mm SP, 72 BM-21 122mm 
RL; 106mm RCL; ENTAC, SS-11, SS-12 Dragon, TOW ATGW;
1,800 23mm, 35mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm towed, 100 ZSU-23-4, 
ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns, HAWK SAM, ac incl 40 Cessna 185,
6 Cessna 310, 10 Cessna 0-2, 2 F-27, 202 AH-IJ, 210 Bell 
214A, 21 Huskie, 88 AB-205A, 70 AB-206, 30 CH-47C hel.
(1,297 Chieftain/Shir Iran med, 110 Scorpion It tks,
BMP MICV, ASU-85 SP ATK, 100 ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns, Rapier 
Improved HAWK, SA-7/-9 SAM, 163 Bell 214A, 350 Bell 214ST 
hel on order).
Deployment: Oman: 2 coys, 1 hel sqn (400) , Syria (UNDOF) :
385, Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 bn (524).
Reserves: 300,000.
Navy: 28,000.
3 destroyers (1 ex-British Battle-class with Seacat SAM,
2 ex-US Sumner-class with 1 hel, all with Standard SSM/SAM).
4 frigates with Mk 2 Seakiller SSM and Seacat SAM.
4 corvettes (ex-US patrol frigates).
7 large patrol craft.
5 Combattante-ll-class FPBG with Harpoon SSM
5 minesweepers (3 coastal, 2 inshore).
2 landing ships logistic.
2 landing craft utility.
2 log spt ships.
8 SRN-6 , 6 Wellington BH-7 hovercraft.
(3 Tang-class trg, 6 Type 209 submarines, 4 Spruance-class 
destroyers, 6 Lupo-class frigates, 7 FPBG with Harpoon 
SSM, 4 log spt ships on order).
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Naval Air:
1 MR sqn with 6 P-3F Orion.
1 ASW sqn with 12 SH-3D.
1 tpt sqn with 6 Shrike Commander, 4 F-27.
Hel incl 5 AB-205A, 7 AB-212, 6 RH-53D, 10 SH-3D.
3 Marine bns.
(39 P-3C MR. ac,15 SH-3D hel on order.)
Air Force: 100,000; 459 combat aircraft.
10 FB sqns with 32 F-4D, 177 F-4E.
10 FGA sqns with 12 F-5A, 140 F-5E.
3 fighter sqnswith 56 F-14A Tomcat.
1 recce sqn with 16 RF-4E.
1 tanker sqn with 13 Boeing 707-320L.
4 med tpt sqns with 64 C-130E/H, 6 Boeing 747.
4 It tpt sqns with 18 F-27, 4 F-28, 3 Aero Commander 690,
4 Falcon 20.
10 HH-43F, 6 AB-205, 84 AB-206A, 5AB-212, 39 Bell 214C SAR,
2 CH-47C, 16 Super Frelon, 2 S-61A hel.
Trainers include 9 T-33, 28 F-5F, 49 Bonanza F33A/C.
Phoenix, Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM, As 12, Maverick, Condor ASM
5 SAM sqns with Rapier and 25 Tigercat.
(5 RF-4E, 24 F-14, 160 F-16A/B fighters, 7 E-3A AWACS ac,
3 F-27 tpts, 4 Boeing 747 tpts, 50 CH-47 hel; Blindfire 
SAM radar on order.)
Para-Military Forces: 74,000 Gendarmerie with 0-2 It ac 
and hel; 32 patrol boats.
Source: The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: I.I.S.S 
p.37.
IRAQ
Population: 12,470,000.
Military Service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 212,000.
Estimated GNP 1977: $16.3 bn.
Defence expenditure 1977-78: 491.5 m dinars ($6.66 bn).
$1 = 0.290 dinars (1978), 0.296 dinars (1977).
Army : 180 ,000.
4 armd divs (each with 2 armd, 1 mech bde) .
2 mech divs.
4 inf divs.
1 indep armd bde.
1 Republican Guard mech bde.
1 indep inf bde.
1 special forces bde.
1, 700 T-54/-55/-62 , 100 T-34, AMX-30 med, 100 PT-76 It tks, 
120 BMP MICV; about 1,500 AFV, incl BTR-50/-60/-152, 
OT-62, VCR APC; 800 75mm, 85mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, 
guns/how; 90 SU-100, 40 ISU-122 SP guns, 120mm, 160mm mor 
BM-21 122mm RL; 26 FROG-7, 12 Scud B SSM,; Sagger, SS-11
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ATGW; 1,200 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm towed, ZSU-23-4, 
ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns SA-7 SAM (T-62 med tks, Scud SSM on 
order).
Reserves: 250,000.
Navy: 4,000.
3 SO—1 submarine chasers.
6 Osa-1, 8 Osa-II FPBG with Styx SSM.
10 P-6 torpedo boats.
2 large patrol craft (ex-Soviet Poluchat-class).
6 coastal patrol boats (under 100 tons).
5 minesweepers (2 ex-Soviet T-43, 3 inshore).
3 LCT (Polnocny-class).
Air Force: 28,000 (10,000 AD personnel); about 339 combat 
aircraft.
1 bbr sqn with 12 Tu-22.
1 It bbr sqn with 10 11-28.
12 FGA sqns: 4 with 80 MiG-23B, 3 with 60 SU-7B, 3 with 
30 SU-20, 2 with 20 Hunter FB59/FR10.
5 interceptor squns with 115 MiG-21.
1 COIN sqn with 12 Jet Provost T52.
2 tpt sqns with 10 An-2, 8 An-12, 8 An-24, 2 An-26, 2 Tu-124,
13 11-14, 2 Heron.
8 hel sqns with 35 Mi-4, 14 Mi-6 , 80 Mi-8, 47 Alouette III,
8 Super Frelon, 40 Gazelle, 3 Puma.
Trainers incl MiG-15/-21/-23U, Su-7U, Hunter T69, 10 Yak-11, 
12 L-29, 8 L-39.
AA-2 Atoll AAM, AS 11/12 ASM (R 550 Magic AAM, Exocet ASM 
on order).
SA-2, SA-3, and 25 SA-6 SAM.
(32 Mirage F-1C fighters, 4 Mirage F-1B trainers, 11-76 
tpts on order).
Para-Military Forces: 4,800 security troops, 75,000 People's 
Army.
Magister, Falcon ST 2, 20 SF-260, 17 Galeb.
4 hel sqns with 13 Alouette 11/111, 6 AB-47, 9 Super Frelon,
10 CH-47C.
AA-2 Atoll, R 550 Magic AAM.
3 SAM regts with 60 Crotale and 9 btys with 60 SA-2, SA-3,
and SA-6 SAM.
(32 Mirage F-1AD/ED fighters, 6 Mirage F-1BD, 150 SF-260 
trainers, 20 CH-47C, 1AS-61A hel on order.)
Source: The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: 1.1.S.S.), 
pp.37-38.
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APPENDIX 2
SAUDI ARABIA
Population: 7,730,000.
Military service: voluntary.
Total armed forces: 58, 500.
Estimated GNP 1977: $55.4 bn.
Defence expenditure 1978-79: 33.30 bn Saudi riyals ($9.63 bn). 
$1 = 3.46 riyals (1978), 3.54 riyals (1977).
Army: 45,000.
2 armd bdes.
4 inf bdes.
2 para bns.
1 Royal Guard bn.
3 arty bns.
6 AA arty btys.
10 SAM btys with HAWK.
250 AMX-30, 75 M-60 med tks; 200 AML-60/-90 armd, Ferret,
50 Fox scout cars; 300 AMX-10P MICV, M-113, Panhard M-3 
APC, 105mm pack how, 105mm and 155mm SP how, 75mm RCL,
TOW ATGW; M-42 40mm SP, AMX-30 SP AA guns, HAWK SAM.
(175 M-60 med tks, 50 Fox scout cars; 200 AMX-10P MICV,
Dragon ATGW, M-16 3 Vulcan 20mm SP AA guns Redeye, Shahine 
(Crotale), 6 btys Improved HAWK SAM on order).
Deployment:
Lebanon (Arab Peace-keeping Force): 700.
Navy: 1,500.
3 FPB (Jaguar-class).
1 large patrol craft (ex-US coastguard cutter).
4 coastal minesweepers.
2 utility landing craft.
(6 corvettes with Harpoon SSM, 4 FPBG, 4 gunboats, 4 landing 
craft on order).
Air Force: 12,000, 171 combat aircraft.
3 FB sqns with 60 F-5E.
2 COIN/trg sqns with 35 BAC-167.
1 interceptor sqn with 16 Lightning F53 2 T55.
3 OCU with 24 F-5F, 16F-5B, 16 Lightning F53, 2 T55.
2 tpt sqns with 35 C-130E/H.
2 hel sqns with 16 AB-206 and 24 AB-205.
Other ac incl 4 KC-130 tankers, 1 Boeing 707, 2 Falcon 20,
2 Jetstar tpts; 22 Alouette III, 1 AB-206, 1 Bell-212,
2 AS-61A hel.
Trainers incl 12 T-41A.
Red Top, Firestreak, Sidewinder R 5 30, R 550 Magic AAM; 
Maverick ASM.
(45 F-15 fighters, 15 TF-15 trainers, 1 Boeing 747, 4KC-130H 
tpt ac; 6 KV-107 hel on order).
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Para-Military Forces: 35,000 National Guard in 20 regular 
and semi-regular bns with 150 V-150 Commando APC, 6,500 
Frontier Force and Coastguard with 50 small patrol boats 
and 8 SRN-6 hovercraft.
Source: The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: I.I.S.S.) 
pp.41-42.
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